1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 June 7th, 2006 25

2
  1                        Appearances
  2  Derry Millar      )             Commission Counsel
  3  Susan Vella        )
  4  Donald Worme, Q. C )    (np)
  5  Katherine Hensel  )    (np)
  6  Megan Ferrier     )
  7  
  8  Murray Klippenstein )   (np)     The Estate of Dudley 
  9  Vilko Zbogar       )   (np)     George and George
 10  Andrew Orkin       )   (np)     Family Group
 11  Basil Alexander    )
 12  
 13  Peter Rosenthal  )              Aazhoodena and George
 14  Jackie Esmonde   )              Family Group
 15  Amanda Rogers    )     (np)     Student-at-law
 16  
 17  Anthony Ross     )     (np)     Residents of
 18  Cameron Neil     )     (np)     Aazhoodena (Army Camp)
 19  Kevin Scullion   )
 20  
 21  William Henderson )     (np)     Kettle Point & Stony
 22  Jonathon George  )              Point First Nation
 23  Colleen Johnson  )     (np)
 24  
 25

3
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  Kim Twohig       )     (np)     Government of Ontario
  3  Walter Myrka     )     (np)
  4  Susan Freeborn   )     (np)
  5  
  6  Sheri Hebdon     )              Student-at-law
  7  
  8  Janet Clermont   )              Municipality of 
  9  David Nash       )     (np)     Lambton Shores
 10  Nora Simpson     )     (np)     Student-at-law
 11  
 12  Peter Downard    )     (np)     The Honourable Michael
 13  Bill Hourigan    )     (np)     Harris
 14  Jennifer McAleer  )
 15   
 16  Ian Smith        )     (np)     Robert Runciman
 17  Alice Mrozek     )     (np)
 18  
 19  Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.)
                               (np)   Charles Harnick
 20  Jacqueline Horvat )      (np)
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

4
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd) 
  2  Douglas Sulman, Q.C. )           Marcel Beaubien
  3  Mary Jane Moynahan)     (np)
  4  Dave Jacklin     )     (np)
  5  Trevor Hinnegan  )     (np)
  6  
  7  Mark Sandler       )            Ontario Provincial 
  8  Andrea Tuck-Jackson )            Ontario Provincial Police
  9  Leslie Kaufman     )   (np)
 10  
 11  Ian Roland       )     (np)     Ontario Provincial 
 12  Karen Jones      )              Police Association &
 13  Debra Newell     )              K. Deane
 14  Ian McGilp       )     (np)
 15  Annie Leeks      )     (np)
 16  Jennifer Gleitman )     (np)
 17  Robyn Trask      )     (np)
 18  Caroline Swerdlyk )
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

5
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd) 
  2  Julian Falconer  )     (np)     Aboriginal Legal
  3  Brian Eyolfson   )     (np)     Services of Toronto
  4  Kimberly Murray   )     (np)
  5  Julian Roy       )
  6  Clem Nabigon     )     (np)
  7  Linda Chen       )     (np)
  8  Chris Darnay     )     (np)
  9  Sunil Mathai     )     (np)
 10  Adriel Weaver     )     (np)     Student-at-Law
 11  
 12  Al J.C. O'Marra  )     (np)     Office of the Chief
 13  Robert Ash, Q.C. )      (np)     Coroner
 14  William Horton   )     (np)     Chiefs of Ontario
 15  Matthew Horner   )     (np)
 16  Kathleen Lickers )     (np)
 17  
 18  Mark Fredrick    )     (np)     Christopher Hodgson
 19  Craig Mills      )     (np)
 20  Megan Mackey     )     (np)
 21  Peter Lauwers    )     (np)
 22  Erin Tully       )     (np)
 23  Michelle Fernando )
 24  Maanit Zemel     )     (np)
 25  Patrick Greco    )     (np)

6
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  
  3  David Roebuck    )     (np)     Debbie Hutton
  4  Anna Perschy     )     (np)
  5  Melissa Panjer   )
  6  Adam Goodman     )     (np)
  7  
  8  
  9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 8 4 5 DONALD WILLIAM BELL, Resumed 6 Continued Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 12 7 Cross-Examination by Ms. Karen Jones 227 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Douglas Sulman 249 9 Cross-Examination by Ms. Melissa Panjer 256 10 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 266 11 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jackie Esmonde 304 12 13 14 Certificate of Transcript 336 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1647 Document Number 2004351. Intelligence 4 Report, Project Maple, September 06, 5 1995. 31 6 P-1648 Document Number 2004352. OPP 7 Intelligence Report, September 06, 1995. 33 8 P-1649 Document Number 2004349. Surveillance 9 Photographs, September 05, 1995. 52 10 P-1650 Document Number 2004347. ERT Ipperwash 11 Patrol Logs, Vehicle/Suspect Checks, 12 September 05, 1995. 56 13 P-1651 Document Number 2004357. Surveillance 14 Photographs, September 06, 1995. 62 15 P-1652 Document Number 1002419. OPP scribe notes 16 from September 09 to September 24, 1995. 158 17 P-1653 Document Numbers 2004366, 2004367, 2004368, 18 2004370, 2004372, 2004373, 2004374, 2004383, 19 2004385, 2004386, 2004388, 2004389 and 20 2004391. Intelligence Reports and Tip and 21 Information sheet, September 07, 1995. 164 22 P-1654 Document number 2004564. Intelligence 23 Section, Briefing notes of Det/Sgt Don 24 Bell, September 12, 1995. 171 25

1 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1655 Document Number 2004579. Intelligence 4 Section. Briefing Notes of Det/Sgt Don 5 W. Bell, September 13, 1995. 171 6 P-1656 Document Number 2004590. Intelligence 7 Section, Briefing notes of Det/Sgt Don 8 Bell and Det/Cst. Whitehead, September 14, 9 1995. 172 10 P-1657 Document Number 2004597. Intelligence 11 Section, Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. D.W. 12 Bell, September 15, 1995. 172 13 P-1658 Document Number 2004607. Intelligence 14 Section. Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. D.W. 15 Bell, September 16, 1995. 172 16 P-1659 Document Number 2004628. Intelligence 17 Section, Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. D.W. 18 Bell, September 18, 1995. 172 19 P-1660 Document Number 2004636. Intelligence 20 Section. Briefing Notes of Det/Sgt D.W. 21 Bell, September 19, 1995 172 22 P-1661 Document Number 2004646. Intelligence 23 Section. Briefing notes of Det/Sgt D.W. 24 Bell, September 20, 1995. 173 25

1 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1662 Document Number 2002372. Memo to All 4 Personnel from J. E. Hutchinson, re. 5 Project Maple Reporting Procedures, 6 September 12, 1995. 175 7 P-1663 Document Number 2004786. Final Report 8 for Project Maple from Det/Sgt D.W. Bell 9 to Det/Sgt Armstrong, January 08, 1996. 178 10 P-1664 Document Number 2004788. Memo from 11 Douglas W. Scott to Deputy Commissioner 12 Boose re. Intelligence Report, Occupation 13 of Ipperwash Provincial Park, January 23, 14 1996. 184 15 P-1665 Document Number 2004798. Letter from Don 16 Bell to Inspector Carson Re: Project Maple 17 Debriefing Points for Discussion, January 18 31, 1996. 191 19 P-1666 Document Number 2003328. Letter from 20 Det/Sgt D.W. Bell to Inspector G.C. 21 Connolley, May 22, 1997. 198 22 P-1667 Document Number 2000903. Project 23 Bluewater, 2nd Edition, 1997. 210 24 P-1668: Document Number 2004078. Will State of 25 Det/Sgt. D.W. Bell (undated). 214

1 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1669 Document Number 2003328. Statement of 4 D.W. Bell (undated). 215 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning. 8 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Good morning. 9 10 DONALD WILLIAM BELL, Resumes 11 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 CONTINUED EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 18 Q: Good morning. 19 A: Good morning. 20 Q: Yesterday we were -- we left off 21 during our discussion of what occurred on September the 22 1st, 1995, and particularly the operational plan meeting 23 and the Project Maple written plan. And I have a few 24 more questions concerning that before we move on to the 25 other events of that day.

1 Now, under the Project Maple plan as you 2 understood it, were you a decision maker in your 3 intelligence role? In other -- 4 A: In my -- as a -- the Project Maple 5 Operational Plan had me in a reporting relationship to 6 Trevor Richardson so ultimately I was reporting to 7 Trevor. However, I would say I had a decision making 8 role with regards to the officers that were working with 9 me in the collection phase of the -- collecting the 10 biographical profiles. 11 Q: All right. So in the collection of 12 data phase. Fair enough. 13 And in terms of your own responsibility 14 were you essentially -- did you do what you were told to 15 do, if you will, or tasked to do by your superior? 16 A: Certainly. 17 Q: And from whom did you receive the 18 majority of your directions in relation to how you should 19 and what -- what you should do in discharging your role? 20 A: Well, certainly once we established 21 the intelligence function which in the meeting of 22 September the 1st the -- we were broken off into our 23 groups we established what the functions of intelligence 24 were. 25 Once I had established what the functions

1 were and reported up into the Incident Commander and the 2 plan was formulated I took responsibility to ensure that 3 the -- tasks that were under our area were completed. 4 Q: Fair enough. But who provided you 5 with your tasks on an ongoing basis between the 1st and 6 the 6th of 1995? 7 A: During that timeframe basically we 8 were collecting the information for the -- for the 9 biographical profiles, so there weren't really any tasks, 10 per se. When I came in the morning, I believe, of the 11 5th Trevor certainly briefed me on some of the things 12 that had happened during the day. 13 When I went out to the Park with Jim Dyke, 14 Trevor directed me in that -- in the manner. So it would 15 be Trevor that would direct me on those occasions. 16 Q: Okay. So if I'm understanding it 17 correctly then, basically your task -- your fundamental 18 task didn't change between September the 1st and the 6th 19 and that was to go out and collect data? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: Which you would then transmit to 22 Trevor Richardson? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And he would then transmit it, in 25 turn, to the Incident Commander or his alternate. All

1 right. 2 A: Having said that, there are 3 occasions, for instance when we returned from the Park, 4 where I'd pass that on to Mark Wright as -- he's second 5 I/C so there are occasions where there are other filters 6 or passages of information. 7 Q: And I think that's an important point 8 because there was no one (1) single conduit or filter of 9 the information. Essentially it was Inspector Carson at 10 the end of the day who, as you said, was the central 11 repository and he received all of the information from 12 various sources throughout the course of this operation? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: All right. Now, what was Inspector 15 Hutchinson's role under Project Maple? 16 A: Detective Inspector Hutchinson with 17 regards to Project Maple and specifically in the 18 intelligence role became more defined after the incident 19 on September 6th/ 7th. 20 Q: All right. 21 A: And at that time he became I think -- 22 I believe there's a -- if I could refer to a memo in the 23 package? 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 2 Q: Sorry, what document are you looking 3 for? 4 A: It's a letter of September the 12th, 5 I believe, where Detective Inspector Hutchinson outlines 6 the reporting relationship and his role in the 7 occupation. 8 Q: Tab 15. 9 A: Thank you. As I say, on Tab 15 a 10 memo to all personnel on Project Maple where Detective 11 Inspector Hutchinson outlines the reporting relationship 12 and -- 13 Q: All right. 14 A: -- in that if I -- should I read it? 15 Q: Actually, I think I prefer to review 16 that letter later, if you will. I'm interested right now 17 in, I understand that he was, at least, involved in the 18 Project Maple matter between the 1st and the 6th 19 September. 20 I understand that he wasn't actually 21 physically present and perhaps you can just tell us what 22 -- what, if you will, role he played with respect to 23 Project Maple from the 1st to the 6th September? 24 A: During that timeframe he attended 25 Gustafson Lake --

1 Q: Yes? 2 A: -- in British Columbia during the 3 incident at Hundred Mile House. 4 Q: All right. And did you receive or 5 did -- information from him that was relevant to your 6 role? 7 A: If I could refer to my notes? 8 Q: Certainly. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: You might look at page 32, the 13 September 5th note, unless there's something earlier that 14 -- that you're aware of? 15 A: That's correct. Page 32 at one 16 o'clock I'd received information from Detective Inspector 17 Hutchinson regarding -- 18 Q: That's 10:50; isn't it? 19 A: Oh, I see -- the one I'm looking at's 20 13:00, sorry. That's -- 10:50 that's Dave Hackenbrok. 21 Q: Oh right. Okay. Sorry. 22 A: 13:00, it's Detective Inspector 23 Hutchinson. And he had provided information on two (2) 24 individuals that he'd indicated could be beneficial in 25 the successful negotiation of a settlement.

1 Q: All right. And that's on page 33 of 2 your notes? 3 A: 33 and 34. 4 Q: Thank you. All right. Now, what was 5 your specific role as team leader of the Intelligence 6 Unit under Project Maple from September 1st to 6th? 7 A: My specific role is outlined in the 8 operational plan. 9 Q: All right. 10 A: The pri -- the primary role was to 11 collect the data for the -- identify those on the Base. 12 And if you could refresh my memory as to the Tab and plan 13 and I could -- 14 Q: It's Tab 5. It's the Project Maple 15 Plan, Exhibit P-424. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: And you maybe looking at page 8 which 20 is the intelligence function. 21 A: Yes. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: So the role was to identify as many

1 people as possible who are occupying the Base, to develop 2 biographical profiles on those identified, to attempt to 3 identify visitors attending the Base -- 4 Q: And just for my information when you 5 say, "attempt to identify visitors" these are not new 6 people to the occupation, but rather people who had a 7 relationship with people within the occupation and would 8 visit the premises from time to time? 9 A: Quite frankly, we liked -- we wanted 10 to know everybody that was coming and going. So I think 11 some people -- there was a possibility that some people 12 who weren't necessarily associated or may have been just 13 coming to provide support on a one (1) time basis. So -- 14 Q: Right -- 15 A: -- we had to be cognizant of 16 everybody coming and going. And then to collect, analyse 17 and disseminate all pertinent intelligence relating to 18 the occupation. 19 Q: All right. And that's what your role 20 was to be as foreseen by Project Maple? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And as you've indicated however, item 23 4, at least to the extent of analysis and dissemination, 24 wasn't necessarily something that you had any active 25 involvement in.

1 Q: Well item 4, the information that 2 came through the JFO members or the traditional 3 intelligence people I would like to, you know, clarify 4 that there was analysis done by the individual officers 5 as far as -- when we look at the intelligence cycle we 6 would collect it, we would evaluate it based on the 7 information. 8 If it was from a source we'd verify it and 9 look at whether the validity is there based on other 10 pieces of information. So there was analysis done, but 11 it wasn't by a traditional like -- an analyst at a 12 specific task. 13 Q: All right. I guess what I mean is 14 that not all raw data that came through to the attention 15 of Inspector Carson went through your -- your hands, if 16 you will, and the analysis and dissemination function in 17 that respect wasn't uniformly carried out, not by you at 18 least? 19 A: You're correct. 20 Q: All right. Thank you. Now, did you 21 continue to engage in any field work between September 22 the 1st and 4th prior to the occupation of the Park? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And with whom did you engage in that 25 work?

1 A: Initially Jim Dyke and -- 2 Q: All right. From the 1st to the 4th? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And what was the purpose of your 5 field work? 6 A: The first -- initially Jim and I were 7 updating the biographical binders. So we were attending 8 the area, collecting information, trying to establish if 9 there are any new people in the Park. And then going 10 back to the office and conducting the necessary data bank 11 checks to establish the profiles. 12 Q: All right. And were you specifically 13 tasked to do that by anyone? 14 A: No that was part of the function in 15 it trying to establish the identifies of the people that 16 were on the Base. So basically we were looking at rules 17 1 through 3 of our function. 18 Q: All right. Thank you. Now, 19 according to the Project Maple plan Jim Dyke was supposed 20 to be an analyst. 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: Designated as a -- as the analyst. 23 But, you've indicated that in fact he was essentially an 24 analyst in title only; is that fair? 25 A: That's correct.

1 Q: And is it fair to say that in reality 2 what transpired was that Inspector Carson discharged that 3 function ultimately, particularly with respect to 4 information that didn't come through you? 5 A: Yes, as I alluded to yesterday I had 6 referred Inspector Carson to be the central repository 7 and the one (1) that conducted the majority of the 8 analysis. However, I think in fairness to the 9 operational plan and Jim Dyke being assigned the analyst 10 function, as a result of the circumstances as how they 11 flowed out -- I'm not sure if Jim was given the 12 opportunity to see if in fact he could perform that role. 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: As you can see on September the 12th 15 everybody's functions changed. The operational plan from 16 an intelligence side changed in that -- and thus the memo 17 from Inspector Hutchison indicated the new flow of 18 information. 19 So because of Jim's expertise as a 20 criminal exper -- investigator I believe he was pulled 21 more into that role so he was never afforded the 22 opportunity. So we never actually got a chance to see if 23 he could have fulfilled the analytical component. 24 Q: That's fair and -- and I'm not being 25 critical of him. It's more a point of he didn't

23
  1  discharge that function in fact.
  2                 A:   That's correct.
  3                 Q:   All right.  And -- all right.  Now,
  4  what technical support and equipment did you have at your
  5  disposal to assist in discharging your intellectual --
  6  the intelligence function between September 1st and 6th,
  7  1995?
  8                 A:   As far as it was outlined in the
  9  plan?
 10                 Q:   We can start with the plan,
 11  certainly.
 12                 A:   Certainly.  The resources that were
 13  needed for Jim, as apparently he needed a laptop computer
 14  so we asked for a laptop.  To discharge our function with
 15  regards to the identity we had most of the equipment that
 16  we -- we required.  
 17                 Certainly the Base, the majority of the --
 18  it was quite clear to see who was coming and going.  Most
 19  of the individuals that we saw were in plain view. 
 20  Through the use of cameras, et cetera, we could take
 21  photos, binoculars and the like to determine identities
 22  and things of that nature.
 23                 So there wasn't really any sophisticated
 24  equipment required to conduct what we were tasked with
 25  doing.

1 Q: All right. Fair enough. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Now, over the course of the September 6 the 4th -- 1st to the 6th, did you have team meetings 7 with Mr. Dyke and -- Officers Dyke and Whitehead and 8 Richardson to coordinate your various information 9 gathering efforts? 10 A: No, team meetings weren't required to 11 do this. I certainly -- it was basically the initial 12 stages Jim and I were working together so the task was 13 quite clear what we had to do. So once we had 14 established the package it would be a matter of handing 15 it off. So to have a team meeting to say we're going to 16 go out and take pictures and grab their bios wouldn't be 17 really beneficial. 18 Q: All right. And just returning to the 19 Project Maple page -- Tab 5 Exhibit P-424, just to close 20 this part of the examination, when you look at the 21 coordinated investigation team organizational chart which 22 we looked at yesterday, first of all as you indicated 23 yesterday it's clear that -- to you that the intelligence 24 component was originally omitted from this chart? 25 A: Correct.

1 Q: And second, while under a traditional 2 model of intelligence all raw data would flow through the 3 Intelligence Unit to the Incident Commander. 4 Under Maple what happened was raw data 5 from the Intelligence Unit flowed through Officer 6 Richardson to the Incident Commander and at the same time 7 other sources of raw data would flow from other officers 8 outside the Intelligence Unit straight to Inspector 9 Carson or Acting Detective Sergeant Wright bypassing 10 Richardson and you? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And hence there was no single filter 13 for all raw data or intelligence and hence your 14 observation that Inspector Carson was in effect the 15 central repository? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: And in terms of the information from 18 the Intelligence Unit it was Trevor Richardson who had 19 the ultimate decision making authority over what went up 20 to the Incident Commander and when? 21 A: That's correct. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: And I think you indicated also that

1 in discharging your task of identification and working up 2 profiles you used local, first -- local police officers 3 to help you discharge that part of your function? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: All right. And that would be a 6 reasonable thing to rely on the local police officers to 7 assist you with that type of a task? 8 A: Certainly. 9 Q: Now, to whom were you to provide your 10 reports, if you will, recording the results and findings 11 of your unit between September 1st and 6th, 1995? 12 A: The primary report that we had was 13 the biographical binders that we're putting forward. 14 However, as time -- as things evolved there were 15 briefings that were conducted by Inspector Carson and/or 16 Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright -- 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: -- and information would flow 19 throughout -- excuse me, flow through those meetings. 20 And as time progressed we prepared executive summaries 21 that were hand -- or hard copy documents that were 22 provided up through the chain. 23 Q: All right. Now, the executive 24 summaries I'll get to in a second, but did you also have 25 reporting responsibilities to your general headquarters

1 for intelligence in Orillia? 2 A: Yes, Ma'am. What I would do, as you 3 can appreciate from my explanation yesterday as to 4 headquarters, JFOs and numerous partners, it was -- I 5 thought it was incumbent upon me to keep everybody 6 informed. 7 As such, I would generally make telephone 8 calls as to update and brief people as to the activities 9 of the day. I would call -- generally call the Detective 10 Staff Sergeant in headquarters responsible for that area. 11 I'd also pass information on to the JFO Unit Commander on 12 occasion to keep him informed as to what's going on; that 13 was generally done by phone. 14 Q: All right. Fair enough. And your -- 15 the -- the reports, if you will, that you provided to the 16 Incident Command, were they typically in writing or 17 verbal prior to the events of the evening of September 18 5th? 19 A: Prior to, they would generally be 20 verbal. 21 Q: All right. And in the normal course 22 would you provide written reports; would that be the -- 23 the preferred course? 24 A: It would all depend. Generally at an 25 operation -- traditional operation you prepare either a

1 monthly report or a bi-weekly report or a weekly report 2 depending on the circumstances and the necessity to have 3 the powers to be, for say -- know what's going on. 4 In this event things were transpiring 5 relatively quickly and relatively fluid. The best form 6 of communication, I believe, was verbal and that at the 7 time, as you can see later on in the operation, a 8 complete final report was submitted wrapping everything 9 up. 10 But due to the fluidity -- the fluid -- 11 how fluid the operation was, the best means of 12 communication was oral. 13 Q: All right. Did the rapidity of 14 events prevent you from putting your findings in -- in a 15 written form? 16 A: No, I'll be quite candid, at the time 17 information was coming in and -- and I was tasked with 18 going out in the field that time wouldn't permit to 19 prepare a written report. As such the verbal method was 20 used. 21 Q: All right. Perhaps we could go to 22 Tab 11 of your -- the Commission Counsel brief of 23 documents. This is Inquiry Document 20004351. This is 24 entitled, Intelligence Report. It looks like it was 25 prepared September 6th at 12:00 noon, I take it.

1 Do you recognize that? 2 A: Yes, I do. And I -- this information 3 would have been received on September 6th. This -- these 4 reports didn't come into play until after -- post the 5 incident -- the -- the shooting. 6 Q: Okay. All right. 7 A: So these reports were prepared, back- 8 dated in the event that they could be entered on the 9 White Rose database which also came into play. So the 10 information's from September 6th; the report would not 11 have been prepared on that date. 12 Q: All right. Thank you for clarifying 13 that. Do you know whose handwriting this is? 14 A: I can take a guess, but I wouldn't -- 15 I wouldn't have 100 percent... 16 Q: All right. In any event, just for 17 the record, it -- it indicates what the topic was, 18 Project Maple, the location, Ipperwash, the time and date 19 that the information was received. This -- a brief 20 handwritten summary of the information, the source of the 21 information, which in this case were two (2) officers -- 22 police officers, and the last line says "reliability" and 23 there's a check mark. 24 Does that mean then that it's trustworthy 25 information?

1 A: I would take it that it is. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: If I can assist? 4 Q: Yeah. 5 A: This document was prepared post as I 6 indicated. It was prepared by -- or created the template 7 by myself in order to have a standardized document that 8 we can have the officers provide us with information, 9 plus those that are involved in the intelligence capacity 10 to ensure that it was sourced and it had some sort of 11 reliability factor on it. 12 Q: And isn't it fair to say that having 13 intelligence reports, even if it's in this format, 14 handwriting, is going to enhance the likelihood that the 15 material is going to be properly and accurately -- the 16 information accurately transmitted to those who need to 17 know? 18 You have a record of it, you're not 19 relying on people's memories to recall what exactly was 20 said by whom? 21 A: That's correct. And as I said when 22 the operation changed and we got into this more 23 centralized intelligence that was the point to have 24 everything coming through one (1) person and have some 25 degree of reliability put on the information.

1 And as I said, it was hoped to eliminate 2 some of the filters. 3 Q: All right. 4 MS. SUSAN VELLA: So let's make this the 5 next Exhibit, please. 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-1647 Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1647: Document Number 2004351. 9 Intelligence Report, Project 10 Maple, September 06, 1995. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 13 Q: And then over at Tab 12 which is 14 Exhibit or not -- Inquiry Document 2004352, it appears 15 that this is a typed document perhaps generated by 16 computer and it's also entitled, Intelligence Report. 17 It's dated September 19, 1995. 18 Was this another change in the format of 19 communicating intelligence information subsequent to the 20 shooting? 21 A: What we did is, we wanted to have our 22 own databank, something that we would have search 23 capabilities. So we obtained a license and the software 24 for a package called White Rose -- 25 Q: Yes.

1 A: -- that had been utilized in another 2 investigation, another major case; it came highly 3 recommended. So the purpose of that was to generate our 4 databank and to have search capabilities. What we did, 5 the document that was on -- we just talked about on Tab 6 11, that would be the document that would be completed by 7 the intelligence officers. 8 It was also -- it was a source sheet would 9 also be referred to in some cases as a assignment 10 register. Because on occasion when information came in, 11 it required follow-up. We would utilize these to -- to 12 task individuals. 13 These documents were, in turn, turned over 14 to clerical, Dawn Pineo, and she would enter it on White 15 Rose. So as you on the document in Tab 11 there is a 16 number in the upper right-hand corner. 17 Q: Yes? 18 A: That number is 0002-95 and it says, 19 "WR-DP", that indicates that that report has been entered 20 on White Rose and that's the corresponding occurrence 21 number. There would be a corresponding hard copy 22 intelligence report for the printed out sheet on Tab 12. 23 So for every computer generated report 24 there is a corresponding hard copy intelligence report. 25 Q: All right. Let's make this the --

1 the document at Tab 12, the next Exhibit please. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1648, Your Honour 3 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 4 5 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1648: Document Number 2004352. OPP 6 Intelligence Report, 7 September 06, 1995. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 10 Q: And again this is another mechanism 11 that was put into place after the events of September the 12 6th which would enhance the ability, I would suggest of 13 the intelligence unit to process and analyse data as it 14 came in. 15 A: It would certainly be a tool to 16 assist us in processing. From an analytical standpoint 17 it would allow us to collect information easier and once 18 we collected it, it would put us in a better position to 19 analyse. 20 Q: Right. And to cope with rapidly 21 unfolding events? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: Thank you. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

1 Q: Now, under Project Maple as it 2 operated from September 1st to 6th, 1995 whose job was it 3 on the intelligence team to check facts? 4 A: To check facts? 5 Q: Verify them? 6 A: Certainly, in the intelligence office 7 at that time, it was myself, Darryl Whitehead, Jim Dyke 8 to a degree. The information, if it came in and was 9 received by a particular officer, it was incumbent upon 10 them to follow-up on it and ensure that the information 11 that they received was accurate. 12 Q: All right. Whose job was it to 13 determine to whom and -- and at what time intelligence 14 would be disseminated beyond, well, disseminated beyond 15 the Incident Commander? 16 A: Beyond the Incident Commander? 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: Like to Orillia Headquarters? 19 Q: Well, no, to for example information 20 given out to external parties. 21 A: The information that was coming 22 through, as ind -- I believe I indicated yesterday that 23 the Director of Intelligence has the authority to, as far 24 as the dissemination of information. So the information 25 that was being disseminated to the various partners was

1 all acceptable within the intelligence realm. So as 2 pertinent information came through or as time permitted 3 we would update our partners. 4 Q: All right. And what about with 5 respect to dissemination of information gathered outside 6 of the Intelligence Unit? 7 Whose job was it to -- to disseminate that 8 information? 9 A: Sorry, you're referring to 10 information that we would receive from the external 11 partners? 12 Q: No, I'm referring to information that 13 came from the other officers outside of your unit. 14 A: Oh, I -- for the intelligence that 15 was outside of my realm, being the regional people and 16 the like, Trevor was in charge of the overall 17 intelligence, so I would say that that information would 18 be his responsibility. 19 Q: All right. What were your marching 20 orders from Inspector Carson emanating from the September 21 1st meeting? 22 A: To carry out the tasks as outlined in 23 the operational plan, Project Maple. 24 Q: And did you form any impressions 25 based on this meeting and -- and your understanding of

1 Project Maple as to what degree of reliance Inspector 2 Carson intended to place on a formal classic intelligence 3 program within this policing operation? 4 A: It was my opinion that Detective 5 Inspector Carson had a -- a sound grasp of the occupation 6 and the community and basically a -- a feel of what was 7 going on. As I alluded to you yesterday I didn't think 8 there was anybody more prepared to deal with the 9 occupation as far as intelligence and information that 10 he'd received. 11 It was clear to me that he was going to 12 utilize intelligence for the role that we were 13 specifically assigned, to assist him in -- in particular 14 with the outsiders; the -- the people that he did not 15 know, that he did not have that information. But as far 16 as making operational decisions, especially tactical, I 17 believe that he was going to make that independent. 18 He would have that in his -- be part of 19 his memory bank, part of the information, part of the 20 data that he had available to him, but he wasn't going to 21 be making it based solely on that information. 22 Q: And indeed isn't it fair to say that 23 he wasn't -- that -- that there wasn't the classic 24 intelligence system put into place in Operation -- or in 25 Project Maple?

1 A: That it was not the classic? 2 Q: That's right. 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: All right. 5 A: But in have -- but in having said 6 that though, we spoke yesterday with regards to the fact 7 component and the intelligence component and there was a 8 great deal of facts that he had to work with. 9 Q: I appreciate that. Thank you. Now, 10 moving on then beyond this meeting on September the 1st, 11 and you may want to refer to your Project Maple notes at 12 Tab 8 Exhibit P-1641, I understand that you had a 13 conversation with Mike Keegan at about 11:25 in the 14 morning on September the 1st? 15 A: Did you say Tab 8? 16 Q: Tab 6 of your notes? 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: The Project Maple notes? 19 A: And the date again was...? 20 Q: We're on September the 1st. 21 A: Okay. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: Okay, yes, 11:25.

1 Q: I have a note that you had a 2 conversation with a Mike Keegan at 11:25? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Do you recall who was Mike Keegan? 5 A: Mike Keegan was an RCMP constable in 6 the London JFO and was one (1) of the officers that 7 handled the First Nations dossier file. 8 Q: And do you recall what the -- what 9 the purpose of this conversation was? 10 A: I'll have to refer to my notes 11 because I don't have any -- any inde -- any independent 12 recollection. 13 Q: All right. 14 Q: I note that I updated Keegan 15 reference information. There's a redacted reference: 16 "OPP activity. Advised that we're just 17 in the planning stages in the event of 18 a problem. 19 Keegan advised that he received a call 20 from a subject. Advises that DND is 21 reporting increased attendance at the 22 Base and there's more Michigan 23 vehicles." 24 Q: All right. And what did you take 25 from that?

1 A: Well, it was another piece of 2 information to assess. I think I alluded to yesterday 3 the fact that we had the Jewels there from Michigan and 4 that when we'd seen other plates from Michigan that there 5 were individuals there that may have violent tendencies; 6 may have ulterior motives. 7 So, again, that was a concern if, in fact, 8 that was happening. 9 Q: All right. And as you said, this was 10 important because while you were -- or while it was your 11 anticipation that Inspector Carson would be relying on 12 his familiarity with the -- the Stoney Point Group, the 13 environment, his long history in the area. 14 What you were learning and passing on was 15 that there was, in fact, an outside group of individuals 16 who were comprising at least a substantial part of the 17 leadership group and there -- and that this -- these -- 18 these were not within the, at least, Inspector Carson 19 wouldn't be familiar with -- with these individuals in 20 the same way? 21 A: Correct. He wouldn't be as familiar 22 with them in the same intimate fashion that he had known 23 the other occupiers. However, he would have had previous 24 knowledge that they were there with the exception of the 25 recent Michigan people.

1 Q: The fact that they are there but not 2 familiarity with -- not having any kind of relationship 3 with them in any way? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: Which would decrease his 6 effectiveness, if you will, in being able to analyse 7 information concerning them? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: All right. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: All right. Now, concentrating on 14 September 1st to the 4th of '95, before -- before we get 15 to the occupation of the Camp -- of the Park, were you 16 conducting undercover surveillance in the Park? 17 A: On the dates of? 18 Q: Between the 1st and the 4th? 19 A: Between the 1st and the 4th, 20 undercover surveillance? 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: I don't believe so. 23 Q: All right. What -- what were you 24 doing? 25 A: Between the 1st and the 4th,

1 recollection has it that Dyke and I were gathering 2 information for the profile binders. 3 Q: And so basically when you say 4 "gathering information" what does that mean? What were 5 you doing? 6 A: Well, attending the area; make -- 7 taking pictures; making visual -- taking visual 8 observations of people around CFB Ipperwash, and making 9 notations, and then going back to the office and running 10 CPIC and databank checks. 11 Q: Okay. And were you in uniform? 12 A: No. 13 Q: All right. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: All right. And as of September the 18 4th what -- had you identified -- let's put it this way, 19 what had you identified as -- as the most serious risk, 20 if you will, or threat posed by the people who were 21 occupying the Army Camp? 22 A: The fact that there was outside -- 23 that the Jewels had become involved in the decision 24 making process would be seen as the most serious threat. 25 Q: All right. Which made the actions

1 less predictable than they might have been before? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: All right. If you go to Tab 4 -- Tab 4 6 of the Commission Counsel brief. This is Exhibit P-426 5 and these are the scribe notes. And page 18, in 6 particular, which is the second document in on your tab? 7 This is scribe notes from September 4th, 8 1995 and there's an entry at -- 9 A: Excuse me. 10 Q: I'm sorry. 11 A: I'm having a little -- my allergies 12 are really bad today I'm having a little trouble hearing 13 so... 14 Q: Excuse me. I'll -- I'll speak 15 louder. If you go to Tab 6? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Exhibit P-426? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: These are the scribe notes and if you 20 would go to page 18 which is the second page in -- 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: -- and you'll see there's an entry at 23 7:11 a.m. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And essentially it appears that you

1 are contacted by Trevor Richardson? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And do you recall what the purpose of 4 this was? 5 A: Yes Trevor had contacted me to advise 6 that the Park had been occupied the evening before and 7 had requested that I attend Forest Detachment. 8 Q: All right. Did you? 9 A: Yes I did. 10 Q: All right. And -- okay. Were you 11 on- duty when the Park was, in fact, first occupied? 12 A: No. 13 Q: All right. What did you do next? 14 A: When Trevor advised me that the Park 15 had been occupied, I travelled to Forest Detachment; 16 enroute I mad a couple of phone calls to notify some 17 people of the events. I attended at Forest Detachment 18 and met with Trevor and was briefed as to what had 19 happened the night before. And I can describe what he 20 told me, if you wish. 21 Q: Okay. And I'm just noting that you 22 arrived at about 8:34 a.m. according to the scribe notes 23 at page 21? 24 A: Approximately. 25 Q: Approximately. And you were at 8:34

1 -- were you involved in the conversation involving Les 2 Kobayashi and Inspector Carson? 3 A: I don't believe so. 4 Q: All right. And so in any event you 5 arrived and you were briefed by Trevor Richardson? 6 A: Trevor, yes. 7 Q: And what were you told? 8 A: I was told that the Park was occupied 9 at 19:30 hours on the 4th of September, '95. That 10 approximately twenty-five (25) to forty (40), men, women 11 and children went onto the Park by about 20:20 -- sorry, 12 there was approximately twenty-five (25) to forty (40) 13 people on the Park by about 20:20 hours. 14 That the fence had been cut off of 15 Matheson Drive and it was unknown who had cut the fence. 16 At 21:25 hours Roderick George had damaged 17 a police vehicle by breaking the rear window with a stick 18 and indicated that there would be charges laid as a 19 result of that offence. 20 That in the afternoon Stewart George had 21 damaged a cruiser by opening another car door into it and 22 that there will be charges relating to that. 23 That David Abraham George had thrown a 24 flare at an Officer last night and that there would be a 25 charge relating to that.

1 And that at ten (10) minutes after 2 midnight on the 5th of September, the MNR and George 3 Speck attempted to serve a trespass notice on Burt 4 Manning, but he would not accept the notice and the 5 officers, as I said, retreated. 6 I later learned that it wasn't George 7 Speck that it was another Officer. 8 Q: All right. Fair enough. 9 A: Noted that there was a green Mercury 10 with a rebel flag on it. And that a rifle had been 11 observed in the rear of the trunk and, in fact, there was 12 apparently a butt of a rifle had been observed. 13 And that the Park had been taken by the 14 Natives for the point which they see as sacred land. 15 Q: All right. And you were reviewing, 16 or at least reading from your Maple notes from about page 17 30 and on? 18 A: Page -- yes, page 30 to halfway down 19 page 31. 20 Q: Thank you. All right. And did any 21 of this information surprise you or take you off guard in 22 any way, given what the intelligence work up you had 23 performed? 24 A: No, that was pretty much consistent 25 with what we were anticipating.

1 Q: All right. Fair enough. And then 2 did you attend at a broader briefing at 9:25 a.m., 3 reflected in the scribe notes at page 24? 4 A: It indicates in the scribe notes that 5 I'm at that briefing, but I do not -- I do not believe I 6 was at that briefing. 7 Q: All right. And is that because you 8 don't have any notes of that meeting? 9 A: I have no notes of that meeting, and 10 I was conducting other business by calling and notifying 11 and preparing to travel out of the Park. 12 Q: Fair enough. Now, did Trevor 13 Richardson task you with any immediate items that you 14 should -- as a result of the Park occupation and your 15 briefing with him? 16 A: We were going to -- assigned to go to 17 -- Jimmy Dyke and myself, to go to the Park and attempt 18 to ascertain the activity that was going on at the 19 present time. 20 Q: All right. And did you attend at the 21 Park, at least the Park area to conduct surveillance? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And was that at approximately 10:00 24 in the morning? 25

1 A: Yes, that's correct. 2 Q: All right. And who did you go with? 3 A: I went with Detective Constable Jim 4 Dyke. 5 Q: What were you looking for? 6 A: We were just -- our purpose was to go 7 out and see the activity that was going on at the Park at 8 that time to determine the number of individuals, men, 9 women, children, the general condition of the Park, just 10 general observations. 11 Q: And what -- what observations of note 12 did you make? 13 A: Referring to my notes again at Tab 6 14 page 31: 15 "At ten o'clock I attended Ipperwash 16 Park. Observed approximately seven (7) 17 people which I noted two (2) were 18 female, two (2) were children, and 19 three (3) were males. They seemed to 20 be -- or they were concentrating in the 21 shower or washroom area. There was a 22 campfire and drop sheets. Observed the 23 following vehicles: ATV [all terrain 24 vehicle], a black -- black flat 25 coloured Oldsmobile, a red flatbed

1 truck, a [excuse me] -- a brown and 2 cream GMC pickup truck, the OPP Who 3 vehicle. 4 The three (3) males were at the front 5 gate and one (1) of the male parties 6 was cutting down a tree." 7 And I note that Jim Dyke was taking -- 8 took photographs. 9 Q: He did take photographs? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. And the purpose of that 12 photographs would be to take them back and have those 13 individuals identified -- 14 A: That -- 15 Q: -- and added to your binder? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: All right. And I understand -- well, 18 if you go to -- back to Tab 6, the scribe notes, and at 19 10:42 a.m. which is page 30, did you -- let me ask you 20 this: Did you report back your findings to anyone? 21 A: Yes, I did. When I returned I 22 reported back my findings to both Inspector Carson, 23 Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright, as well as 24 Detective Sergeant Richardson. 25 Q: All right. And what of note did you

1 pass onto them? 2 A: I provided the exact account as I've 3 just related to you as to my observations at the Park. 4 Q: All right. And did you provide any 5 analysis or conclusion with respect to the observations 6 concerning the -- the nature of the occupation? 7 A: No. 8 Q: All right. And why wouldn't you do 9 that? 10 A: I think it was quite clear that we 11 had the First Nations people that occupied the Park in 12 the same manner that they had occupied CFB Ipperwash and 13 were just carrying on their day-to-day activities. 14 Q: Okay. And did you see anything that 15 caused you any concern with respect to a potential risk 16 to public safety based on your observations? 17 A: No. 18 Q: Now, according to your notes you then 19 called a Dave Hackenbrok or back, at 10:50 a.m.? 20 A: Yes, that's correct. 21 Q: And who was he? 22 A: Dave Hackenbrok was at General 23 Headquarters and I believe he was the First Nations -- 24 had the First Nations dossier under Pete Lollar. 25 Q: All right. What was the purpose of

1 your call to him? 2 A: I -- excuse me -- my purpose was to 3 update him on the events that had occurred in the last 4 twenty-four (24) hours, specifically the occupation of 5 the -- the Park. And I asked him to ensure that any 6 military inquiries came directly through Inspector 7 Carson. 8 Q: All right. Now, how did that come 9 up? 10 A: Our Headquarters people have a -- a 11 much broader networker than a lot of the field units. I 12 don't have an independent recollection but I would 13 believe that Dave would have indicated that he would be 14 talking to DND. 15 And having regard for previous errors in 16 the flow of communication from GHQ to this operation I 17 wanted to ensure that Dave was aware that all information 18 is to be processed through Inspector Carson. 19 Q: All right. So effectively if there 20 was any military intelligence of note that was to go 21 directly to Inspector Carson? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And therefore effectively bypass you? 24 A: Well, suffice it to say that I would 25 be aware of it because -- because of my relationship with

1 Hackenbrok. 2 Q: Okay. But in terms of the formal 3 structure? 4 A: Formal structure. What we wanted to 5 alleviate was any situations that occurred before where 6 information was flowing directly to the detachment 7 members, specifically the officers on the road. 8 Q: All right. And with respect to the 9 military intelligence piece wouldn't it make more sense 10 for that type of information to flow through you to 11 Inspector Carson? 12 A: Well, as I said, I would be aware of 13 the information. The big concern there in the -- the 14 significance of that notation is to ensure that we didn't 15 have another incident like we did with Peter Warren 16 previously. 17 Q: All right. Is it fair to say that as 18 a general proposition an incident commander should be 19 relying on his or her intelligence team to provide a 20 finished product in the form of raw data which has gone 21 through the intelligence cycle? 22 A: In the standardized operation that 23 would be the proper procedure. 24 Q: Now, in the late morning of September 25 5th were you essentially working on compiling the -- the

1 profile book that we looked at yesterday in the Forrest 2 Detachment? 3 A: I believe so. 4 Q: All right. And if you go to Tab 9 of 5 the Commission Counsel brief, this is Inquiry Document 6 20004349. It appears to be a series of photographs. I 7 apologize for the poor quality of our photocopies. But I 8 note that they are photographs and you'll see the 9 alternate pages there are -- what appears to be the 10 handwriting that was on the back of each photograph. 11 I'm just wondering is this the type of 12 thing that you were involved in compiling September 5th 13 and 6th? 14 A: Yes, that's correct. 15 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And the dates are 16 primarily, I believe, September the 5th for these ones. 17 I'd like to make this the next exhibit, please. 18 THE REGISTRAR: P-1649, Your Honour. 19 20 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1649: Document Number 2004349. 21 Surveillance Photographs, 22 September 05, 1995. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 25 Q: And I note the information recorded

1 basically records when the photograph was taken, who took 2 the photograph, a general description of what is in the 3 photograph. 4 And is there any -- any other relevant 5 information that was put on to these? 6 A: No, you've described it accurately. 7 Q: Thank you. Now, were you also 8 receiving information in furtherance of your 9 identification and profile task from police officers who 10 were at the checkpoints that were set up on September 5th 11 and 6th, 1995? 12 A: That's -- excuse me, that's correct. 13 Q: All right. And what did you 14 understand the purpose of these checkpoints to be? 15 A: The purpose of -- to determine who 16 was coming and going from the area. 17 Q: And is that the type of information 18 that you received from them? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: So basically just the identities of 21 the -- of the -- of who; the occupants of the car or just 22 the drivers? 23 A: You'd have the -- generally be 24 provided with the license plate of the vehicle and the 25 occupants.

1 Q: And how was that information 2 transmitted to you? 3 A: In hard copy and -- and in it, both 4 hard copy and verbal. 5 Q: All right. Did you have any input 6 into the -- into the -- the information gathering 7 function of the checkpoints? 8 A: No. 9 Q: All right. In your opinion, were the 10 checkpoints used to their maximum potential with respect 11 to assisting you in information gathering? 12 A: I believe so. The checkpoints were 13 staffed by uniform personnel, trained police officers 14 that had the ability to make the appropriate observations 15 and I believe the information they provide -- provided 16 was the best available that they had based on the stops 17 that they were making. 18 Q: Would -- would -- were any 19 directions, to your knowledge, given to the police 20 officers as to what they should be particularly paying 21 attention to in making their observations of the vehicle? 22 A: I believe during our briefings that 23 we indicated to the uniformed personnel the type of 24 information that would be of interest to us and basically 25 we were interested in -- in anything -- in anything and

1 everything they saw. 2 And certainly we were interested, as well, 3 if they saw any indication of firearms because we, as you 4 are aware, were receiving quite a bit of information and 5 to have officers provide us with a hands-on account of 6 that would be of significant importance. 7 Q: And in your view did the -- were the 8 police officers at the checkpoints given adequate 9 authority to -- to make proper observations about 10 whether, for example, there might be firearms in 11 vehicles? 12 A: Well, with regards to the term, 13 authority, I think your authorities come within the 14 various Provincial and Federal Statutes. So I think 15 given the circumstances they had to work in that the 16 information provided was adequate. 17 Q: All right. And if we go to Tab 8. 18 This is Inquiry Document 2004347. It's entitled, ERT 19 Ipperwash Patrol logs Vehicles/Suspect Checks. This one 20 is dated September 5, 1995. 21 Is this an example of the form of 22 information that you would receive from the checkpoints? 23 A: Yes. They would have a varying 24 degree of detail in the information but, this is an 25 example of what we would receive.

1 Q: And if you looked, in fact, there's a 2 number of reports that follow this Tab and these are all 3 typical examples is that fair? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: I'd like to make this next series of 6 document, under Inquiry 2004347, the next Exhibit? 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-1650 Your Honour. 8 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1650: Document Number 2004347. ERT 10 Ipperwash Patrol Logs, 11 Vehicle/Suspect Checks, 12 September 05, 1995. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 15 Q: Now, did you attend at a briefing at 16 18:15 on September the 5th at the command trailer -- 17 command post? 18 A: Excuse me, yes, I did. 19 Q: And do you recall what the purpose of 20 this meeting was? 21 A: It was an overall reporting -- a 22 briefing and reporting by the team leaders as to the 23 activities of the day. And we were also introduced to 24 Detective -- sorry, Inspector Linton as the Incident 25 Commander from 19:00 to 07:00.

1 Q: All right. And did you understand 2 this to be -- that Inspector Linton to be the alternate - 3 - he will be the night shift incident commander? 4 A: Yes I did. 5 Q: And this was your first introduction 6 to him? 7 A: Yes it was. 8 Q: All right. And do you recall what 9 of significance you reported to Inspector Linton at your 10 meeting with him? 11 A: I don't have a specific notation. I 12 don't know if it's in the scribe notes. 13 Q: I don't believe there's any -- I'm 14 thinking of -- you had a meeting with him in advance 15 didn't you of the briefing? 16 A: I don't -- I don't believe so. 17 Q: Okay. I'll see if I can help. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: I'm sorry, I don't have that 22 reference in our materials. 23 A: I don't believe I had any contact 24 with Inspector Linton prior to that briefing. 25 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And the unit

1 leaders, you were one (1) of the unit leaders? 2 A: Team leaders. 3 Q: Team leaders. And who were the 4 others? 5 A: I believe that's indicated in the 6 scribe notes. Traditionally it would be your ERT 7 leaders, Trevor, Mark, the logistics, everybody that was 8 outlined in the positions of authority, for lack of a 9 better term, in the operational plan, Project Maple. 10 Q: All right. Thank you. And what did 11 you do for the balance of your shift that evening after 12 this briefing -- after this briefing? 13 A: I continued with the profiling and 14 met with one of the local officers to assist in the 15 identification of the -- some of the photos. 16 Q: All right. And did you leave the 17 Forest Detachment at about 22:30? 18 A: Yes I did. 19 Q: And you arrived in London at about 20 23:30? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: All right. And did anything else of 23 significance occur over the balance of your shift from 24 September the 5th? 25 A: No.

1 Q: Fair to say that most of your time on 2 September the 5th, 1995 was allocated to identifying the 3 occupiers and visitors to the occupied areas and working 4 up profiles? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: Fair to say that this task could have 7 been done by officers with less formal intelligence 8 training and experience than you? 9 A: Possibly. 10 Q: Indeed that this type of work 11 routinely is done by criminal investigators like Mark Dew 12 isn't it? 13 A: It all -- profiling and binders of 14 that nature, in criminal investigations unless you're 15 doing a work-up on somebody you may not go into as much 16 detail as we were looking for. And suffice it to say we 17 were attempting to make some sort of analysis with 18 regards to verifying information and checking with the 19 validity. 20 In our role certainly from 1993 through 21 1995 we had gathered a significant amount of information; 22 a significant amount of information regarding possible 23 weapons in the area. 24 Q: Hmm hmm. 25 A: So it was incumbent upon us to

1 utilize the information that we gathered in the past to 2 provide some sort of analysis to see in fact what we were 3 really facing. Although we didn't have, as I alluded to 4 yesterday, the collection resources that I would have 5 like to have had to assist in analysis -- 6 Q: Hmm hmm. 7 A: -- at least we had some background 8 and some experience that we could put forward. 9 Q: All right. But to be clear what -- 10 what was the extent of your analysis? 11 A: Well, certainly when we were taking a 12 look at the individuals and we took a look at their 13 records and things of that nature, and tying them into 14 the overall occupation, and tying into the information 15 that we received with regards to associations from people 16 from outside the area, if we had an individual for 17 instance that had a record for weapons and we had 18 information that that individual may be meeting with 19 somebody from another area known to have weapons, we had 20 that knowledge that we could put an assessment on it. 21 Somebody that may -- that did not have 22 that, would overlook that and that would be something 23 that would be considered to be a flaw in the process. 24 Q: Right, which is why -- which is why 25 you identified as a difficulty yesterday the fact that

1 not -- not all the information that went to the Incident 2 Commander was filtered through the process that you would 3 have put it through? 4 A: Exactly. 5 Q: Okay. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: Is it fair to say that -- that your 10 time was essentially being devoted to complement the 11 Criminal Investigation Branch of this operation, in other 12 words working up possible arrest warrants with respect to 13 the -- the evening -- the -- the takeover of the Park, 14 the evening of September the 4th? 15 A: I think what we were doing is we were 16 in a tact -- in a tactical role at that time. We were 17 assisting in -- assisting the Incident Commander and 18 providing him with information that could help him 19 establish some of his tactical priorities. Certainly, as 20 I said, you know, yesterday, the variable in all of this 21 information was not the fact that there was an 22 availability of weapons, it was the information that was 23 coming in indicating the sophistication of possible 24 weapons. 25 So that's from the intelligence standpoint

1 that we were trying to attempt to ascertain for the 2 Incident Commander. We were trying to give him some sort 3 of clarity to that picture, what we were doing -- when 4 were looking at the individuals that were involved in 5 the occupation or some of the people coming from outside. 6 So our position was straight tactical. 7 And if you recall yesterday I believe in my definition of 8 'tactical' in many cases you are working towards criminal 9 prosecutions; you are working towards assisting criminal 10 investigations. So in the truest sense this was a 11 tactical intelligence operation. 12 Q: All right. Were you asked by Trevor 13 Richardson to pay attention to certain individuals who 14 had been identified September the 4th in -- in the course 15 of, for example, the -- the smashing of the cruiser 16 window and the throwing of the flare? 17 A: No. 18 Q: All right. I understand that you 19 returned to duty at 7:00 a.m. on September the 6th, 1995? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And you arrived at Forest at about 22 7:50 a.m? 23 A: Yeah, that's -- that's correct. 24 Q: And you resumed your work identifying 25 individuals in the photographs and -- and working on the

1 profiles for the binder? 2 A: That's correct. And I should say 3 that while you're talking I am referring to these notes 4 in Tab 6 page 36, just to be clear. 5 Q: Yes. I -- thank you. And how did 6 you think the profile books that you were working on were 7 ultimately being -- were going to be used in this 8 policing operation? 9 A: Certainly I -- I thought they would 10 be utilized to determine who was in the -- in the Park 11 and in the -- the Base to assist officers in -- should 12 arrests be required, to identify the people that they'd 13 be arresting; and that was the principal source. 14 Q: All right. And you said, a minute 15 ago, that you had -- that you were engaging in tactical 16 decisions, or at least information for tactical 17 decisions. What was your team doing specifically which 18 would be characterized as "tactical intelligence" between 19 September 4th and 6th? 20 A: In gather -- as you're aware, that 21 with the occupation of the Park there was a potential 22 that arrests would have to be made. And, I mean, regard 23 that all along our principal priority was to negotiate a 24 peaceful resolution. 25 However, as a result of events that were

1 occurring there was a possibility for arrests and I 2 alluded to several -- a few earlier with regards to David 3 George and Judas, I believe, and the potential is there 4 for future arrests. 5 The documents that we were providing were 6 identifying those individuals that could be possible -- 7 possible individuals subject to arrest. It would also 8 provide the officers that were conducting the arrests 9 with the necessary information regarding those 10 individuals. 11 For instance, it would alert them to any 12 incidents where they may have been involved with 13 resisting arrest, any incidents where they may have been 14 involved in assaults and the like, so they could have 15 those -- that information in their memory banks when 16 they're executing the arrests. 17 Conversely, it would also allow them to 18 realize that if they're arresting an individual that had 19 never had any dealings with the police, that would be 20 their first time dealing with the police, and that a 21 different approach may have to be taken because it would 22 be the first dealing in such an incident and it may have 23 arisen as a result of their devotion to the cause and the 24 occupation. 25 Q: Right. And just so that we're --

1 we're clear, really what it sounds like the tactical 2 intelligence was directed at was providing information 3 that -- that might be utilized with respect to individual 4 alleged criminal activities by the occupiers but aside 5 from the occupation itself? 6 In other words, individuals committing 7 arguably mischief, things like that, but -- but un -- but 8 unrelated to the overall occupation? 9 A: Certainly that would be -- you know, 10 we'd have to look at the overall picture; that would be 11 one (1) aspect of it. 12 Q: All right. And was there anything in 13 your intelligence work that you were doing which was 14 intended to assist the Incident Commander with respect to 15 predicting what the future actions of the occupiers might 16 be? 17 A: No. No, and that, again, that was -- 18 that would be in the realm of strategic intelligence and 19 it would be difficult having regard for the resources -- 20 or the sources that we had available to us at that time. 21 Again, with regards to the future, it was 22 clear that there was a plan in place with regards to 23 injunctions and it was clear to me that the long-range 24 plan had been established that, in fact, we were going to 25 negotiate.

1 Q: Sure. That was the overall plan and 2 objective. But as you said, you played no role in a 3 strategic intelligence function which would have -- which 4 would be aimed at assisting the Incident Commander with 5 anticipating realistic scenarios as to how this may, in 6 fact, play out? 7 A: I didn't play a role in that, no. 8 Q: Would that be a role that the 9 intelligence unit would normally engage in if tasked to 10 do so? 11 A: If they required a strategic 12 analysis? 13 Q: Yes. And you were capable of doing 14 that? 15 A: JFO? 16 Q: Well, your intelligence unit? 17 A: The OPP at that time, strategic 18 intelligence was just basically coming to the forefront. 19 Q: Yeah. 20 A: And I believe it was in and around 21 1995 that the OPP formed the strategic Intelligence Unit. 22 So our capacity for strategic intelligence wasn't where 23 it is today. 24 Q: Fair enough. So strategic 25 intelligence wasn't a brand new concept?

1 A: No, it wasn't. 2 Q: Okay. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: All right. Now, if we go to the 7 scribe notes, please, at Tab 6 of Commission Counsel 8 brief, Exhibit P-426 and to page 53. This is September 9 6th, 1995 and it's an entry at 8:39 a.m.? 10 And it reads: 11 "JOHN CARSON: If they say they are 12 not getting an injunction someone will 13 be upset." 14 The next page: 15 "Don Bell got a call from RCMP. 16 Someone in -- is going to come up and 17 see you. Detective Sergeant Bell, to 18 advise them it is okay to send somebody 19 up. Detective Sergeant Bell, Vince 20 George came back last night and 21 identified some of the people and 22 advised they are not suspects." 23 Now, can you just tell me what this is 24 about? 25 A: Excuse me, I have no independent

1 notation on that and my recollection is relatively vague. 2 But, I believe that is -- I believe I would have received 3 a call from Mike Keegan, the RCMP member at our office. 4 However, I don't believe it was Mike that 5 was coming up to see Inspector Carson. I believe it 6 would be somebody, perhaps a senior officer. However, I 7 don't recollect who that would be. 8 But, generally any information or any 9 request relating to the RCMP would be flowed through Mike 10 Keegan to myself. 11 Q: And at 8:42 it appears that -- it 12 says: "John Carson have -- have any 13 idea of who is coming in? 14 Detective Sergeant Bell states he does 15 not." 16 Now do you recall what that was about? 17 A: That's relating back to the RCMP 18 Officer, I believe. 19 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Did the Incident 20 Commander provide you or make any demands of you at this 21 point in terms of what you were to do for him? 22 A: I don't believe so. 23 Q: Did you have any sense or information 24 as to what controls, if any, were in place at the Command 25 Post with respect to the flow of information beyond the

1 incident command structure? 2 A: No. 3 Q: Normally, would it be of concern to 4 you as an intelligence officer that intelligence or raw 5 data related to tactical or operational decisions, which 6 come to your attention be kept confidential within the 7 policing operation? 8 A: I was confident that the flow of 9 information was going through myself, Trevor, Mark and 10 Inspector -- Detective Staff Sergeant Wright and 11 Inspector Carson. That was the chain and with regards to 12 our information I was comfortable with that. 13 With regards to the information, or 14 intelligence as its often been referred to, outside of my 15 realm, I didn't know how that was being distributed. 16 Q: All right. But that -- all right. 17 In the normal course, would you have expected there to be 18 controls in place with respect to the dissemination of 19 that information? 20 A: Traditionally I would have like to 21 have see it coming into one (1) central hub and it going 22 forward. 23 Q: All right. Did you have a meeting 24 with Trevor Richardson that morning? 25 A: Yes, upon my arrival I met with

1 Trevor. 2 Q: And what did you learn? 3 A: Again referring to my notes of Tab 6, 4 page 36, I was advised by Trevor that overnight four (4) 5 police vehicles had been damaged at a checkpoint near the 6 CFB main gate, that the windows had been broken by rocks, 7 and that -- he further stated that automatic gunfire had 8 been heard overnight on the Base. 9 Q: All right. Did that information have 10 any impact on your assessment of the risk that lethal 11 force could be used in this operation? 12 A: Again, you know that was consistent 13 with information we'd been hearing throughout the 14 occupation, so again it was something that had to be 15 considered by the Incident Commander. 16 Q: Did it matter to you if, you know, 17 what was heard was automatic gunfire or semi-automatic 18 gunfire? 19 A: I think as I alluded to yesterday, to 20 me regardless of whether it's automatic, single shot, and 21 it has the ability for deadly force, certainly the fact 22 that it's automatic gunfire the potential is greater. 23 However, it still -- excuse me, it's still 24 is an indication that there's potential for lethal force 25 in the Base.

1 Q: All right. And were you tasked to do 2 anything relating to this information about the report of 3 gunfire? 4 A: No I wasn't. 5 Q: All right. You weren't asked to 6 verify it or to check its accuracy? 7 A: Certainly when we receive that type 8 of information it would be -- we would take it upon 9 ourselves in our daily duties to try to attempt to verify 10 that. As I said yesterday, we'd been trying to attempt 11 to verify the information we received regarding weapons 12 and gunfire since day 1 of the occupation. 13 And the difficulties that we had, again, I 14 think I can go back to the collection phase, if we had 15 taken that and prioritized in a different manner it might 16 have been easier to do so. But, having regard for the 17 resources and the abilities at the time, we couldn't 18 verify that. 19 Q: All right. And did you attend at a 20 Command Post briefing at 10:15 a.m. that morning? 21 A: Yes, I did. 22 Q: And do you recall what of 23 significance or at least what -- what update you 24 provided? 25 A: Again I'm referring to the scribe

1 notes to refresh my memory. 2 Q: At page 60. 3 A: I updated those in attendance on the 4 intelligence information. John Carson advised to stay 5 tight on our approach at the checkpoints. I -- 6 Q: What -- I'm sorry, what did that mean 7 to you? 8 A: To continue being diligent with the 9 information that was being obtained by those at the 10 checkpoints. 11 Q: All right. 12 A: I stated that the check sheets being 13 -- are being filed alphabetically. Advised that the 14 intelligence information shows that some violent people 15 may be there. And I believe I was alluding to the 16 Michigan information that was received, I believe, the 17 day before. 18 Generally at those meetings I would 19 provide all the information that we'd received over the - 20 - the day no matter, you know, how trivial it may seem 21 just so everybody had a grasp of what -- what was coming 22 in to us. 23 Q: And when you provided the information 24 were you also providing a reliability assessment? 25 A: I would tell -- I would give my

1 opinion as to what the validity of the information was. 2 Certainly information with regards to the gunfire, you 3 know, everybody was aware that in the command team there 4 that that information was ongoing and -- and coming in on 5 a regular basis and basically was unsubstantiated. 6 Q: And then after that briefing did you 7 continue to work on the -- the profile binders at the 8 Forest Detachment? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And if we go now to Tab 10 of the 11 Commission Counsel brief 2004357, these are a series of 12 photographs with handwriting on the back of them, and 13 these ones are dated September 6th, 1995. 14 So are those the -- the photographs and 15 profiles that you put together or your team put together 16 on the 6th? 17 A: These photos indicate they were taken 18 on the 6th so yes, that's correct. 19 Q: I'd like to make this the next 20 exhibit, please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1651, Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1651: Document Number 2004357. 24 Surveillance Photographs, 25 September 06, 1995.

1 2 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 3 Q: And I understand you then had a 4 meeting at 11:30 that morning with Const -- or Officer 5 Vince George? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And what transpired at that meeting? 8 A: Referring to my notes at Tab 6 page 9 37? 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: Vince indicated there was a 12 debriefing. I have Officers Plant, Richardson, and Eve. 13 I subsequently learned that -- that Plant was an error, 14 it was actually Parent -- Parent. 15 It indicated that an individual is behind 16 -- individuals are behind this operation; that the 17 individual had gone to Grand River, Michigan. It 18 indicated that they were living in the maintenance 19 building. 20 It indicate that an individual was at the 21 Camp last night and that individual stated that they had 22 guns with -- they were six (6) males from the Muncey 23 First Nations territory, that automatic gunfire had been 24 heard last night. 25 It identifies two (2) other subjects that

1 are redacted that are believed to be, I believe in the 2 maintenance building -- oh, sorry, believed to be in the 3 building immediately west of the hospital. 4 I believe it indicates who may have been 5 operating the OPP Who vehicle. And it went on to say 6 that more support would be coming from Walpole Island. 7 Q: All right. And what did you do with 8 this information? 9 A: One (1) of the intelligence reports 10 would have been filled out a later date. That would have 11 later been reported up through the -- the chain at one 12 (1) of the intelligence briefings or sorry, one (1) of 13 the briefings. 14 Q: All right. And did either Trevor 15 Richardson or Inspector Carson or someone on his behalf 16 ask you to do anything in follow-up to this information? 17 A: We followed up on the information on 18 the -- through our Windsor Intelligence Unit as to those 19 individuals that were identified from the United States. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: And at 11:55 I spoke to Jeff Gray 22 regard -- excuse me -- regarding queries on those 23 individuals that he'd made on our behalf. 24 Q: All right. And he was with the 25 Windsor Intelligence?

1 A: Yes, Jeff Gray was a detective 2 constable assigned to the Windsor OPP Intelligence Field 3 Unit. 4 Q: All right. And who else did you 5 speak with? 6 A: I contacted an individual at Canada 7 Customs and had the individuals flagged at the border in 8 an attempt to have them secondaried if, in fact, they 9 crossed. 10 Q: All right. And that was at 12:15? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And then at 13:20 you spoke to a Karl 13 Heck who you told us was with the Department of National 14 Defence? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And what -- 17 A: Major Karl Heck. Karl had contacted 18 me with regards to -- obviously he was reporting up. 19 Karl Heck was, basically, the military police, and he was 20 prepare -- excuse me, preparing a report and I advised 21 him of the following information. 22 I advised him that Carson was the onsite 23 commander; that four (4) arrest warrants have been 24 issued; that there are no arrests at present; that last 25 night there was damage to four (4) police vehicles at the

1 main gate; that an individual was present last night that 2 identified individuals that are calling the shots, and I 3 told him that that was believed reliable. 4 This -- the individual was present but not 5 in the limelight; that there weren't very many Natives at 6 the Park; that the -- the Natives were driving back and 7 forth to the -- from the Park to the Base; that we see in 8 many instances that the Park may be an extension of the 9 Base. 10 Identified an individual from Walpole 11 Island who was violent; that this morning the -- the road 12 was blocked to the beach with picnic tables. However, 13 they were dispersed when the police approached. 14 Nothing -- excuse me, nothing further 15 reference weapons. Major Heck advised me that Doug Smith 16 was returning onsite -- Captain Doug Smith. He'd be 17 returning to the -- the Base. And advised to have him 18 liaise directly -- I advised him to liaise directly with 19 Inspector Carson. 20 Q: All right. And did you have any 21 success in the leads that you had out trying to find out 22 information about the individuals -- the outsiders if you 23 will, of whom you had concerns? 24 A: All our checks came back negative. 25 In attempting to locate the residents and such we weren't

1 able to -- to do that at that time. 2 Q: It appears that according to the 3 intelligence record, if you will, as it existed at this 4 point in time was that essentially the leadership of the 5 occupying group was dominated by -- or continued to be -- 6 at least was dominated by outsiders, right? 7 A: It appeared at that time that the 8 Jewels were calling the -- calling the shots, for lack of 9 a better phrase. 10 Q: And you also identified a Buck 11 Doxtator? 12 A: I don't believe I said his name. 13 Q: Yesterday you did. 14 A: Okay. I was just thinking today. 15 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Was he still a 16 concern then? 17 A: Yes, Buck Doxtator was a concern. 18 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And what about a 19 Robert Isaac, was he a concern? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And how did the observation that 22 these quote "outsiders" were now at least dominating the 23 leadership of the occupying group, inform the strategy, 24 if you will, or the objectives with respect -- or the 25 strategy with respect to accomplishing the objective of

1 containment and negotiating a peaceful resolution from 2 your perspective? 3 A: From my perspective, and again this 4 would have to be my opinion, you know, Inspector Carson 5 had to be aware that the traditional people that had been 6 occupying the Base, and then we developed, I would say, a 7 fairly good rapport with in discussions had now changed 8 and that the people he would be possibly talking to, that 9 rapport may not be as strong, if at all. 10 Q: And it's fair to say that while John 11 Carson had familiarity with the Stoney Point group, he 12 did not have the same degree of familiarity, nor did your 13 team, with these specific individuals who now seemed to 14 comprise the leadership of this group? 15 A: We -- the Jewels were an unknown. 16 There was somewhat of a familiarity, particularity with 17 Buck -- Buck Doxtator from the London JFO perspective. 18 And Robert Isaac, there was a degree of familiarity with 19 him from the Windsor intelligence. 20 Q: Just -- maybe you would go to Tab 34; 21 this is Exhibit P-1644. And this is what you identified 22 yesterday as the binder that you were working from over 23 the course of the initial days of the occupation. 24 And I noted that while there is a profile 25 with respect to Buck Doxtator there does not seem to be

1 any profiles with respect to either of the Jewel brothers 2 or any of the Isaacs? 3 A: Had a -- excuse me, I'm not sure 4 where -- when this document plays out as far as the -- I 5 don't know when this document, where -- where it came 6 from in the evolution. 7 Q: Okay. All right. 8 A: This could have been, you know, 9 September 4th. It could have been -- 10 Q: Because we did note yesterday the 11 notation of Dudley George's date of decease. 12 A: And again I'm not sure if this has 13 been reproduced in its entirety. 14 Q: That's fair. 15 A: Because I know that -- I'm sure the 16 other one is not. 17 Q: All right. Do you have any 18 recollection as to whether or not, you had a profile 19 sheet in your binder between September 4th and 6th which 20 reflected any information about those individuals? 21 A: I have -- to be quite candid I don't 22 have an independent recollection. 23 Q: Fair enough. Thank you. Now, did 24 you receive any information from either -- from a Major 25 Heck with respect to a Captain Smith on the 6th?

1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And what was your information? 3 A: That Captain Smith was returning to 4 the area, onsite, as I believe Major Heck referred to. 5 Q: And did you have any understanding 6 as to what Captain Smith's role was with respect to 7 Ipperwash? 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Can -- do you recall whether he was 12 the Military's designated Liaison Officer with -- to the 13 OPP for this matter? 14 A: He may have been. 15 Q: Do you recall having any contact with 16 Captain Smith between the 4th and the 6th? 17 A: I have no independent recollection. 18 I'd have to check my notes. 19 Q: All right. Did you have any 20 information as to whether Captain Smith had the ability 21 to communicate with persons who were in the Army Camp 22 over the course of the 4th to the 6th of September? 23 A: Again, I have no recollection of 24 that. 25 Q: Would that be an important piece of

1 information for you to know, if it was true? 2 A: If Smith did? 3 Q: Yes. If he had the ability to 4 contact people within the Army Camp? 5 A: Certainly, if he had people he was 6 speaking to in there, would be of value. 7 Q: And why would that be of value? 8 A: Again it would be a conduit to people 9 that are on the -- occupying the area that could provide 10 us first hand accounts of what's going on. Again, we'd 11 have to look at the assessment of that as to, you know, 12 what we're being told. 13 Q: And what was your understanding with 14 respect to any attempts or plans on the part of the 15 police to initiate negotiations or contact with the 16 occupiers? 17 A: Well, it's my belief that we were 18 working on obtaining -- the MNR was obtaining an 19 injunction and then we would -- the injunction would be 20 exercised, and that if it wasn't followed that 21 negotiations would continue until the occupation was 22 resolved. 23 Q: Did you have any input into how best 24 to facilitate negotiations or at least open the lines of 25 communication as between the police and the occupiers?

1 A: No. And as I stated yesterday, the 2 local officers involved, including Inspector Carson had a 3 far greater rapport with the occupiers than we did. 4 Q: I appreciate -- I'm not asking 5 whether you would have been the right person to do it, 6 but would it be -- would it have been appropriate to task 7 you with such a function, that is to identify persons who 8 might act as go- betweens, between the police and the 9 occupiers in order to initiate or facilitate 10 negotiations? 11 A: Traditionally, I believe, that would 12 have been appropriate. However, I do believe that the 13 local Officers had a better read on who the best people 14 would have been to negotiate. 15 Q: Well, for example, was it part of 16 your task to determine, in terms of identifying the 17 visitors to the Park, that is the visitors who weren't 18 occupiers, the visitors to the Park, with respect to then 19 identifying potential people who might be approachable by 20 the Police to facilitate communications? 21 A: Could we have identified that? 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: Possibly, but again, the people at 24 the Park and the -- the locals, I mean having regard for 25 the outsiders, the Jewels, I think our -- still our best

1 bet was to try to negotiate with those that we were 2 comfortable with And again, I don't think that we were in 3 a better position -- we weren't in the best position to 4 provide that. I do believe that that component would be 5 best served through Inspector Carson and the local 6 officers. 7 Certainly, we could identify potential, 8 but I don't think -- I don't believe that would have 9 carried the weight that would have been put on by 10 Inspector Carson to his knowledge of the local officers. 11 Q: I understand, but that's my point. 12 Wouldn't it have been appropriate to task you with the 13 function of identifying frequent visitors who appeared to 14 have good relations with the occupiers, in order to pass 15 that type of information to Inspector Carson to alert him 16 as to who those people were, and then he could have 17 followed up as he saw fit? 18 A: That could have beneficial. 19 Q: I'd like -- I think this is an 20 appropriate time to take the morning break. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good time 22 for a break. 23 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 24 for fifteen (15) minutes. 25

1 --- Upon recessing at 10:32 a.m. 2 --- Upon resuming at 10:53 a.m. 3 4 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 5 resumed. Please be seated. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 12 Q: Thank you. We're canvassing the 13 events of the afternoon of September the 6th, 1995. And 14 if you would go to your Maple notes at page 40, Tab 6. 15 And as well we have the scribe notes at Tab 6 of the 16 Commission Counsel brief, page 62, 14:27 hours. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 21 Q: It appears there was a further 22 Command Post briefing at which you attended? 23 A: Yes, that's correct. 24 Q: And was this one led by Acting 25 Detective Staff Sergeant Mark Wright?

1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: All right. And it indicates that: 3 "Don Bell discusses intelligence 4 information that he has on some people 5 that there were on the Base. Don Bell 6 has notes pertaining to same." 7 This is reading from the scribe notes. 8 And of course you have a notation as well in your own 9 notebook. 10 Can you tell us what intelligence 11 information you conveyed at this briefing with respect to 12 the people on the Army Base? 13 A: I would have conveyed the information 14 that I'd received from Jeff Gray regarding the follow-up 15 on the US individuals being -- which I believe were the 16 Jewels. 17 Q: And -- and to be clear you were 18 asking Mr. Gray to follow-up with his contacts on the 19 FBI, weren't you? 20 A: Using the FBI and other local 21 authorities in Michigan. 22 Q: Okay. And you reported that -- that 23 those inquiries had come back negative? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: Meaning what?

1 A: With regards to -- he was unable to 2 find anything out on the individuals with regards to 3 where they were living, with regards to criminal records 4 and things of that nature. 5 Q: All right. So therefore these 6 individuals were still a question mark -- 7 A: That's -- 8 Q: -- from your perspective. 9 A: I'm sorry. That's correct. 10 Q: All right. And did you provide Staff 11 Sergeant -- Detective Sergeant Wright with any 12 assessments with respect to the assessment of -- of the 13 use of force, of lethal force being used by the occupiers 14 as a result of the intelligence gathering efforts you'd 15 made to that point in time? 16 A: No, I didn't. 17 Q: Did -- were you asked for your 18 opinion? 19 A: No, I wasn't. 20 Q: Would it be, if you will, within your 21 -- your realm of abilities as -- as intelligence officer 22 to provide an informed assessment on that type of issue? 23 A: I believe with regards to the 24 weapons, et cetera, from my position that was still an 25 area that was still up in the air with regards to the

1 reliability factors of the information. 2 Certainly we had information that 3 indicated -- excuse me, that -- that indicated that there 4 were gunshots being heard. We heard of automatic gunfire 5 being heard, we've heard of weapons being brought in. 6 But we've also heard from a source that we 7 believe to be reliable that there weren't any weapons in 8 there. So I believe that that information, my position 9 on that hadn't been substantiated to the point where I 10 could make a solid opinion or a reliability for Mark 11 Wright. 12 Q: All right. You couldn't -- you 13 weren't at a stage in your process where you could offer 14 an opinion on the degree of reliability or unreliability 15 of that information? 16 A: We're still in evaluation -- 17 evaluation stage. 18 Q: Thank you. And did you receive any 19 response from -- from Detective Sergeant Wright with 20 respect to your report and the -- the lack of conclusion 21 that you could draw with respect to that information? 22 A: No. What I'd like to clarify here is 23 that Mark, Trevor and myself, we were all very -- we were 24 aware of the information that we had, more or less, on 25 both sides, to a degree.

1 Mark was comfortable, I believe, with what 2 we were providing him from the intelligence function. 3 And as far as my offering an opinion to Mark, that 4 wouldn't have served a purpose at that time because Mark 5 was already in a -- like -- like Inspector Carson, he 6 already had a lot of the information. 7 And, in fact, if there was a second 8 repository, Mark would be the second best officer to 9 provide the solutions or the analysis to all the 10 information obtained. So Mark was privy to all the 11 significant information. 12 He would realize that we're still in the 13 position of analysing, as would he would have been in 14 still in a position of analysing as to the threat that 15 was on the other side of the hill, so to speak. 16 Q: All right. So you've identified two 17 (2) people in the command structure, the Incident 18 Commander, John Carson, and his second in command, if you 19 will, Mark Wright, as being, in your view, capable of 20 discharging the central repository function, so to speak, 21 which -- which in your view meant that the -- the 22 analytical function that you would normally provide 23 wasn't as important? 24 A: Correct. And -- and that's 25 demonstrated as well in the -- the organizational chart,

1 because if you see Trevor, Mark is in between himself and 2 Inspector Carson. 3 Q: What about -- what about the 4 alternate incident commander, Inspector Linton; would you 5 put him in the same category? 6 A: As the other two (2) officers? 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: I'm -- I'm not aware that Inspector 9 Linton had the same knowledge base as the other two (2) 10 officers in this case. 11 Q: All right. Or the same history? 12 A: Exactly. The same background and -- 13 as to the events, and as well as the local knowledge. 14 Q: And he wasn't involved between 1993 15 and '95, at least with respect to dealings with you 16 regarding Ipperwash? 17 A: Inspector Linton? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And are you tasked with anything by 21 Mark Wright as following this meeting with respect to 22 what -- what you should be doing or what information you 23 should be looking to verify or anything like that? 24 A: I believe we're just -- excuse me, I 25 believe we're just to continue on with the

1 responsibilities and the functions that were outlined in 2 the operational plan, Project Maple. 3 Q: And so you effectively returned to 4 your task of identifying the individuals and working up 5 profiles and trying to find out more information, 6 background information particularly, about the outside 7 element? 8 A: And I -- we're beginning to move 9 towards a task or function for -- with regards to further 10 collection, analysing and dissemination. Our networks -- 11 or, you know, we're talking to headquarters. We've got, 12 as I said before, Hackenbrok's talking to military. I've 13 been talking to the Military. 14 So we are starting to liaise a little more 15 now and trying to, you know, the profiles are nearing 16 completion so we're starting to branch out. 17 Q: And that's, of course, with respect 18 to only that information which you're actually acquiring? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. As opposed to the information 21 from officers outside of the Intelligence Unit? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Okay. Any doubt in your mind as to 24 whether you conveyed to Inspector Carson and Mark Wright 25 that the leadership component of the occupiers appeared

1 to be driven by the Jewel brothers? 2 A: Whether I provided that information? 3 Q: Yes. In other words, that you 4 conveyed that assessment. 5 A: Well, certainly, based on my 6 recollection of how the briefings were conducted and the 7 information that we had regarding the Jewels, it's my 8 belief that that would have been conveyed to Inspector 9 Carson. 10 And I believe that was done in the four 11 (4) days, the 1st to the 4th. 12 Q: And were you ever challenged on that 13 assessment? 14 A: I don't believe so. 15 Q: I understand that at 15:00 hours you 16 left the Forest Detachment with Detective Sergeant Randy 17 Parent? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And who -- who is Detective Sergeant 20 Randy Parent, in terms of -- in terms of his role in this 21 operation? 22 A: I believe Detective Sergeant Parent 23 was in the Chatham Crime Unit No. 1 District 24 Headquarters. I believe he was a colleague of Trevor 25 Richardson.

1 Q: All right. And where did you go? 2 A: Again, referring to my notes, Tab 6, 3 page 40, we went in the area of Army Base -- the Army 4 Base Road, as we were looking for power sources that 5 could be utilized by our technical support branch. 6 Q: And did you have an understanding as 7 to what the plan was in that respect? 8 A: I believe what was being contemplated 9 was the use of surveillance cameras and things of that 10 nature, monitoring equipment by TSB. And we were 11 assisting them in providing them suitable locations where 12 they may be able to install such equipment. 13 Q: What's TSB? 14 A: Sorry, Technical Support Branch. 15 Q: Thank you. And was this to be part 16 of the complement for information gathering? 17 A: I believe that was to assist -- it 18 wasn't part of the intelligence function. That was 19 assisting the criminal side. 20 Q: But for information gathering? 21 A: Information gathering and potential 22 evidence should something happen. 23 Q: All right. Then why did you go if it 24 wasn't -- wasn't really part of the intelligence 25 function?

1 A: Well, certainly, TSB or Technical 2 Support Branch falls within Investigative Support Bureau, 3 I also had a -- which intelligence was part of. So 4 there's a linkage between our two (2) branches. 5 But more importantly, I was familiar with 6 the area having been -- you know, spent some time between 7 '93 and '95. And I think I have more of a familiarity 8 than probably Randy did. 9 Q: And where did you -- where did you 10 go, what were the potential locations for the 11 surveillance cameras? 12 A: I can't tell you that today. 13 Q: All right. But I take it would be to 14 give you an eye into what area; the Park, the Army Camp, 15 both? 16 A: I believe we were looking at 17 locations for -- to cover both the Base and the Park. 18 Q: And what was the result of this trip? 19 A: Again, I'm not -- I can't recall 20 whether or not we identified any specific sites or not. 21 Q: Were there capabilities though? 22 A: Would there have been? I would think 23 that there would have been suitable locations. But I 24 can't recall if we identified any or if we were able to 25 identify any at that time, or if they had to be

1 identified at a later time by the actual members of the 2 Technical Support Branch. 3 Q: Okay. And at 15:30 did you attend at 4 the Forest Detachment to meet with Constable Vince 5 George? 6 A: Yes, I did. 7 Q: Why? 8 A: Vince was one of the Officers that we 9 were utilizing to assist us in the identification of the 10 photos that we had taken at either the Base or the Park. 11 Q: Did you stay at the Forest Detachment 12 to continue with your work on the profile book? 13 A: Yes, I did. 14 Q: Did you conduct any surveillance 15 yourself on September the 6th? 16 A: Not surveillance, per se, in the 17 truest sense, but at 16:45, and again referring to Tab 6, 18 Page 40, I accompanied Detective Sergeant Trevor 19 Richardson, excuse me, with regard to an incident that 20 had been reported in regarding the OPP Who vehicle. If 21 memory serves, the vehicle that was reported that had 22 been struck in the sand at one (1) of the beach 23 locations. 24 So Trevor and I went out to see if we 25 could locate the vehicle, however, we could not.

1 Q: And what was the concern with respect 2 to locating this vehicle? 3 A: I believe that the report, again 4 going by recollection and perhaps my preparation that the 5 vehicle was stuck in the sand after being driven in an -- 6 in an erratic and threatening manner to some of the 7 cottage owners. 8 Q: All right. And did you speak with 9 any of -- any civilians with respect to this situation? 10 A: Yes. Yes, after we had departed we 11 were advised to meet with a civilian party in the Port 12 Franks area. 13 Q: And what was the purpose of that, or 14 what did you learn from that conversation? 15 A: I believe they may have been the 16 initial ones to report the vehicle being stuck in the 17 sand. And we spoke to the individual and his wife at 18 approximately 17:30 or 5:30 in the afternoon. They were 19 very unsettled with regards to the activity of the First 20 Nations in and around their cottage/residence. Excuse 21 me. 22 They had observed an individual on what 23 was referred to as the CFB or the Army portion of the 24 beach. The trunk of the vehicle was up and they observed 25 males loading and unloading something which they couldn't

1 determine what it was. 2 The vehicle drove towards the point area 3 and the -- apparently they were speaking on behalf of the 4 local cottagers that they were afraid that the Natives 5 were going to come through the barriers and -- and harass 6 them. 7 Q: And you say that you had the 8 impression that they were speaking on behalf of the -- 9 the local residents there? 10 A: Yes, I do. 11 Q: And what, if anything, did you do to 12 respond to your -- your perception of their anxiety? 13 A: We tried to reassure them that, you 14 know, things were in hand and that there was -- the 15 police and the First Nations had a rapport and that we 16 were working together to ensure that, you know, their 17 safety would be maintained and, you know, just to lower 18 their anxiety a little bit. 19 I note that I used the word 'paranoid' and 20 I think there was a -- a level of paranoia throughout the 21 community at that time because there was a lot of 22 information that was going along, certainly within the 23 Native and non Native communities. 24 So we were trying to drop the level of 25 angst and try to give them a sense of reality and a sense

1 of fact based on what we knew at the time. 2 Q: All right. And did you return then 3 to the Forest Detachment at about 18:00 hours? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And what did you do for the balance 6 of the evening, prior to the deployment of the CMU and 7 TRU Team later that night? 8 A: Excuse me. I was working on the 9 profiles. 10 Q: In the Forest Detachment? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: All right. And to be clear, you're - 13 - you're in the -- the physical building of the Forest 14 Detachment, you're not in the Command Post trailer? 15 A: The actual detachment itself. 16 Q: Thank you. And did you stay at the 17 Forest Detachment for the balance of that evening, prior 18 to the -- to the -- the altercation? 19 A: I would expect that during -- 20 sometime during that time period I would have grabbed 21 some dinner. 22 Q: All right. Other than that? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. Were you part of any 25 discussions or privy to any discussions with respect to a

1 plan to deploy the TRU? 2 A: No, I wasn't. 3 Q: Or with respect to plans to deploy 4 the Crowd Management Unit? 5 A: No, I wasn't. 6 Q: Or the actual deployment of either of 7 those units? 8 A: No, I wasn't. 9 Q: Were you in the Command Post over the 10 course of that evening? 11 A: I was in Forest Detachment. 12 Q: I know, but were you at the -- in the 13 trailer? 14 A: No. 15 Q: So basically, if I can simply it, you 16 were at your desk working on profile books during the 17 course of the deployment of the TRU and CMU? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Were you privy to any communications 20 with respect to the deployment of the TRU and CMU? 21 A: And again, I'm going by memory, and 22 this was eleven (11) years ago. I believe I could hear 23 the radio transmissions within the detachment. 24 Q: And these would be radio 25 transmissions from what source?

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1 A: From the CMU and the Command Post. 2 Q: And the -- the Command Post or the 3 TOC, or do you know? 4 A: I can't say. 5 Q: All right. Fair enough. Were you 6 concentrating on these communications? 7 A: To a -- to a degree. I mean I was 8 trying to get these profile binders done because that was 9 my main function. So certainly, depending on the, you 10 know, the level of excitement, for lack of a better 11 term -- 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: -- you know, if it was getting a 14 little hot then it'd pique my attention? 15 Q: All right. Now, prior to the 16 deployment of the CMU and TRU, were you privy to any 17 communications from the Oscar Teams that had been 18 deployed? 19 A: No. 20 Q: All right. Were you privy to any of 21 the communications from the TRU Sierra Team? 22 A: No. 23 Q: Or from the TRU Team at all? 24 A: No. 25 Q: All right. When did you become aware

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1 that the TRU and CMU had been activated? 2 A: Again, because I -- that had no 3 bearing on my function I don't have a note of that. 4 Q: All right. Do you believe you became 5 aware of it at least close to the -- the time that it was 6 activated? 7 A: I would anticipate -- as I say, my 8 level of active notification would have been by chance 9 listening and overhearing the transmissions. 10 Q: All right. Fair enough. Did you 11 attend at the TOC at all that night prior to the -- the 12 discharge of firearms? 13 A: No. 14 Q: All right. Aside from working up the 15 profile books that evening and overhearing from time to 16 time radio communications, did you have a conversation 17 that evening with Staff Sergeant Bezaire? 18 A: Bezaire? 19 Q: Bezaire, B-E-Z-A-I-R-E? 20 A: I don't have a notation in my notes. 21 I had a conversation with Carl Armstrong. 22 Q: Yes, at 18:20. But you -- did you 23 have a prior conversation requesting the assistance of a 24 Dawn Pineo? 25 A: I do recall -- I -- I have

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1 independent recollection at some time, I'm not sure if it 2 was that night. But I did call Staff Sergeant Bezaire to 3 ask for Dawn Pineo. 4 Q: All right. And what -- who -- what 5 would be the role of Dawn Pineo? 6 A: Dawn Pineo was one of the clerical 7 assistants at London JFO. I was asking if she could be 8 assigned to assist us in the data entry. 9 Q: All right. And do you recall whether 10 that request was made prior to the deployment? 11 A: Prior to the deployment of the CMU 12 and TRU? 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: Okay, it -- that could be the 18:00 15 notation that's redacted. 16 Q: Yes, that's right. At page 41 of 17 your notes? 18 A: Okay. Yes, that's -- at 18:00, if 19 that's the redacted area, and I believe that says if -- 20 the redacted area would be saying contact "Buzz" which 21 was Staff Sergeant Bezaire's nickname -- 22 Q: Right. 23 A: -- and a reference to Dawn Pineo. 24 Q: Okay. And what gave rise to the 25 observation that you needed the assistance of someone of

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1 her -- of her capability? 2 A: I think, based on the information 3 that we were starting to obtain and the fact, as you 4 alluded to earlier, some of the functions were not 5 necessarily that of an officer, an intelligence officer, 6 that we thought it would be appropriate to have her to 7 attend to conduct some of those responsibilities. 8 Q: And that would free up your time and 9 your team's time to utilize your expertise more 10 efficiently? 11 A: We could go into more of the phase 4 12 of the operational plan functions. 13 Q: And then you indicated that you also 14 contacted Carl Armstrong at 18:20? 15 A: Yes, I did. 16 Q: And what was the purpose of that? 17 A: Carl Armstrong was the Staff Sergeant 18 in charge of field units at OPP General Headquarters, 19 Intelligence Section, and I was advising him that I had 20 requested Dawn Pineo to come and that Buzz had approved 21 it, because she was an OPP resource it was appropriate to 22 go up the chain. 23 Q: Fair enough. Now I understand that 24 you received some information with respect to weapons 25 from Mark Dew at around 21:15 hours?

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: And can you tell me, what did you 3 learn from him? 4 A: It was identified from -- Mark 5 advised me that a -- he had a source, which I did not 6 know who the source was, that there were weapons at CFB 7 Ipperwash, and again I'm referring to page 41, Tab 6. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: Weapons at CFB Ipperwash. The 10 information that he provided were that there were four 11 (4) SKS rifles, two (2) Mini-Ruger 14s with thirty (30) 12 round magazines, numerous hunting rifles with scopes. 13 They were possibly making gas bombs. 14 Q: And just for my information, what 15 would an SKS stand for? SKS -- 16 A: I'm not sure what SKS stands for, but 17 I believe it's an assault rifle. 18 Q: Okay. Thank you. And you indicated 19 that -- did Mark Dew -- Mark Dew was Trevor Richardson's 20 second in command; is that fair? Do you know. 21 A: I'm not comfortable to say that. 22 Q: You're not comfortable to say that. 23 All right. He was in the Criminal Investigation Unit 24 under Trevor Richardson? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: All right. Did he mention or advise 2 what level of reliability he attached to this 3 information? 4 A: No, he didn't. 5 Q: And did you attach a degree of 6 reliability to this information? 7 A: No, I didn't, because I didn't know 8 who the source was. 9 Q: All right. So when it says in your 10 notes, "Source information UK" for unknown, what were you 11 referring to? 12 A: I believe that's -- I don't know who 13 the source is. 14 Q: All right. You didn't ask him? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Why not? 17 A: Within the scope of intelligence, 18 officers develop informants on a regular basis. 19 Obviously, the security and identity of the informants is 20 very significant in that you don't want to compromise 21 them to potentially lead to harm. 22 Traditionally, police officers won't ask 23 as to the identity of the informant. That they rely on 24 the Officer that is the informant handler to evaluate the 25 information appropriately and to pass that on. And

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1 that's what I would have done on that occasion. 2 Q: That's what you assumed? 3 A: That's what I would have done on that 4 occasion. 5 Q: That's what you would have done. All 6 right. Well, why -- why is this information that you 7 need to know? 8 A: Well, again, as the intelligence -- 9 having the intelligence component, I believe Mark felt it 10 incumbent to pass that on through myself. I later learn 11 -- and I was aware that that was passed on through other 12 sources. Again, this goes back to our problem with the 13 filters, not having one (1) single source of information. 14 As you're aware, and I think made clear, 15 there were various sources of information that were being 16 fed up through to the Incident Commander. And this did - 17 - would cause difficulty. The information that was 18 provided by Mark Dew, from my perspective, was just 19 another piece that would go under the file of weapons and 20 level of sophistication. 21 As I've alluded to, there have been 22 various pieces of information indicating more 23 sophisticated weaponry in the Base or the Park. 24 In my mind, that wasn't a significant 25 factor. My concern was with the lethal force and being

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1 able to handle the lethal force. 2 John Carson was aware of that as well. 3 And from my readings and preparation, I know that 4 Inspector Carson and myself were on the same page when 5 assessing the information, and that our concern and our 6 belief was there was the availability of firearms there. 7 And that's what we were going with, was 8 the availability, which we knew from our previous history 9 in the area with regards to the hunting and things of 10 that nature, that those types of weapons would be 11 available. 12 So I put this in one (1) silo, in my mind 13 and in our area, that we would later on continue to 14 assess and try to attempt to confirm. 15 Q: All right. But, I think you 16 indicated that as at this time, at least, there was still 17 a great deal of uncertainty, from your perspective, as to 18 the reliability of information, specifically with respect 19 to assault weapons. 20 And even with respect to rifles, hunting 21 rifles, although -- you had some background information 22 that there might be hunting rifles; isn't that right? 23 A: I'd say, in my opinion, if I was 24 putting reliability factor of hunting rifles, I would 25 put that as confirmed reliable.

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1 Q: All right. But with respect to 2 assault rifles? 3 A: That would be unknown reliability. 4 Q: And with respect to unknown 5 reliability, remind us what -- what that means? 6 A: Sorry, I'm going to take a step back. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: The unknown reliability, however, if 9 I was reporting that up the chain, if I was reporting 10 this information, I would assess that as believed 11 reliable, because the number of occasions that we had 12 received information with regarding the assault rifles, 13 it's yet to be proven. However, it's coming on so many 14 occasions that we can't take the chance of not putting a 15 believed reliable tag on it. 16 So in a reporting mechanism, you would 17 assess it as believed reliable, due to the number of 18 times that it's come forward. 19 Q: All right. But you didn't know who 20 the source was? 21 A: No. 22 Q: And you didn't ask Mark Dew what 23 degree of reliability he attached to the information or 24 the source? 25 A: And to be quite candid I don't know

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1 the context of this conversation and how long it lasted. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: I believe that there's a good chance 4 this was a passing comment. There -- this wasn't a long 5 conversation. 6 Q: Well, it was significant enough for 7 you to make a note. 8 A: Anything that I would get with 9 regards to weapons I'd make a note of. 10 Q: Right. And I guess the bottom line 11 is, is that you were unable to assess from your own 12 judgment the degree of reliability to attach to this 13 information? 14 A: From -- I could not assess the 15 reliability factor on this strictly on the information 16 obtained from Mark. 17 Q: All right. Did Mark Dew mention 18 anything to you during the course of this conversation 19 about a civilian car being damaged? 20 A: No. 21 Q: All right. Now, if you had been the 22 recipient of this information from the informant if you 23 will, what would you have done with it in terms of your 24 due diligence prior to passing it along to the Incident 25 Commander?

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1 A: First of all I'd have to qualify the 2 informant. And in qualifying the informant there are 3 several factors I'd look into. I'd look into -- first 4 the easiest thing for us to do is a criminal record check 5 to see if that particular individual has any record of 6 deceit, obstruction, or anything that would lead somebody 7 to believe that he's not telling -- he or she is not 8 telling the truth. 9 The second thing you'd look into is if 10 he's provided you any information in the past that's 11 proven to be beneficial and resulted in, for example, a 12 successful search warrant or confirmed reliable 13 information. 14 Thirdly, you'd evaluate the, you know, 15 person's position as to if there are any ulterior motives 16 or anything of the like to provide that information. And 17 we quite often see in the drug business that other drug 18 dealers will rat out their -- their competition, so 19 certainly you have to be alive to those issues. 20 So those are the types of things that 21 you'd be looking into or I'd be looking into if I was 22 qualifying an informant. And depending on your findings 23 that assists you -- assists you in your evaluation stage 24 to determine if -- what weight you're going to put on 25 that. So if I was assessing that information I'd look at

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1 that. 2 So the informant, that would be phase -- 3 phase 1. And as I said the mitigating circumstance here 4 is that we had received information with regards to the 5 automatic and more sophisticated weapons in the past, so 6 that does give it a piece -- a little bit more validity 7 or a little more elevation in the reliability scale from 8 the onset. 9 Q: All right. Fair enough. That would 10 be one (1) part of it but certainly not the whole 11 process? 12 A: Exactly. 13 Q: So, for example, if you had known 14 that this informant had -- had publicly expressed 15 disapproval of the actions of the occupiers to the point 16 of calling them thugs, would that impact on your 17 assessment with respect to any possible ulterior motives? 18 A: Yes, it would. 19 Q: All right. In any event, you weren't 20 asked to evaluate the reliability of this particular 21 information? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And you simply made a note of it and 24 didn't follow up on it in any way? 25 A: That's correct.

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1 Q: And that's because it wasn't part of 2 your job? 3 A: Well, it's not that it wasn't part of 4 my job, I wasn't in a position to be able to follow it up 5 because I didn't know -- have the requisite information 6 to conduct the proper follow up. Again, that goes back 7 to my critique yesterday with regards to one (1) single 8 source of intelligence and the lack of filters. 9 Q: Fair enough. Now, you indicated that 10 at this time there wasn't, to your knowledge at least, 11 any standardized protocol with respect to providing this 12 kind of intelligence information in written form? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: And to your knowledge was this 15 information passed along in written form by way -- 16 A: To my -- sorry. 17 Q: Sorry, go ahead. 18 A: To the best of my knowledge, and a 19 lot of this knowledge is based on my preparation for the 20 Inquiry and my readings, that this information was passed 21 on in a verbal method. 22 Q: And is it fair to say that one (1) 23 reason why it's prudent to have this type of sensitive 24 information transferred in writing, is to avoid the 25 possible scenario of verbal communications losing

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1 something in the translation as they get passed on from 2 person to person? 3 A: Certainly, if it's written down in 4 its truest form, that's the best method of communication. 5 Q: For that reason though? 6 A: To avoid any misrepresentation? 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: If it's to avoid a broken telephone 10 scenario? 11 A: Yes, correct. 12 Q: Is that fair? And at this time there 13 was no standardized written protocol with respect to 14 intelligence reports? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: Now, did you ultimately understand or 17 find out what the name of this -- the original source of 18 this information was? 19 A: Yes, I did. 20 Q: And who was that? 21 A: Gerald George. 22 Q: Thank you. 23 A: If I can add to that, I did not -- 24 Q: Certainly. 25 A: -- find that out until the last

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1 couple of days. 2 Q: Okay. Oh, fair enough. So 3 throughout this whole process, at least the active 4 operation, you didn't know this name? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: Thank you. I'd like to put -- you 7 indicated that Mark Dew didn't convey any information to 8 you with respect to damage to a civilian vehicle; did you 9 come to learn over the course of that night or come into 10 any information about a damage having been occurred to a 11 civilian vehicle? 12 A: I'm not sure if it was that night but 13 I did become aware of that information. 14 Q: Later? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: All right. Let me ask you this: If 17 you received two (2) versions of the same event as 18 follows: (a), a number of -- 19 A: Excuse me, if I could just ask you -- 20 Q: Certainly. 21 A: -- to go closer to the microphone. 22 Thank you. 23 Q: Certainly. I appreciate you have 24 allergy issues and it's blocking your hearing a little 25 bit today.

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1 A: Thank you. 2 Q: Okay. Thank you for reminding me. 3 If you received two (2) versions of the same event as 4 follows; I'm going to put a version to you and ask you 5 some questions about it. 6 First of all, a number of First Nation 7 occupiers attacked a female civilian's car with baseball 8 bats near the sandy parking lot, scenario A. 9 Scenario B, a protestor got into a heated 10 verbal dispute with an aboriginal Band Councillor who had 11 publicly denounced the occupation, and as the Band 12 Councillor drove away from the -- the site, a protestor 13 threw a rock at his sister's car and damaged it. 14 From an intelligence perspective would you 15 want to find out which version of the story was accurate? 16 A: Definitely. 17 Q: Why? 18 A: Well, certainly the first version 19 seemed to be somewhat unprovoked. It would seem to 20 demonstrate some hostility as a result of the occupation. 21 The second scenario would lead me to 22 believe that there was some sort of issue between the 23 Councillor and the protestors, and that although the 24 action of throwing the rock wasn't appropriate, they were 25 acting out as to their angst to that individual.

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1 Q: All right. And if you had those 2 versions of -- different versions of events, would you 3 then take steps, as you've described them, to put that 4 information through the intelligence cycle? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you'd want to do that before you 7 relayed those different versions to the Incident 8 Commander? 9 A: Yeah, certainly that would be the 10 ideal situation. However, having regard for the 11 situation, I think what I would do if it was information 12 that had been passed through me, I would make the 13 Incident Commander cognisant of the fact that we've 14 received this information and that I'm in the process of 15 determining the reliability. 16 But I would want him to have that at least 17 available to him -- 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: -- because of, as I say, that is a 20 piece of information that has been ongoing and it's 21 another more recent information and it's very timely. So 22 I'd want him aware of it, but I'd give him the caveat 23 that we're trying or attempting to put it through the 24 process and determine the reliability. 25 Q: So as to raise caution to him or a

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  1  flag to him that you haven't made ultimate determination
  2  yet? 
  3                 A:   Exactly.  Basically, we're still in
  4  the information stage; we haven't turned it into the
  5  intelligence stage. 
  6                 Q:   All right.  Fair enough.  After you
  7  received this information then from Mark Dew, did you
  8  return to your work on the profiles? 
  9                 A:   I don't believe I was working on the
 10  profiles at that time.  I have a notation, again,
 11  referring to page 41, Tab 6, that I again, as indicated,
 12  I can hear the transmission and I was aware that there
 13  was activity at the Park, so I remained in the area.
 14                 I believe I was more or less in a standby
 15  function to see if there was anything that we were going
 16  to have to provide from the intelligence side of the
 17  house. 
 18                 Q:   All right.  As at 21:15 p.m., from a
 19  tactical perspective, what had you identified as the
 20  greatest risk to the threat of public safety, based on
 21  the intelligence that you had been apprized of to date?
 22                 A:   Certainly I think we had to be
 23  cognizant that there was an availability of weapons.  In
 24  the morning, I believe, it was the morning of this date
 25  that we had the report of the live automatic gunfire.

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1 We also, I believe, either in the last 48 2 hours had a report of the sighting by the Officers of the 3 butt of the rifle. So I think from a public safety 4 standpoint and Officer safety standpoint, we had to be 5 cognizant that there was a possibility, at least, of the 6 availability of weapons in the Base/Park. 7 Q: All right. And was that the extent 8 of the threat assessment that you had to be alert or 9 cognizant to that possibility? 10 A: Well, I think we also had to be 11 cognizant of the fact if we utilize the binders and the 12 profiles, that there was also individuals in there that 13 had, in the past, demonstrated violent tendencies. 14 Again, you know, in this situation, in a 15 tactical component, we're only looking at, you know, the 16 worst case scenario. We're not taking into account that, 17 yes, there are peaceful people on there, we have to take 18 into account the non-peaceful component. 19 So from a threat assessment we're looking 20 at, yes, there's a possibility for the availability of 21 weapons, yes, there are people in there that in the past 22 have demonstrated violence, so that's what we have to be 23 cognizant of. 24 And yes, we have to also be aware of that 25 emotions are extremely high right now because we have

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1 individuals that are involved in an occupation that they 2 have a strong belief in. 3 So there's several components there that 4 you have to be aware of. 5 Q: As at 21:15 p.m., did you have any 6 information in your possession, any reliable information 7 in your possession which caused you concern that there 8 may be some type of offensive activity that evening by 9 the occupiers? 10 A: I didn't have that information. 11 Q: All right. Now, you indicated that 12 later that evening you were -- you were in the Forest 13 Detachment working up your profile books and you had 14 occasion to at least by privy to radio communications 15 between the CMU and the Command during the course of the 16 deployment? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And do you have any recollection 19 about any of those transmissions that you overheard? 20 A: The only recollection I could -- I 21 have is that it was obvious that tensions were high and 22 that the team had been deployed and it appeared as though 23 it was, you know, wasn't going as planned. 24 Q: All right. And is the next thing of 25 significance which happens involve a -- involving you at

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1 least, evolve around a visit from Trevor Richardson at 2 23:41? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: And you were in the -- still in the 5 Forest Detachment at that time? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And what does he tell you has 8 happened? 9 A: Again, I'm going to refer to my notes 10 at Tab 6, page 42. 11 Q: Definitely. 12 A: More or less, Trevor had asked me to 13 attend and had asked me to accompany him. As a result, 14 it had been learned that a -- we were looking for a 15 white, Chevrolet motor vehicle that was -- reportedly had 16 a flat tire and it was believed to be transporting a 17 Native person that had been -- that had been shot. 18 And we believed that the vehicle was in 19 the area of the Nauvoo Road and Brick Yard and Burnham. 20 At the time I had a greater familiarization as to the 21 area, so my -- my -- that would have meant something to 22 me at that time. 23 Q: Okay. And did Trevor Richardson tell 24 you anything of the circumstances which had given rise to 25 the situation in which there was an individual with an

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1 injury in a car? 2 A: I believe, and again, I don't have a 3 note of this, but my recollection would put that we did 4 have a discussion while en route as to what happened, and 5 the fact that it was possible that we had shot the 6 individual. We being the -- an OPP Member. 7 Q: All right. And so did you have an 8 understanding that this was a suspected gunshot injury? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. And did he tell you what 11 the -- his information was -- the source of his 12 information with respect to pursuing a white Chevrolet? 13 A: The source of his information? 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: I don't believe so. 16 Q: He just basically told you that's 17 what we're looking for? 18 A: We're looking for the white 19 Chevrolet. 20 Q: All right. And so what did you do? 21 A: We were ultimately travelling towards 22 Strathroy Hospital. We took the route that we believed 23 the white Chevrolet -- Chevrolet would take in a -- 24 travelling to the nearest medical facility. 25 Q: What route was that?

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1 A: We travelled on the Nauvoo Road to 2 Highway 402 and then Highway 402 to Highway 81. 3 Q: Actually can we just back up for a 4 moment? I think you -- I -- I'd like to know first of 5 all when you left the Forest Detachment where did you go? 6 A: What route? 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: Eleven (11) years ago I could tell 9 you that route. 10 Q: Did you go -- did you go to the 11 Nauvoo Road residence? 12 A: No, we didn't go to the residence. 13 Q: All right. You went straight to the 14 hospital? 15 A: No, we -- I believe we took a route 16 that, you know, we felt would be the route that the white 17 Chev would have taken. 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: Our goal was, having regard for the 20 fact that the white Chevrolet had reported to have an 21 injured person in it, and it had a flat tire the chances 22 of us -- of -- of them getting immediate medical 23 attention wasn't as fast as we could provide it. 24 Also the chances of driving a motor 25 vehicle with a broke -- sorry, a flat tire isn't very

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1 safe and other possible injuries could occur. It was our 2 intention to be able to intercept the vehicle and 3 ascertain in fact if there was an individual in there 4 requiring medical attention and then be in a position 5 either to provide first aid ourselves or get EMS in the 6 area that could transport in a faster manner. 7 Q: Was one (1) of the purposes of 8 pursuing this vehicle also to see whether there were any 9 suspects in it? 10 A: At the time I wasn't articulated any 11 grounds for myself that could make arrests, however, 12 Trevor was provided with grounds for arrest in the event 13 individuals were involved with the -- the incident at the 14 -- the Park. 15 Q: All right. And did you encounter 16 this car en route to the Strathroy Hospital? 17 A: While en route and subsequently 18 attending the Strathroy Hospital at three (3) minutes 19 after midnight we had not seen the car. 20 Q: Okay. And what did you do when you 21 arrived at the hospital and you see -- you don't see the 22 car in the parking lot? 23 A: We returned and were retracing our 24 steps and we were going to attempt to try to locate the 25 vehicle on our way back to Forest.

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1 Q: And what type of a -- a car were you 2 in? Were you in a marked cruiser or an -- 3 A: No. 4 Q: -- unmarked car? 5 A: We were in a plain -- plain police 6 car. 7 Q: When you say, "plain" -- 8 A: An unmarked -- unmarked police car. 9 Q: Unmarked police car? So...? 10 A: No lights, no identifiers. 11 Q: Okay. Thank you. And as you went -- 12 went to retrace your route from the hospital what 13 happened? 14 A: When we returned onto Highway 81 we 15 observed the -- the -- at eight (8) minutes after 16 midnight which I believe now is the 7th of September. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: We observed the white Chevrolet and 19 it was obvious although it was in the distance because 20 you could see the sparks coming off the rim from the flat 21 tire. The vehicle was southbound on Highway 81 and I 22 noted it was in the vicinity of MacDonald Chev Olds. 23 And to assist the Inquiry although I 24 don't have a very good recollection of the geography of 25 the lay of the land in Forest in 1995 I did grow up in

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1 Strathroy so I have a very good knowledge of Strathroy 2 and the landmarks in the vicinity of the hospital as to 3 where we were. 4 Q: Yes, so how far away were you from 5 the hospital? 6 A: At this time we were probably within 7 a couple of kilometres. 8 Q: Okay. And what did you do or what 9 did you and -- and Officer Richardson do when you saw 10 this white Chevrolet with the tire rim? 11 A: Well, it was also noted at that time 12 that a -- a marked Strathroy Police Service cruiser was 13 in the area as well and that vehicle actually pulled in 14 front of our vehicle and -- and engaged in following the 15 white Chevrolet as well. 16 Q: So did you turn -- did you have to 17 turn around, do a U-turn? 18 A: Yes, we had to turn around. 19 Q: And follow the car? 20 A: We proceeded northbound, turned 21 around, proceeded southbound. 22 Now, because of my familiarity with the 23 area I knew that it was prudent to continue on to the 24 hospital in order to seek medical attention. Also, as 25 far as stopping the vehicle if there was an opportunity

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1 or if there were people that may have been of particular 2 concern to the police it was the best area from a safety 3 standpoint and to get emergency services people to assist 4 if there was an injured person in there. 5 Q: So you didn't attempt to stop the 6 car? 7 A: Didn't attempt to stop the car. It 8 was I believe prudent on our part to continue on having 9 regard for the information on the injured party and we 10 were basically -- we were within minutes from the 11 hospital. 12 Q: All right. 13 A: So we continued to the hospital. We 14 proceeded 81 Highway and I believe it's Pannell Lane and 15 then into the actual hospital property itself. And the 16 hospital has a canopy or I think I refer to it in my 17 notes as a tunnel area in the emergency area. 18 Our vehicle pulled in front of the Chev 19 vehicle as we arrived at the hospital and the Chev 20 vehicle -- the white vehicle would have been in the 21 middle and the Strathroy Police vehicle was behind us. 22 Q: So the trunk -- at the trunk side of 23 the car? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And you were at -- at the hood side--

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1 A: The hood side -- 2 Q: -- of it? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. Then what happened? 5 A: At that time I attended at the -- the 6 vehicle and I attended at the passenger door behind the 7 driver. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: And I observed a male lying on the 10 rear seat and I observed a young male seated in the area 11 behind the driver. I observed the female exit the 12 vehicle on the other side -- front passenger side. 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: I asked the young male to exit the 15 vehicle and attend with me at the front of our vehicle. 16 Q: Why was that? Why did you do that? 17 A: I wanted -- there was three (3) 18 people in the vehicle. Trevor was attending to one (1) 19 of them. I had the person in the back. I believe the 20 Strathroy Officer was tending to the female party. 21 Q: All right. So Trevor Richardson took 22 charge of the driver? 23 A: I believe so. 24 Q: You took charge of the back seat 25 passenger?

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1 A: Yeah. 2 Q: Someone else took charge of the 3 female passenger? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And who took charge of Dudley -- 6 sorry, of the individual? 7 A: The medical staff at the hospital. 8 Q: All right. Carry on? 9 A: In -- as to whether Trevor had the 10 driver -- I can't say 100 percent. I took the passenger 11 and that's what I made note of. But the other parties 12 were looked after by the officers on scene. 13 Q: And what was your impressions of this 14 individual that you took charge of; description, his 15 demeanour? 16 A: The individual in -- if I can refer 17 to my notes on -- and go through that? 18 Q: Certainly. 19 A: Okay. Again, page 43, Tab 6. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: I attended the -- asked the young 22 male to exit the vehicle and obviously he appeared young 23 to me. 24 Q: A minor? 25 A: It was difficult -- to be quite

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1 candid at that time, he was young. You can appreciate 2 that you're a little pumped up with regards to the 3 situation that had gone on. But I made note that he was 4 young so it was -- it would appear that he was obviously 5 a young offender. A young -- young person, sorry. 6 Q: Thank you. 7 A: He verbally identified himself to me 8 and we engaged in a -- I engaged in -- in talking to him. 9 I asked him some questions. Asked him what had happened 10 and he stated that he was at Stoney Point. 11 I asked him what he meant by that. He 12 stated that he was with -- sorry, that he was at the Base 13 when his uncle came in and he had been shot. That they 14 put him in the car and drove him to the hospital. 15 I asked him who he was with and he stated 16 he was with two (2) other individuals. He stated that he 17 had to keep his hand over where his uncle was shot. He 18 stated he was shot over the heart -- over his heart. 19 I observed blood on his hands and the 20 bottom of his pants. He was calm in his demeanour and he 21 understood my questions. He answered without hesitation. 22 Q: And what did you take from that 23 observation that he answered without hesitation and was 24 calm? 25 A: You know, I didn't feel that he was

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1 being -- he felt obligated to answer my question. 2 Certainly my interpretation of the event and my full 3 recollection of how it happened is I asked him out of the 4 car and we engaged in a dialogue. 5 Q: All right. And -- 6 A: And he was receptive to it. 7 Q: All right. So he was cooperative? 8 A: Yeah. There was -- at no time did he 9 ever say I don't want to talk to you or there was no 10 further questions on his behalf with regards to what was 11 going on, he just -- we just had a talk. 12 Q: And did he seem forthcoming to you? 13 A: His answers, as I say, were without 14 hesitation. 15 Q: Did -- did you -- did he give you any 16 reason to disbelieve what he was saying to you? 17 A: Well, if I can continue on? 18 Q: Definitely. 19 A: I asked him what had happened. He 20 stated that Dudley was at the gun fight. He didn't know 21 anything else about the incident. I asked him how many 22 people were at the Base and he said about a hundred and 23 fifty (150). 24 I asked him how many guns were on the Base 25 and he stated none. We're not allowed to have any guns

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1 or to have guns. And at that point I asked for a uniform 2 to attend and eventually carried -- conducted an arrest. 3 Q: Now, when -- when this individual 4 said to you that there were no guns because they weren't 5 allowed to have any, how did you assess that response? 6 A: At that point, I didn't think that 7 was being portrayed to me in an accurate manner, or that 8 he did not have -- was not privy to all the facts that 9 were available. 10 Q: Hmm hmm. 11 A: Or all the information that was 12 available. 13 Q: All right. Did you prompt him in any 14 way with respect to that answer? 15 A: No. 16 Q: So it came out spontaneously? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And based on your assessment of the 19 situation, did you believe that you had grounds to 20 execute and arrest this individual? 21 A: The grounds for the arrest were those 22 that were articulated to me by Trevor on the way down. 23 He didn't articulate to me the exact grounds, but it was 24 my understanding that the people involved were going to 25 be arrested for, I believe, conspiracy to -- or to commit

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1 attempt murder as a result of the incident at the Park. 2 Q: All right. But you weren't privy to 3 the factual assumptions underlying that? 4 A: No, that was -- and again, I'm the 5 intelligence side of the house. At that time Trevor had 6 both capacities still and that's why he had been 7 articulated the grounds. And again, his primary 8 function, I would say, at that time, was now to look 9 after and to assist in the investigation surrounding the 10 incident at the Park. 11 Q: Now when you approached this vehicle 12 and looked inside of it, did you see any weapons of any 13 kind, either in the car or in the possession of any of 14 the occupants of the car? 15 A: My time -- the answer to that 16 question is no. However, I would like to qualify that 17 and say I didn't -- I didn't search that vehicle. I 18 attended at the door and quickly asked the male subject 19 to get out and accompany me. And that's what happened. 20 Q: All right. You said you handed over 21 this individual to another Officer to be arrested, who 22 was that Officer? 23 A: Constable Walt Vanessen of Chatham 24 OPP. 25 Q: All right. When you had looked in

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1 the car initially, you observed the injured party as 2 well. Can you tell me what the -- what you recall of 3 him? 4 A: To the best of my recollection, it 5 didn't appear as though he was alive at the time. 6 Q: And what was the basis of your 7 observation? 8 A: He wasn't moving. 9 Q: All right. Now, in the meantime, as 10 you were having this conversation with this young 11 individual -- first of all, did you come to know his 12 identity? 13 A: Yes, I did. 14 Q: And what was it? 15 A: I believe he identified himself to me 16 as J. George. 17 Q: Okay. And did you have an 18 opportunity to see or to see what was going on in the 19 vicinity of the white Chevrolet as you were having your 20 conversation with J. George? 21 A: I was focussed on this individual. 22 Q: All right. So you didn't see what 23 transpired? Were you able to see what became of the 24 driver and the female passenger? 25 A: No.

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1 Q: Did you see them being arrested? 2 A: No. 3 Q: Did you observe the person in the 4 back seat of the car who was injured, did you observe him 5 being attended to? 6 A: No. 7 Q: Did you see him being taken into the 8 hospital? 9 A: No, I saw him in the hospital after. 10 Q: I see. All right. Now, after you 11 handed over the young man to Officer Vanessen to be 12 arrested, did you -- did you follow him? Did you observe 13 his arrest? 14 A: Did I observe Vanessen arresting him? 15 Q: Yes. 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. What did you do then 18 after you handed him over? 19 A: I attended -- I attended inside the 20 hospital -- 21 Q: All right. 22 A: -- and made my notes. And then stood 23 by, in a, for lack of a better term, a security function, 24 until Trevor was prepared to leave and return to Forest. 25 Q: All right. And were you provided

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1 with any further details at that time with respect to the 2 grounds for -- upon which the individuals were going to 3 be arrested? 4 A: No. 5 Q: And how long did you stay at the 6 hospital in the security function? 7 A: Approximately one (1) hour. 8 Q: And did you leave at approximately 9 1:25 a.m.? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: Now, prior to turning over J. George 12 to Officer Vanessen, had you given any thought as to 13 whether this young man should first talk -- be allowed to 14 talk to the treating health care professionals, given the 15 fact that he was a relation, obviously, that you knew, of 16 the injured person and -- and that he might have some 17 knowledge about the circumstances of the injury or the -- 18 the history, medical history of the man? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Why not? 21 A: Why didn't I think it would help 22 here? 23 Q: Why didn't you think about that, yes? 24 A: Certainly, you know, as police 25 officers, sometimes we get caught up in the emotion of

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1 the event and our focus is strictly on the activity, and 2 that being a criminal activity. And I'd say that we've 3 come a long way from 1995 to current, as regards to the - 4 - dealing with victims, dealing with accused, dealing 5 with individuals who may have been accused in this case. 6 Certainly, in hindsight, that would have 7 been something that should have been considered. Whether 8 that be considered by myself or those that were 9 conducting the arrest, that's difficult to say, but 10 certainly I agree with you that the individual should 11 have been given the opportunity to talk to somebody. 12 Q: All right. Did you learn of the fate 13 of the man who was in the back seat of the car? 14 A: Yes, I did. 15 Q: And what did learn of that? 16 A: That he passed away. 17 Q: Did you learn his identity? 18 A: Yes, I did. 19 Q: And who was that? 20 A: Anthony George. 21 Q: Did anything of significance or of 22 note occur at the hospital while you were there, 23 obviously after the arrest, once you were there in a 24 security capacity? 25 A: Mr. George was in a receiving room or

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1 a separate room in the -- in the hospital where he had 2 been treated and looked at by medical personnel. 3 Q: I'm sorry, which Mr. George are you 4 referring to now? 5 A: Anthony. 6 Q: Thank you. 7 A: The deceased. And again, because 8 this was now the criminal component I had to take a back 9 seat, for lack of a better term, and I believe a family 10 member, I don't -- I believe it was a family member, but 11 definitely an individual did attend and wanted to perform 12 a ceremony of some sort with relating to the deceased. 13 Q: All right. An Aboriginal ceremony? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Okay. And do you know what 16 transpired in that connection? 17 A: I believe there was a concern because 18 I believe it involved some sort of fire and there was 19 concern over the oxygen and that in the hospital, 20 however, I do believe that ultimately it was -- it was 21 carried on. 22 Q: All right. Can you describe what the 23 scene was like at the hospital in the aftermath of the 24 arrival of Anthony George? 25 A: I'd say it was relatively hectic.

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1 Q: Hectic? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Did you receive any information with 4 respect to any other injured First Nations persons at the 5 hospital? 6 A: I believe people were coming in, 7 other -- I believe other injured parties were coming in, 8 however, I had no contact with them, but it's my 9 recollection that I believe there were two (2) other 10 parties that came in. 11 Q: All right. Where did you go after 12 you left the Strathroy Hospital? 13 A: I attended with Trevor, we returned 14 back to Forest Detachment at -- again referring to my 15 notes page 45, Tab 6. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: And I spoke to, sorry, Detective -- 18 Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright and was advised 19 that Whitehead and myself were to return tomorrow morning 20 at nine o'clock. 21 Q: All right. And you arrived back at 22 around 2:00 in the morning? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: At Forest. And you had this 25 conversation and then you left Forest Detachment at about

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1 3:00 a.m.? 2 A: Actually I left at 2:15 and I 3 returned to London and got there about 3:00 a.m. 4 Q: Oh, fair enough. Thank you very 5 much. All right. 6 Commissioner, we're -- we're five (5) 7 minutes early but it would be a convenient time to break 8 rather than forging into the next area. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 10 We'll break for lunch now. 11 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 12 adjourned until 1:00 p.m. 13 14 --- Upon recessing at 11:55 a.m. 15 --- Upon resuming at 1:01 p.m. 16 17 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 18 resumed, please be seated. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. Good 21 afternoon. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 23 afternoon. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA:

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1 Q: We left off this morning before lunch 2 at the conclusion of your shift September 6th and into 3 the early hours of September 7th. And I wonder now if we 4 can turn our attention to the beginning of your day shift 5 on September the 7th. 6 And your note reference would be page 46, 7 Tab 6 of the Maple notes. We're still on Exhibit P-1641. 8 A: Okay. 9 Q: Thank you. I understand that you 10 received a page at 6:45 a.m. from Sergeant Margaret Eve? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And what was that about? 13 A: Sergeant Eve requested intelligence 14 information regarding information that we received that 15 an individual had returned to Walpole Island, it 16 indicates there it was referred to Mr. Isaac, is believed 17 to be recruiting Warriors to attend at Ipperwash. At 18 that time I called Detective Constable Darryl Whitehead 19 of the JFO and updated him regarding the information. 20 I requested that he meet me at my 21 residence to travel to Forest. I called Constable Keegan 22 who was the London JFO RCMP member, First Nations 23 dossier, to check his sources regarding the request. 24 And I called Detective Constable Gary 25 Aspden, who was the Number 2 District or West DIC, to

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1 check his sources. At seven o'clock I returned a call to 2 Forest and spoke with Detective Sergeant Hudson and 3 advised that we didn't have any contact specifically to 4 Walpole. 5 However, we were checking with Oneida and 6 our Provincial sources, and I would advise if we received 7 any information. 8 Q: Okay. And I'm sorry, what was the 9 last thing you said? Sorry. The very last sentence that 10 you read. 11 A: That I would advise Detective 12 Sergeant Hudson if we received any information. 13 Q: Okay, fair enough. And did you 14 ultimately receive any relevant information in pursuant 15 to this request? 16 A: I don't believe that we were able to 17 substantiate that information. 18 Q: All right. And at 7:45 a.m., did you 19 receive further information of significance? 20 A: Received infor -- believed to be 21 source information, it's redacted; believed reliable 22 information regarding a public meeting to be called this 23 morning. 24 The shooting apparently had united the 25 groups, that is the groups that were on the Base and

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1 those that were at Kettle and Stony Point. 2 They were talking, the First Nations 3 people were talking about organizing a group that could 4 surround the police; that is the First Nations at the 5 Base, the First Nations behind the lines. 6 And indicated that they wanted an inquiry 7 ASAP. Stated there was no guns there. I requested the 8 CI to call me reference any Oneida activity. 9 Q: All right. And just for our 10 information, the fact that you made a notation at 7:45 11 beside the redacted information as BR or believed 12 reliable, does that mean that you came to that assessment 13 on your own? 14 A: Yes. That -- that informant -- and I 15 can -- is the informant that was providing information to 16 Detective Sergeant Lollar. 17 Q: Okay. So that was the basis of your 18 reliability assessment. All right. And I understand 19 then at 8:00 a.m. you were assigned some intelligence 20 tasks? 21 A: Actually, that's myself assigning 22 intelligence gathering tasks. 23 Q: Thank you. 24 A: What we were doing is establishing 25 what I've referred to as an intelligence network to

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1 respond to the unfortunate incident the night before, to 2 gather intelligence, not only at a local level, but 3 provincial and national, if at all possible, as to 4 intelligence regarding basically individuals that may be 5 coming in support or assist this occupation as a result 6 of what happened. 7 So Detective Constable Whitehead was 8 assigned to liaise with the No. 3 District Intelligence 9 Coordinator, and particularly to see if there was any 10 response from Six Nations First Nations territory. 11 Gus Riddell is a Detective Constable in 12 the intelligence branch in headquarters in Orillia. He 13 was assigned to follow-up with the Eastern Ontario DIC's 14 and, in particular, the Cornwall Akwe -- it doesn't say 15 Cornwall Akwesasne but it would have been Cornwall and 16 Akwesasne. Gary Aspden, who as I alluded to earlier, 17 was the number 2 DHQ DIC and he was tasked with Oneida 18 and Muncey. 19 And then at 8:25 I contacted Pete Lollar 20 of general headquarters and he was to contact his sources 21 at CSIS to obtain a provincial overview. 22 Q: Yes. And then at 8:40 you update 23 Carl Armstrong, is it? 24 A: Yes, update Carl Armstrong, who is my 25 OPP Staff Sergeant in charge of the field units which I

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1 reported to within my capacity at London JFO. 2 Q: All right. And then there follows, 3 it looks like, two (2) contacts from CSIS? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And what was that about? 6 A: The information relates to -- 7 indicates that the First Nations people are talking and 8 that Six Nations -- people of the Six Nations are talking 9 to the individuals at Oneida. They're also talking to 10 Ipperwash. Stated that the calls were coming from the 11 Ipperwash parks store. And the number I believe there, 12 519-243-1255 is the number at the store. 13 Q: Okay. All right. And these calls 14 occurred at nine o'clock and 9:23? 15 A: Those -- this information is being 16 related to me from CSIS. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: So when those calls were taking place 19 I take it would be sometime from the incident of the 20 night before to the time I'm talking to them. 21 Q: Sorry. That's good for 22 clarification. I meant your calls with CSIS were at -- 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Okay. And then at 9:40 you are 25 speaking with -- with Aspden again -- Gary Aspden?

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1 A: At 9:40 I'm actually with Gary 2 Aspden. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: And we're having a meeting with a 5 confidential informant at the No Frills Grocery Store in 6 London. The -- it was at Highbury and Hamilton No Frills 7 Store. I was with Gary Aspden and I was -- we were in 8 Gary Aspden's vehicle meeting with the -- with the 9 source. 10 Would you like me to continue? 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: With regards to the -- the source was 13 advising that this grandmother -- their grandmother was a 14 clan mother on Oneida, and indicated they were associated 15 to individuals I believe on Oneida. 16 Stated that there was a green army phone 17 that they utilized to call from reserve to reserve. 18 And at 9:53 I spoke with Detective 19 Inspector Goodall, reference maintenance, which refers to 20 payment to the informant. I -- 10:01 I returned to -- 21 with Gary and further information was provided by the 22 informant indicating that they felt that the transformer 23 off of Wellington Road, west of Regina Mundi, which is a 24 school in London, will be blown up, and the reason of 25 that was to knock out power.

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1 He indicated that two (2) individuals last 2 week were discussing this. They were also looking at the 3 propane tank behind the London City Police as a possible 4 target. And having worked at London City Police 5 building, there is a large propane tank in the rear lot. 6 Tower 9-1-1; I'm not sure what the 7 significance of that -- sorry, Tower 91, I don't know 8 what the significance of that is but there's a redacted 9 area there. Perhaps this -- there may have been an 10 incident surrounding a hydro tower in 1991 because it 11 alludes later on on page 50 that individuals were 12 responsible for blowing up that tower. 13 And then they spoke about a tower that was 14 blown up last week in sup -- last week in support of the 15 Gustafsen Lake incident in BC. Spoke about their 16 girlfriend and clan mother; that everything had to be 17 more or less approved by the clan mother before it was 18 acted upon. 19 Q: All right. Now, it seems that at 20 this point in the operation the -- the number 1 risk or 21 threat that you have identified with respect to public 22 safety and officer safety is a concern that there's going 23 to be some type of retaliation from people other than the 24 occupiers? 25 A: Yes, the number 1 concern would

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1 appear to be that a united front would come to be in 2 support of the occupation as a result of what happened 3 the night before. 4 Q: It also appears that, at least in a - 5 - in a fairly short timeframe, a two (2) hour timeframe, 6 you have -- you've made a lot of progress in the sense of 7 speaking with sources, speaking to your contacts in other 8 intelligence networks and essentially gathering 9 information and processing it to a degree perhaps that -- 10 that was greater than before? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And is it fair to say that at this 13 stage in the operation that you have a great deal more 14 control if you will or direction, over the direction of 15 the intelligence and information gathering component of 16 the operation? 17 A: Yes, as a result of the incident that 18 occurred the night before Trevor certainly had a lot on 19 his plate. And although there was no formal, I would say 20 changing of the guard, with regards to the leadership and 21 the intelligence it was clear that it had -- that Trevor 22 had too much to do. 23 So as such I would say that an informal 24 reporting relationship took place outside of the 25 organizational chart where I assumed the intelligence

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1 responsibilities as far as supervising it and Trevor more 2 or less looked after the criminal side. 3 Q: All right. And were you comfortable 4 with that position? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And if we go to the scribe notes, Tab 7 6. 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Page 106. We're on September 7th 10 obviously. And if we look at the 11:41 -- the 11:41 a.m. 11 entry it would appear that you are briefing Inspector 12 Gordon on intelligence information. 13 Now, who is Inspector Gordon at this 14 stage? 15 A: I believe Inspector Gordon was the 16 Incident Commander for the day shift, and I believe he 17 was an inspector out of Number 6 District Headquarters 18 Mount Forest. 19 Q: And what was the purpose of your 20 briefing of him? 21 A: I'd be briefing Inspector Gordon with 22 regards to the information I had received from the CI in 23 London at the meeting we just discussed. 24 Q: All right. And did you express to 25 him any -- at least the -- relay the information with

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1 respect to concerns with respect to the possible influx 2 of personnel and weapons to the site? 3 A: I don't have specific notation of 4 that but it was, from my perspective, from my memory, I'd 5 be indicating to him that it appears as though there's a 6 -- a movement afoot from further outside attendance that 7 we should be aware of. 8 Q: And would you have been in a position 9 at that time to provide him with any degree of 10 reliability or trustworthiness with respect to that 11 information? 12 A: The information -- certainly the 13 information that we were receiving now is starting to be 14 developed and assigned more for liability factor. I 15 can't say for sure if I asked -- if I told him, you know, 16 with regards to the information I just discussed whether 17 it was believed reliable or not. But as we're -- we're 18 now starting to enter into the phase where we're going to 19 be preparing the written documents as alluded to I'm now 20 taking the role of supervisor. 21 Now, I'm going to implement measures that 22 I feel are significant. So as we go into the next phase 23 that's when we're going to be reporting to the Incident 24 Command the information received with reliability factors 25 attached to it.

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1 Q: And putting the information, if you 2 will, becoming more the -- the central conduit of -- of 3 raw data and information? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And putting it through the filter 6 that you would as an intelligence officer? 7 A: Yes. I -- I still want to make clear 8 at this time we still aren't -- don't have a formal 9 analyst -- 10 Q: Right. 11 A: -- but our expertise in conducting 12 the process of an intelligence cycle is there and we're 13 conducting an analysis based on our experience as 14 intelligence officers. 15 Q: All right. So this is informal but 16 nonetheless it's being implemented and practised? 17 A: Exactly. 18 Q: All right. And at 13:30 according to 19 the scribe notes, page 111, you are having a -- a 20 conversation with John Carson about a helicopter, and 21 he's making a request that you arrange to have the RCMP 22 helicopter put on standby in Sarnia or London. 23 Now, do you recall what -- what John 24 Carson's role was at this point, the afternoon following 25 the event?

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1 A: Sorry, what time was that? 2 Q: 13:30. 3 A: Okay. John Carson's role -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Page 111. 5 It's page 111. Are you on the same page? 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, yes. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 8 THE WITNESS: John Carson's role at that 9 time was the overall he -- regardless of who was in the 10 house. Like whether it's John -- Jim Gordon, John 11 Carson's the overall -- he would have control of the 12 situation. He was the overall as the Commander. 13 So on that occasion despite the fact that 14 I believe Jim Gordon was still there, John would be just 15 making sure that everything was being done according to 16 the way he wanted things. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: Are you sure that John Carson was 20 still the official Incident Commander? 21 A: At this time? 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: Unless the reins had been turned over 24 to somebody else that I'm not aware of. 25 Q: Inspector Gordon?

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1 A: No. That's what I said I think -- 2 sorry. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: I might have been going a little fast 5 there. Inspector Gordon was the onsite Incident 6 Commander, per se. 7 Q: Yes. Okay. 8 A: But there's no doubt in my mind that 9 John Carson oversaw the whole operation. 10 Q: He -- he -- 11 A: And it would -- 12 Q: -- he was still a go to person? 13 A: He was the man. 14 Q: Okay. Unofficially? 15 A: In my belief he was -- regardless of 16 who was onsite, if I was reporting -- if you ask me on 17 that date if John Carson or Jim Gordon was on site, who 18 I'd be reporting to, I would be going to John Carson. 19 Q: Fair enough. All right. And what 20 was the reference to the helicopter about? 21 A: I believe they wanted the helicopter 22 there to do aerials. 23 Q: Was there a discussion at time about 24 a Westcam? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And can you tell us what those 2 discussions concerned? 3 A: The Westcam is a -- basically a -- a 4 camera that's all -- capable of taking photo -- 5 photographs and imagery from considerable elevation and 6 the photo -- it would have been a mechanism to obtain 7 aerial photos of the Park, the Base, et cetera. 8 Q: Okay. And did the OPP have its own 9 Westcam at this time? 10 A: To be quite candid, I'm not sure if 11 we had our own Westcam at that time because as I recall 12 in '93 we were using the RCMP's equipment at that time. 13 I'm not sure if we had it at that -- we do 14 now. 15 Q: Okay, fair enough. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: And maybe just to -- to assist a 20 little, if you look at page 118 of the scribe notes, 21 still Tab 6, at 16:40 there's a reference: 22 "Don Bell advises Jim Gordon..." 23 Sorry. I'll wait til you get to your 24 notes. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: "Don Bell advises Jim Gordon and Dale 5 Linton that the RCMP helicopter is 6 grounded. It will be here tomorrow." 7 And does that assist your -- your 8 recollection with respect to whether -- what the purpose 9 of the RCMP helicopter was? 10 A: I believe that's further of our 11 conversation earlier in the day to have it attend -- to 12 assist in aerial photography. 13 Q: All right. So the Westcam? 14 A: The Westcam would be the mechanism 15 that we'd use. 16 Q: And prior to the -- the 7th, was a -- 17 was a Westcam in operation to your knowledge over the 18 site? 19 A: I'm not sure -- there may have been a 20 request prior but I don't know if it was available. 21 Q: And would that type of device be of 22 assistance in -- in information gathering? 23 A: It could be, depending on -- the 24 Westcam generally has a ground link and if it was -- if 25 you had specific things in mind to point the operator of

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1 the helicopter and the observer in the right direction, 2 it could provide you with some intelligence. 3 Q: All right. Now, perhaps you could go 4 next to page 130 of the scribe notes. And we're now 5 into, I believe, September 8th at thirteen (13) minutes 6 after midnight. And there's the following reference: 7 "Gerry Thompson and Dave Crane agree 8 they should have an analyst to go over 9 intelligence information." 10 Now, first of all, do you recall what 11 roles Gerry Thompson and Dave Crane played in the 12 operation at this time? 13 A: Yes, I do. Gerry Thompson was an 14 Inspector, I believe, from Barrie and Dave Crane was the 15 director of the intelligence branch at the time. 16 Inspector Thompson was serving as the Incident Commander 17 for that shift. 18 Dave Crane had been in Western Ontario on 19 another matter and a result of the incident had attended 20 the Forrest Detachment to -- to see what assistance I may 21 require, or as the Director what assistance the incident 22 command may require from his branch. 23 When Dave got there we had a conversation 24 as to what we had available to us as far as resources and 25 things that we -- we would like to improve the operation.

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1 And one (1) of the thing -- a couple of things that were 2 identified was one (1) the -- our office base wasn't 3 suitable for an intelligence operation. We would prefer 4 a more secure office, a more private type office to 5 provide a better working environment. And an analyst 6 would have benefit so -- 7 Q: And when you say "an analyst" do you 8 mean a classic analyst in the intelligence -- trained in 9 the intelligence system? 10 A: Yes. An analyst from headquarters. 11 Q: All right. And if you look at page 12 131, Dave Crane is indicating that the incident needs an 13 analyst so he has identified that as a need as the 14 Director of Intelligence. 15 A: As a result of our conversation -- 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: -- he's gone to Gerry Thompson and is 18 more or less telling Gerry that he sees that as a 19 requirement and I believe at that time they agreed that 20 an analyst would be provided. 21 Q: All right. And was one ultimately 22 provided? 23 A: In fact, two (2) analysts were 24 provided. Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Setts Cerilli 25 was assigned to provide analytical duties -- analytical

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1 capacity to the intelligence component of Ipperwash or 2 Project Maple. 3 And Acting Detective Sergeant Howard Birch 4 was assigned to provide analytical capacity to the 5 criminal or the Detective Inspector Goodall's side of the 6 operation. 7 Q: All right. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: And then if you look at page 150, 12 this is of the scribe notes. It's still September 8th 13 and the 17:14 hours and I don't think there will be a 14 notation in your note but let me just refer to the scribe 15 notes: 16 "Terry Bladon advised Jim Gordon that 17 he told Don Bell to make a book with 18 all intelligence information." 19 Now, can you tell us what -- what you were 20 directed to do? 21 A: Terry Bladon is a -- was a Staff 22 Sergeant out of 6 District Headquarters. And with 23 regards to the book I really don't have any recollection 24 of that. 25 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And if we go

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1 over to Tab 14, this is Inquiry Document Number 1002419. 2 I believe it's also part of Exhibit P-426, September 9th. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Okay. It's -- it's the 7 same Inquiry Document Number but this portion hasn't yet 8 been made an exhibit. What I have here are excerpts 9 which relate to Don Bell from September 9th to September 10 24th, an intelligence section briefing note, and I would 11 ask that this be made the next exhibit? 12 THE REGISTRAR: Is that Tab 14, Ms. 13 Vella. 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Yes. 15 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. P-1652, Your 16 Honour. 17 18 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1652: Document Number 1002419. OPP 19 scribe notes from September 20 09 to September 24, 1995. 21 22 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And it will be 23 important to note that these are only excerpts from the 24 scribe notes that I've made exhibits. All right. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 4 Q: And you'll see that the 13:00 hour 5 notation September 9: 6 "Don Bell requests printout of all 7 notes since 04 September until this 8 date." 9 And does this represent your attempt to 10 start to have a more formalized process with respect to 11 written reports and having all the documents, the reports 12 in one (1) place? 13 A: I believe that's referring to the 14 scribe notes. 15 Q: Yes. 16 A: And my intent there was -- if you 17 recall during the actual incident my knowledge was 18 basically based on what I overheard in the Forest 19 Detachment from radio transmissions or, you know, 20 sporadic conversations through Trevor. 21 So I wanted that to provide myself and the 22 other intelligence officer with more of a thorough 23 background of what had transpired to-date and to see, in 24 fact, if we could pull anything out of that or draw any 25 conclusions from the information that we'd received up

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1 until that to assist us in the reliability of the 2 information. 3 Q: So you're trying to bring all the 4 information into one (1) space? 5 A: Exactly. 6 Q: And then you're going to take a look 7 at it with your fellow intelligence officers and process 8 it in a way that you -- you normally would? 9 A: It would be also, you know, available 10 to Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Cerilli as he begins 11 to conduct his analytical review. 12 Q: Okay. And at page 174, this is 13 September 10th, 1995, of the scribe notes, it follows the 14 9:50 a.m. entry, the bottom: 15 "Don Bell and Intelligence Unit has 16 moved to Grand Bend office now?" 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: So this is pursuant to your request 19 to have a more secure office space? 20 A: That -- that was actually two-fold -- 21 Q: Hmm hmm. 22 A: -- in that if you recall in my 23 previous comments I spoke about intelligence reporting 24 generally to the higher level of command. And in fact 25 that Chief Superintendent Coles had secured office space

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1 at Grand Bend. 2 So in conjunction in our -- with our 3 request for a better working environment and in fact with 4 Chief Coles being in Grand Bend we moved to that 5 location. 6 Q: All right. Now, in the -- in the 7 days following the events of September the 6th, 1995, did 8 you observe a change in the intelligence component and 9 process under Project Maple? 10 A: The date was after September 6th? 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: Well, certainly as it became more of 13 a responsibility of the Intelligence Section per se, with 14 the JFO taking more of a leadership category, it became a 15 more formalized intelligence process. The information 16 was being as later, you know, Detective Inspector 17 Hutchison put the decree out that it would all come to 18 us. 19 But basically since -- after the incident 20 the information was coming to us for the most part and 21 that allowed us to have the one (1) repository of 22 information, allowed us to have -- prepare our executive 23 summaries and present one (1) document twice a day to the 24 Incident Commander. 25 Now, if something required -- it was a

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1 more of an urgent nature, certainly we could exercise 2 either meeting in person or via the telephone but a more 3 formalized written form had been commenced -- had 4 commenced after the 6th. 5 Q: And who and what do you believe 6 prompted that change to a more formalized intelligence 7 process as you have described it? 8 A: Myself. 9 Q: And what prompted it? 10 A: Well, certainly the dynamics of the 11 incident changed. I -- I think I've explained it in some 12 detail what my opinions and my beliefs were with regards 13 to the intelligence process prior to the incident of -- 14 unfortunate incident with Mr. George. 15 In that case I felt that Inspector Carson 16 could fulfill the role of an analyst, could digest the 17 information and make the appropriate tactical decisions 18 and tactical priorities based on the local officers, his 19 knowledge, and the information that was being provided 20 from the various, for lack of a better term, intelligence 21 tentacles. 22 Certainly they -- at that time we had a 23 good grasp of what was going on in the Park with regards 24 to the occupiers and as I alluded to earlier I felt that 25 in many cases the information that we were dealing with

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1 wasn't intelligence but information that was fact, based 2 on the local knowledge. 3 Post September 6th the dynamics changed 4 and as we've indicated in the early stages here we've 5 seen that there is a definite interest from outside First 6 Nations territories and certainly there was support from 7 non-First Nations people. 8 The dynamics were changing and we were 9 going to have a whole new group of people that possibly 10 were attending; individuals that the local law 11 enforcement community or the local community as a whole 12 would not be in a position to assess what kind of people 13 they are. 14 Q: Hmm hmm. 15 A: Whether they were not in a position 16 to judge, whether they were there in a peaceful support 17 or they were there with some other alternative means. 18 As such, I thought it was incumbent to put 19 measures in place where we could have a formal process, 20 where we could do the collection and more importantly the 21 evaluation collation in analysis, because we weren't in a 22 position now to have that one central figure that could 23 that. 24 And in doing so, I felt that that would be 25 to better prepare the Incident Commander to make the

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1 appropriate tactical decisions that he may be forced to 2 face in the future. 3 Q: And if we look at Tab 13, Inquiry 4 Document 2004366 as an example of the formalization of 5 the intelligence process that you directed, there are a 6 series of intelligence reports starting at September 7, 7 1995 and proceeding through -- well the last one's 8 September 7th as well. 9 In any event, are these -- this is -- this 10 is an example of the formalization of the process; is 11 that fair? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: I would like to make this the next 14 exhibit, please. 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1653, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1653: Document Numbers 2004366, 18 2004367, 2004368, 2004370, 19 2004372, 2004373, 2004374, 20 2004383, 2004385, 2004386, 21 2004388, 2004389 and 2004391. 22 Intelligence Reports and Tip 23 and Information sheet, 24 September 07, 1995. 25

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1 THE WITNESS: And again, I bring 2 attention to the notation at the top right corner 3 000195WR/DP. As this document would then be going on the 4 formal computer databank. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 7 Q: And does this mean by September the 8 7th, or thereabouts, you also had the rights to the -- 9 the White Rose database? 10 A: No, I don't believe we had it that 11 quickly. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: I believe it was some time after that 14 it -- 15 Q: In September though? 16 A: -- is in the notes. Pardon me? It 17 was in September, yes. 18 Q: And this is an enhanced database with 19 greater research capabilities or search capabilities than 20 the one that you had been using earlier? 21 A: Yes. And more -- and it was on site 22 as well. 23 Q: All right. Was there -- first of 24 all, did you now have a direct reporting relationship to 25 the Incident Commander?

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1 A: I was reporting to Hutch -- sorry, 2 Detective Inspector Hutchinson. 3 Q: All right. 4 A: Now I don't know if that reporting 5 relationship commenced on the 12th. There may be some 6 indication that it commenced on or about the 9th. 7 Q: All right. Prior to that though, 8 were you communi -- communicating directly to the 9 Incident Commander? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. So there's no 12 intermediary? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And was there a focus or a component 15 on strategic intelligence in the days following September 16 the 6th? 17 A: We did not enter a strategic capacity 18 the days after. The situation was, in my opinion, it's 19 still extremely volatile. And our priorities at that 20 time would remain tactical. 21 Q: Okay. Is it fair to say that the 22 level of formal intelligence analysis and evaluation was 23 stepped up? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And it became more concentrated under

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1 your leadership? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And in your view, did this new 4 system, if you will, enhance the subsequent Incident 5 Commander's abilities to make informed decisions? 6 A: In my opinion, I don't believe it 7 enhanced his position to make decisions, but I believe it 8 provided him the -- an opportunity to make informed 9 tactical decisions based on the information we were 10 providing. 11 I don't want to make that to seem as 12 though he was in a better position now than he was 13 before, because as I eluded to you before, with the 14 exception of the tentacles, I still believe he was in a 15 position to be the central repository and make the 16 appropriate decisions. 17 Q: Okay. You're speaking to John 18 Carson? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And -- but that -- what about the 21 others? The other -- the subsequent Incident Commanders, 22 Gordon, Thompson? 23 A: The -- their position would have been 24 enhanced by the new process. 25 Q: All right.

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1 A: Excuse me, whenever I think of 2 Incident Commander I automatically think Inspector 3 Carson. 4 Q: That's fair. And -- and that's -- 5 that's because they didn't have the same degree of 6 history or experience as -- as John Carson had with this 7 situation? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: Just like Inspector Linton didn't 10 have the same degree of experience or history with the 11 situation. 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: Now in terms of the amount of raw 14 data that you were having to re -- that you were 15 receiving in the days following the events of September 16 the 6th, is it fair to say that you were receiving as 17 much or more raw data than you had in the days 18 immediately preceding the incident? 19 A: The JFO component or the true 20 intelligence role, yes, we were. And I think just by 21 virtue of the fact that everything was coming through to 22 us, increased our workload. 23 Q: And not -- notwithstanding the 24 increase in the volume of -- of information and raw data, 25 you were still able to implement the formalized

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1 intelligence process with written reports? 2 A: That's correct. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Now, is it fair to say that there was 7 a change in the lead, if you will, in terms of the 8 intelligence initiative, from what we had described 9 earlier as regional intelligence to general headquarters, 10 after this -- the -- the events of September 6th? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: All right. 13 A: Now, probably the -- an opportune 14 time for me to speak of the -- our capacity at this time. 15 When we became a formalized intelligence structure, those 16 officers that were intelligence officers, being the DIC's 17 such as Aspden, Hernandez, I believe, had another role, 18 but they became part of our intelligence team. 19 Our complement also increased in that we 20 had twenty-four (24) hour coverage. And I believe Jeff 21 Gray and Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Miller became 22 part of our team as well. 23 We also had Detective Constable 24 Hackenbrok, I believe, come in on a full-time basis for a 25 period of time. So our complement more or less doubled

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1 from the time pre -- pre-September 6th. 2 Q: Okay. And so you had coverage now 3 basically 24/7? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And who -- who directed the doubling 6 in the intelligence component of this police operation? 7 A: I think that would have been in 8 conjunction with myself and Detective Inspector 9 Hutchinson. 10 Q: All right. Now, if you go to Tabs 16 11 through 23 of Commission Counsel brief, and I'll -- I'll 12 go through them one by one. 13 The first is Intelligence Section Briefing 14 Note dated September 12, 1995 and it's Inquiry Document 15 2004564. 16 Then at Tab 17, Intelligence Section 17 Briefing Note dated September 13, 1995 and Inquiry 18 Document Number 2004579. 19 And then another briefing note September 20 14th, 1995 at Tab 18 at 2004590. 21 Intelligence Section briefing note dated 22 September 15, 1995, 2004597. 23 Intelligence Section briefing note at Tab 24 20 for September 16, 1995, 2004607. 25 At Tab 21 Intelligence Section briefing

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1 notes September 18, 1995, 2004628. 2 At Tab 22 the intelligence Section 3 briefing notes dated September 19, 1995 at 2004636. 4 And, finally, at Tab 23 Intelligence 5 Section note -- briefing notes for September 20, 1995, 6 2004646. 7 And these are all part of the product or 8 the result of a formalized intelligence process? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: All right. And I'd like each of 11 these documents to be made -- I guess we should make them 12 an exhibit per tab. 13 THE REGISTRAR: Per tab? 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Yes, per tab. So, Tab 15 16 would be...? 16 THE REGISTRAR: P-1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 17 1658, 1659, 1660, 1661. 18 MS. SUSAN VELLA: So that's Tabs 16 19 through 23 respectively, for the record. Thank you. 20 21 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1654: Document number 2004564. 22 Intelligence Section, 23 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt Don 24 Bell, September 12, 1995. 25 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1655: Document Number 2004579.

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1 Intelligence Section. 2 Briefing Notes of Det/Sgt Don 3 .Bell, September 13, 1995. 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1656: Document Number 2004590. 5 Intelligence Section, 6 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt Don 7 Bell and Det/Cst. Whitehead, 8 September 14, 1995. 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1657: Document Number 2004597. 10 Intelligence Section, 11 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. 12 D.W. Bell, September 15, 13 1995. 14 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1658: Document Number 2004607. 15 Intelligence Section. 16 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. 17 D.W. Bell, September 16, 18 1995. 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1659: Document Number 2004628. 20 Intelligence Section, 21 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt. 22 D.W. Bell, September 18, 23 1995. 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1660: Document Number 2004636. 25 Intelligence Section.

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1 Briefing Notes of Det/Sgt 2 D.W. Bell, September 19, 1995 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1661: Document Number 2004646. 5 Intelligence Section. 6 Briefing notes of Det/Sgt 7 D.W. Bell, September 20, 8 1995. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 11 Q: You agree that during these -- the 12 timeframe for the balance of September, there was a 13 serious level -- potential level of risk with respect to 14 the threat to the safety of public and police? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And indeed, the Forest Detachment had 17 security patrols for its own protection after September 18 the 6th? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: You indicated that at some point in 21 September, perhaps the 9th or somewhere between the 9th 22 and -- and the 12th of September, you start to report to 23 Inspector Hutchinson? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: And tell us, first of all, what his

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1 position was at that time? 2 A: I believe Detective Inspector 3 Hutchinson was a CIB inspector to the London deployed 4 unit, CIB being Criminal Investigations Branch. 5 Q: All right. And what -- why were you 6 reporting to him? 7 A: If I could refer to the tab where he 8 has the memo of the 12th? 9 Q: Sure, if we would -- I think that's 10 Tab 14 but let me check. No, it's not Tab 14. Hang on. 11 A: Tab 15. 12 Q: 15, thank you. 13 A: On the 12th... 14 Q: 12th of September, 1995, Document 15 Number 2002372 and it's a memorandum from J. E. 16 Hutchinson? 17 A: Yes. And in that memorandum it was 18 directed to all personnel re. Project Maple reporting 19 procedures. The significance of this memo is that we're 20 now amending, more or less, the operational plan of 21 Project Maple, whereby we're changing some of the command 22 structure. As such, the memo was distributed and it came 23 about as a result of the following: 24 "Chief Superintendent Coles has 25 assigned me [meaning Detective

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1 Inspector Hutchinson] to be the OIC 2 [meaning the Officer in Charge] as it 3 relates to the following functions 4 during this operation: Crime, 5 intelligence, technical support, and 6 communications. Detective Sergeant 7 Bell has been designated to oversee the 8 intelligence function and its 9 personnel. All intelligence 10 information pertaining to this 11 operation should be forwarded to our 12 office at Grand Bend Detachment in the 13 previously established manner. 14 Detective Sergeant Bell and I will 15 ensure that intelligence gathered is 16 disseminated to our command staff." 17 And I should stand corrected, that at the 18 time Detective Inspector Hutchinson was, in fact, an 19 Acting Superintendent in Charge of Criminal Operations 20 for West Region. 21 Q: All right. And I'd like to make this 22 the next exhibit, please? 23 THE REGISTRAR: P-1662, Your Honour. 24 25 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1662: Document Number 2002372.

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1 Memo to All Personnel from J. 2 E. Hutchinson, re. Project 3 Maple Reporting Procedures, 4 September 12, 1995. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 7 Q: And when he is referring to, All 8 intelligence information being forwarded to our offices 9 in the previously established manner, he's referring to 10 the formalized manner that you put into place after the 11 6th? 12 A: Yes, because what we haven't spoken 13 about, there was an intelligence tray at the Forest 14 Detachment with the reports that we had, that you've 15 already alluded to, where the officers could complete and 16 fill out information, plus the check sheets were still 17 available, so those documents were to go into the -- the 18 file, and then when we were in Forest Detachment we would 19 pull them and bring them back to Grand Bend to do our 20 work. 21 Q: All right. And so, effectively, at 22 this point, you -- you are the central repository for all 23 the intelligence and raw data with respect to the post 24 shooting matters? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: All right. And how long did you 2 continue in that function with respect to Ipperwash? 3 A: More or less 'til I was transferred 4 to my current unit, the Biker Enforcement Unit, which was 5 in June of '98. 6 Q: All right. Now, I understand that in 7 January of 1996 you wrote a -- a final report with 8 respect to Ipperwash? 9 A: Excuse me. That's correct. 10 Q: If you would go to Tab 24, please, 11 Inquiry Document Number 2004786. And there's a letter 12 dated January 8, 1996, to the officer in charge, 13 Intelligence Section from D. W. Bell. And attached to 14 that is a report dated January 2, 1996? 15 And is that -- was that authored by you? 16 A: Yes, it was. 17 Q: And what gave rise to you preparing 18 this report? 19 A: For any major operation that we 20 conduct, which Project Maj -- excuse me, Project Maple 21 would certainly fall under the category of major event, a 22 final report is submitted to Command to explain the -- 23 basically explain whether you've met your goals and 24 objectives and for review the event. 25 Q: All right.

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1 A: So Command can review the event. 2 Excuse me -- 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: -- I've got a bug issue. 5 Q: Okay. Let's make that the next 6 exhibit please. 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-1663, Your Honour. 8 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1663: Document Number 2004786. 10 Final Report for Project 11 Maple from Det/Sgt D.W. Bell 12 to Det/Sgt Armstrong, January 13 08, 1996. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 16 Q: And what was your understanding as to 17 what use would be made of this report? 18 A: To utilize by -- this report would 19 have gone up through the chain of command. I would 20 expect it would eventually have found its way to the 21 Commissioner's desk. 22 It would have been utilized as a summation 23 of the role of intelligence and what some of our findings 24 were in the event -- during the event of Project Maple. 25 Q: And it -- according to the synopsis

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1 on the first page of your report, it was, quote: 2 "This report summarizes the Stoney 3 Point group's occupation of the 4 Ipperwash Provincial Park which 5 commenced on 4 September 1995." 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Did you have anyone review a draft 8 version of this report for accuracy? 9 A: This report would have, and again, 10 I'm going by memory, but my tradi -- traditionally I have 11 somebody review documents that I write because you tend 12 to read over the same mistakes. 13 More than likely, Darryl, Detective 14 Constable Whitehead, would have reviewed this. It's also 15 possibly -- possible that Dawn Pineo may have reviewed it 16 as well as -- although she was a clerk within our office, 17 certainly her duties often went beyond that of a clerk, 18 it was sometimes used in an anal -- analytical capacity. 19 Q: All right. And just so we have an 20 idea as to what this -- the contents of this report, it 21 appears that from pages 2 to 14 is a summary of the 22 profiles of the occupiers and the charges which were 23 being considered to be of -- against each of them. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: And then pages 15 to 16 is a 3 chronology of the material, if you will, the material 4 historical events going back to May of 1942. Just pages 5 15 to 16 I'm looking at. 6 A: 15 and 16, yes. 7 Q: All right. And then page 16 to 21 8 sets out the background with respect to the intelligence 9 function? 10 A: If there's -- it's a background of 11 the intelligence function and more or less somewhat of a 12 synopsis of the time period in and around the occupation 13 of the Park. 14 Q: All right. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: And I'd like to -- to refer you to 19 page 17 about midway down, there's a paragraph that reads 20 the following: 21 "On 6 September '95, an incident 22 occurred in the vicinity of Parkway 23 Drive and Army Camp Road in which a 24 number of First Nations people were 25 damaging a vehicle with a baseball bat.

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1 As a result of this incident, the ERT 2 and TRU teams were dispatched to defuse 3 the situation." 4 Now just staying with that, can I ask you 5 what the -- the basis of your information was with 6 respect to that statement? 7 A: Yes. The basis of that information 8 is what was conveyed to me initially. And when I was 9 preparing this report I --I believe I utilized the media 10 release that indicated the same. 11 In preparation for this Inquiry, I now 12 realize that that's false; that's -- that was written in 13 error. It should have related to the incident regarding 14 the vehicle and the rock. 15 Q: And did you -- as of January the 2nd, 16 1996, however you believed that to be an accural -- 17 accurate portrayal of that event? 18 A: Actually until about a week ago I 19 believed that to be an actual portrayal of the event. 20 Q: All right. And if we continue with 21 that paragraph: 22 "As the officers were leaving the scene 23 a school bus and a large car drove 24 through the Park fence and pushed a 25 garbage dumpster into the officers.

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1 Occupants of the vehicle fired upon the 2 police who returned fire. As a result 3 of this exchange Anthony O'Brien 4 "Dudley" George was fatally wounded." 5 And can I ask you what is the source of 6 your information, particularly with respect to the aspect 7 that the occupants of the vehicles fired upon the police 8 in this exchange? 9 A: The source of that information would 10 have been what had been portrayed to me on or about the 11 time of the event. The -- the exact officers that gave 12 that to me I don't have that answer for you at this... 13 Q: All right. As of January 2nd, 1996 14 you believed that to be accurate? 15 A: That's correct. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: All right. And if we go to page 21 20 under "intelligence", the third paragraph, I'll read the 21 following: 22 "During the summer of 1995 intelligence 23 sources indicated that the SPG..." 24 I take that's the Stoney Point Group. 25 "... were intended -- intending on

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1 occupying Ipperwash Provincial Park at 2 the conclusion of the Labour Day 3 weekend." 4 Now, did -- did you have advice or 5 intelligence in the summer that that would -- with the 6 specificity of the prediction of the timing of the 7 occupation? 8 A: I cannot -- to be -- if I wanted to 9 be extremely specific I would have written that during 10 the month of August/September, but having taken into the 11 fact that August, September followed in the summer, I 12 wrote it as "summer". 13 Q: Okay. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: All right. Let's go next to Tab 25. 18 We are in Tab 25, sorry. No, we aren't. Tab 25 please. 19 This is Inquiry Document 2004788; a document dated 20 January 23, 1996. The covering letter is from Douglas 21 Scott to Deputy Commissioner Boose and attached to it is 22 a memorandum authored by S. Cerilli to S/D Crane dated 23 October -- 24 A: 11th. 25 Q: Sorry, October 11, 1995. And can you

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1 identify this document for us? 2 A: Yes. This would appear the document 3 that's been prepared by Setts Cerilli providing 4 Superintendent Crane the analytical charts that have been 5 prepared by Setts and I believe Howard Birch. 6 Q: And there are -- yes, there's a 7 number of diagrams or charts attached to this report, and 8 these were prepared in the aftermath of the events of 9 September 6th? 10 A: Yes. I just want to clarify, these 11 reports -- these charts are the ones that were prepared 12 specifically by Cerilli and not Birch. So these relate - 13 - pertain to the occupation of the Park and they were 14 prepared after September 6th. 15 MS. SUSAN VELLA: All right. I'd like to 16 make this the next exhibit, please? 17 THE REGISTRAR: P-1664, Your Honour. 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1664: Document Number 2004788. 20 Memo from Douglas W. Scott to 21 Deputy Commissioner Boose re. 22 Intelligence Report, 23 Occupation of Ipperwash 24 Provincial Park, January 23, 25 1996.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 3 Q: And I believe that you refer to these 4 charts in your report at Tab 24, Exhibit 1663 as well, at 5 page 22 of that report. Second last paragraph: 6 "To further assist investigators and 7 the command staff an analyst was 8 provided who developed comprehensive 9 charts on those involved in the 10 occupation." 11 Is that right? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: That's the right reference? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And then at page 25 of your report, 18 Exhibit P-1663, at Tab 24, page 25, under "conclusion" 19 you write: 20 "Throughout the occupation there was a 21 great concern over the number of 22 firearms that were entering the 23 occupied area, however, one should 24 remember that guns are not the only 25 form of deadly force. Many of the

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1 individuals involved in the occupation 2 of the Park are extremely volatile in 3 their nature and could be described as 4 [quote] 'loose cannons' [close quote]. 5 In the incident that resulted in the 6 death of Dudley George these 7 individuals attempted to drive over our 8 officers." 9 And was that -- did that represent an 10 accurate reflection of -- of part of your conclusion with 11 respect to your experience of the -- the events of 12 September 4 to 6? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Okay. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Now, if you go next to Tab 26, 19 please, this is Inquiry Document 2004798. It's a 20 covering fax sheet dated February 2, 1996, from yourself 21 to Inspector Carson and attached to it is a -- a memo 22 which you've written to Inspector Carson dated January 23 31, 1996, and it's entitled, Project Maple Debriefing 24 Points for Discussion. 25 A: Can I just back up one (1) second? I

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1 don't feel -- 2 Q: Certainly. 3 A: -- comfortable with that without 4 explanation of that term 'loose cannons'. 5 Q: Certainly. 6 A: I'd like to explain that. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: I think I alluded to early about the 9 dynamics changing within the -- the Base and certainly 10 there was a -- what I would consider a respectful 11 relationship between the First Nations occupiers and the 12 police up until the changing dynamics. And I think with 13 the influence of some of the people that we've identified 14 earlier being the Jewels and perhaps some of the -- Buck 15 Doxtator and some of the outside sources coming in and 16 the nature of the event we certainly saw a change. 17 And by 'loose cannons' I'm referring to 18 the activity that resulted in the bonfires on the 19 highway, some of the rock throwing incidents, some of the 20 erratic driving, the incidents surrounding the -- the TOC 21 and things of that nature. It was somewhat of a -- a 22 generalization which in hindsight was somewhat vague and 23 should have required further explanation on my part, 24 however, that's what I was referring to. 25 Q: All right. And -- and in fact you

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1 made a similar observation with the same language in your 2 notes on September 21, 1995, at pages 114 to 115? These 3 are your Maple notes Tab 6? 4 A: Okay. Sorry, page 114? 5 Q: Yes, that's what my notes says at 6 least. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: All right. 9 A: And that's the same -- it's the same 10 set of circumstances. And again sometimes my command of 11 the English language may not be what it should be and 12 slang sometimes takes precedent and is often too general. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Thank you. All right. Now we were 17 back at -- to Tab 26 Inquiry Document Number 2004798 and 18 you've written a -- a memorandum to Inspector Carson and 19 it's basically points for a discussion with respect to a 20 Project Maple debriefing; is that right? 21 A: That's -- excuse me that's correct. 22 Q: And were you -- were you requested to 23 provide points for a planned debriefing? 24 A: I believe so. 25 Q: And are these your thoughts?

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1 A: These would be my thoughts based on 2 discussion with the members involved in the intelligence 3 process including Detective Inspector Hutchinson. 4 Q: And do they represent the basis for a 5 constructive but critical discussion of the intelligence 6 process of Project Maple under Inspector Carson? 7 A: I think it would -- it would form a 8 starting point for a discussion on it. You know, 9 certainly in this here we talked about the benefits, in 10 Part 2 the parameters placed on intelligence, that would 11 assist us in the discussion commencing with concerns 12 relating to the collection phase which I spoke of 13 yesterday, in that the parameters that were established 14 definitely hindered the collection process which 15 ultimately hinders the evaluation and reliability 16 analysis. 17 Q: Just tell me what those parameters 18 were again? 19 A: Again referring to the document dated 20 January 31st: 21 "Parameters placed on intelligence 22 officers [bullet point] No covert 23 activity. 24 [bullet point] No stopping of First 25 Nations people travelling in the area.

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1 [bullet point] These limitations made 2 it extremely difficult to corroborate 3 the intelligence information we were 4 receiving." 5 Q: And point 3 is termed, "White 6 backlash". What -- what was that to represent? 7 A: Again represented by bullet point: 8 "Perception within the local non-Native 9 community that there are two (2) sets 10 of laws in Ontario, those for the 11 Natives and those for the rest of the 12 population." 13 And then bullet point: 14 "How will this affect our community 15 policing philosophy in the area?" 16 Q: And what were you trying to convey 17 there? 18 A: Well certainly, you know, the First 19 Nations Kettle and Stony Point and, you know, lived in 20 this community for a long period of time and I have 21 friends that grew up in Forest and I know that there was 22 a great deal of camaraderie between the communities. It 23 intermingled between the communities. 24 And as result of the occupation, it seems 25 that rapport was diminishing and in fact on several

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1 occasions we noticed that people were talking of this 2 perceived two (2) sets of laws. And in fact with the 3 formation of the group On Fire to address that perception 4 backed up that. 5 Q: And how would that impact, if you 6 will, your perception impact on the intelligence 7 functioning? 8 A: As you remember we were, you know, 9 part of the role is utilizing members of the community 10 to provide us with information. One has to has to assume 11 or one has to wonder if in the information provided would 12 be tainted, if in fact they see this perception. 13 Q: Fair enough. I'd like to make this 14 the next exhibit please. 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1665, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1665: Document Number 2004798. 18 Letter from Don Bell to 19 Inspector Carson Re: Project 20 Maple Debriefing Points for 21 Discussion, January 31, 1996. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 24 Q: I understand that there was a -- a 25 review session that was held amongst certain of the

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1 police officers with respect to Ipperwash on February the 2 21st, 1996. 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: And did you attend at that? 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: And what was the purpose of that 7 function? 8 A: The purpose of that function was 9 basically to give a -- have an overall review and 10 debriefing of the situation where those involved, the 11 various groups, specialist groups, were involved in their 12 -- sorry. 13 Q: No, no. Not at all. Other things 14 are going on. 15 A: Were involved in going over their -- 16 reviewing their area of expertise and identifying the 17 pros and cons associated to each area. 18 Q: All right. And if you go to Tab 29, 19 Exhibit P-457. It's entitled, Ipperwash Review, February 20 21, 1996 and it appears to be typed notes if you will, of 21 that -- that discussion. 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And that's the discussion you 24 participated in? 25 A: Correct.

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1 Q: And is it fair to say that -- that 2 you actively participated in this discussion? 3 A: I believe Detection Inspector 4 Hutchinson was the spokesperson for intelligence. 5 Q: All right. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: And if you would look at page 3, I 10 want to take you to just a couple of -- of references 11 here. There's a reference at the top of the page to Serg 12 -- something attributed to Sergeant Richardson. 13 A: At -- excuse me, at the very top? 14 Q: yes. 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: "Sergeant Richardson [dash] - 17 personnel at roadblocks were taking 18 down items of concern but were not 19 taking down anything of meaningful 20 purpose. Should have stopped vehicles 21 but this was ceased. 22 We needed more information coming from 23 the roadblocks. Some unknown 24 reliability because of the many pieces 25 of information coming in.

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1 There was a lot of information but 2 there was no concrete proof of, i.e., 3 weapons in the Park." 4 Now you've made a number of points there 5 but, I think, surrounding the reliability of information 6 and use of checkpoints. 7 Do -- do you recall these points being 8 raised by Sergeant Richardson or at least at the meeting? 9 A: No. But I can -- having read that, I 10 could put it into context I believe. 11 Q: All right. 12 A: After the events of September the 13 6th, the personnel -- the roadblocks, people weren't 14 stopping the vehicles. And that was one of the points I 15 put on for points of discussion. 16 So certainly we lost the ability to have 17 dialogue with people coming and going and lost the 18 ability to see anything that may be in plain view. 19 Because certainly at no time were we searching these 20 vehicles when they were going through the checkpoints but 21 at least you got a chance to have plain view observations 22 as to what you -- what was inside the vehicle. 23 Q: All right. And his -- his point: 24 "Some unknown reliability because many 25 pieces coming in -- because of the many

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1 pieces of information coming in." 2 Was that something that you also observed 3 during the course of the 4th to the 6th of '95? 4 A: I would probably take it a step 5 further. You know, it was -- the majority of information 6 we had to question the reliability because in -- because 7 of the various sources the intelligence process really 8 wasn't being utilized, so as to properly assess and 9 utilize the intelligence process it would be difficult to 10 put accurate reliability factors. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Vella, 12 for our records, you've been reading from Tab 29 which is 13 Exhibit 457. I don't think you mentioned the exhibit 14 number -- 15 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I hope I mentioned the 16 exhibit number. Exhibit P-457, that's correct. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you did, 18 okay. Excuse me. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: No problem. Thank you. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 22 Q: And then if you would go to page 4, 23 please, of the same document. The bottom reference is a 24 statement attributed to Inspector Goodall: 25 "Issue raised that there were

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1 insufficient people to supply 2 information, and that investigators 3 found the need to have a better 4 understanding of what had taken place 5 at the shooting. Innocent people were 6 placed in jail due to lack of proper 7 information being passed on." 8 And can you comment on that? Did you -- 9 did you share that concern? 10 A: Because that's from the criminal side 11 of the house, I have difficulty offering a proper opinion 12 on that. 13 Q: All right. All right. Fair enough. 14 On page 7 to 8 of the report under -- or discussion, I 15 should say, under "Intelligence and TSB," Technical 16 Support Branch, right? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: Okay. And some points are made on 19 page 8, and I don't know if they were attributed to Chief 20 Col --Coles or not; that's the last reference. But in 21 any event, these points appear to have been made during 22 the course of the discussion: 23 "Need to make sure that raw 24 intelligence given out has been 25 analysed to some degree."

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1 Do you concern -- agree that that was a 2 concern arising from the September 4 to 6 operation? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: "Concerns raised that TOC centre 5 caused confusion, as there was another 6 level to go through, as intelligence 7 members were not sure what information 8 had been passed on and what information 9 had not been passed on." 10 Is that a concern you shared? 11 A: We're talking September 4th to 6th? 12 Q: Correct. 13 A: Being -- I can answer specific to my 14 intelligence entity, that's true. 15 Q: Fair enough. The next point: 16 "Some information could have been lost, 17 therefore there is a need identified to 18 reduce levels to lessen confusion." 19 Can you help us out with that? 20 A: Again, I think that, you know, points 21 to the fact, again, that we should have had one (1) 22 single source, so the information -- if Maple had gone 23 with Trevor Richardson, being the sole intelligence 24 supervisor, it should have gone to Richardson, then to 25 Inspector Carson.

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1 Q: All right. Or conversely, you, being 2 the central source, correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: Thank you. Can you go next, please, 5 to Tab 31. This is Inquiry Document 2003328. It's a 6 letter dated May 22, 1997. It appears to have been 7 authored by you to -- and addressed to Inspector 8 Connolley; can you identify that letter for us? 9 A: Yes, inspector Connolley was -- as 10 indicated in the document in professionals standards 11 branch. It indicate -- it was basically a will say -- oh 12 sorry. It was a synopsis of my -- or a snapshot of my 13 involvement in the -- the occupation of CFB Ipperwash and 14 Ipperwash Provincial Park. 15 Q: All right. And is it an accurate 16 representation of your involvement? And I assume this is 17 post September 6th? 18 A: Yes. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'd like to make this 20 the next exhibit, please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1666, Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1666: Document Number 2003328. 24 Letter from Det/Sgt D.W. Bell 25 to Inspector G.C. Connolley,

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1 May 22, 1997. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 4 Q: And we go next to Tab 32. This is 5 Exhibit P-483. I believe that has been referred to as 6 the Connolley Report; do you recognize this report? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And page 4 is the -- sorry, page 4 of 9 the report there's a section called, Intelligence. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Did you have any input into this 12 report? 13 A: I believe I provided a Will Say -- 14 Q: All right. 15 A: -- to Inspector Connolley regarding 16 my involvement. 17 Q: And what did you understand the 18 purpose of this report to be? 19 A: I believe it -- it was to look at a 20 best practices aspect of the -- of our organization's 21 management of the affairs at Ipperwash. 22 Q: All right. And if you look to page 23 11, this is part -- part of the report addressing 24 recommendations, and look at recommendation number 6 in 25 particular:

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1 "The Ontario Provincial Police review 2 how intelligence information is 3 gathered, authenticated, and analysed." 4 And he says: 5 "One (1) area will surely be examined 6 in any statutory forum dealing with the 7 Ipperwash Provincial Park incident, 8 will be the intelligence of the -- that 9 the OPP possessed during the incident. 10 How is the information obtained? How 11 is it authenticated? 12 These will be questions -- these will 13 be questions that will have to be 14 answered. One (1) concern that was 15 identified was the erroneous 16 information that was provided by one 17 (1) faction involved in its attempts to 18 discredit the other faction." 19 Now, do you have any comment on that? 20 A: You'll have to excuse me, I -- I lost 21 you there at the beginning and I couldn't interrupt. 22 Where was that? 23 Q: Sorry. Excuse me. Page 11. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: I'm sorry about that, I should have

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1 watched. 2 A: Page 11? 3 Q: Item 6. 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: And instead of me reading it out I'll 6 let you read it yourself and my question is whether or 7 not you -- you agree with those observations. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: I agree with that. 12 Q: All right. Thank you. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Now, you -- you indicated earlier in 17 your evidence that it would have been, in retrospect, 18 helpful to have had the raw data that had been collected 19 and provided to the London JFO from various sources, 20 collated and -- and perhaps analysed to a greater degree 21 than it was prior to September the 4th, that that would 22 have helped? 23 A: I think what I -- what I meant or 24 what I said or hoped to articulate, was that I had 25 previously stated that I didn't see a formal -- an

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  1  analysis by a trained analyst to provide much use to
  2  Inspector Carson with regards to establishing tactical
  3  priorities.  
  4                 What I could see a trained analyst
  5  providing to Inspector Carson, is because of their
  6  organizational capabilities, to put a package together, a
  7  nice tight package, where he'd have all his information
  8  properly outlined, detailed, although still not be able
  9  to put much reliability on it because it's still
 10  difficult to -- because of my collection concerns, to do
 11  that, but he'd have that tight package where he'd have
 12  one (1) shop -- one (1) shop stop -- one (1) stop
 13  shopping to assist him in taking his tactical priorities
 14  forward.
 15                 Q:   Right.  Because as capable as -- as
 16  you saw Inspector Carson to be, it would be unreasonable
 17  to think that he would recall every single incident and
 18  occurrence that had been recorded somewhere in writing
 19  between '93 and '95 and magically bring it all together
 20  for a particular analysis; is that fair?
 21                 A:   I agree with you.
 22                 Q:   And would -- would one (1) of the
 23  functions of a trained analyst, in reviewing all that raw
 24  data and trying to perhaps look at patterns that one
 25  might take from the raw data, would -- would that be one

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1 (1) of the functions of a trained analyst? 2 A: For Patter -- 3 Q: Yeah. 4 A: Sorry, patterns? 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: As -- I can -- like, just off the top 7 of my head, patterns are something that an analyst would 8 look at. Certainly a pattern that you would see would be 9 heightened traffic during the summer months versus the 10 winter months and things of that nature. 11 So that would be one (1) area that they 12 might investigate. 13 Q: What about a pattern that would 14 highlight the use of a certain bus in a manner which was 15 used in a way to -- to damage or run into vehicles with 16 persons in it, from time to time? 17 I mean that -- that's a pattern, if it was 18 supported by the raw data, that a trained analyst should 19 pick up? 20 A: Could be a pattern. But -- again -- 21 again, with regards to something of that nature, those 22 issues I think that the Inspector was live to -- alive 23 to, rather. 24 I believe that some of the information 25 that the analysts would have been able to silo for him,

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1 were some of the less obvious types of activities that he 2 may let slip his mind. 3 But I believe that activities such as 4 motor vehicles being used as weapons would be something 5 that would be front and centre in his mind when 6 determining tactical priorities. 7 However, I do believe that the analyst 8 would be better equipped to assist him in providing 9 information or refreshing his mind -- memory with regards 10 to less obvious incidents. 11 Q: Sure, because the incident commander 12 has enough on his mind to be expected to be going back 13 and thinking of all the scenarios without some 14 assistance? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Fair enough. So, for example, if you 17 look at Exhibit P-411, this was the CFB Ipperwash 18 incident, it's -- do you still have this in front of you? 19 If not we can put another copy before you. P-411? 20 A: Yes. The Ipperwash Incident? 21 Q: It's a thinner copy than mine so 22 hopefully -- oh, it's double-sided, okay. And if you 23 look, for example, June 21, 1995 entry, and it's in 24 chronological entries. And there's a report at 16:45; 25 are you there, it's page 10?

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1 A: June 21 -- yes. 2 Q: Page 10: 3 "Captain House reports a yellow school 4 bus was observed travelling on an 5 interior road at the same rate of speed 6 as the patrol vehicle. One (1) of five 7 (5) Native passengers threw a camera at 8 the patrol vehicle, no damage." 9 You see that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And then if you look at the next 12 entry, June 22, 1995 00:36 hours: 13 "Captain Howse reports the same yellow 14 school bus entered the built up area 15 and attempted to ram or bump a patrol 16 vehicle. There were five (5) or six 17 (6) young males in the bus that cannot 18 be identified. One (1) occupant mooned 19 and shouted obscenities at the patrol 20 vehicle. The bus then collided with a 21 parked Iltis, knocking it forward about 22 ten (10) metres. Minor damage to the 23 parking brake and some scratches on the 24 Iltis." 25 Do you see that?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And if we go to the next page, June 3 23, 1995, 9:15 a.m.: 4 "Captain House reports a patrol vehicle 5 was charged at by one (1) Native 6 throwing pieces of driftwood. Patrol 7 vehicle backed up to avoid being hit 8 and then turned to leave the area when 9 it notices yellow school bus carrying 10 four (4) Natives was pursuing the 11 patrol vehicle. Passengers on the bus 12 were throwing objects at the patrol 13 vehicle. Barrels could be seen inside 14 the bus and it was apparent that the 15 vehicle had been prepared for this type 16 of confrontation. This all occurred in 17 the beach area." 18 You saw that? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And then if we go to page 21, the 21 July 29th entry. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Sorry, the 13:45 entry back on page

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1 19, but it goes on right through to page 21. At any 2 event, back on page 19: 3 "The yellow school bus with men, women 4 and children broke into the built-up 5 area of CFB Ipperwash and smashed into 6 doors of the supply building. They 7 then backed into a DND jeep pushing it 8 fifty (50) feet. Driver was taken into 9 custody by two (2) MP's but then they 10 were overpowered by several other 11 Native people and the driver escaped. 12 Investigation continuing." 13 And then I noted that in -- in your notes 14 -- your Maple notes, if we went to the entry at May 23, 15 1993 -- 16 A: May 23, '93? 17 Q: May 23, '93, Tab 6? 18 A: 23, '93 or -- 19 Q: '93. 20 A: Okay. 21 Q: Sorry, it's not -- 22 A: Tab 2? 23 Q: Probably. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 2 Q: Sorry, May 27th, excuse me, at page 3 19. It's May 27th, I misread that, 1993. And there's a 4 reference to school bus being present at a certain -- 5 certain incident? 6 A: I -- it's 27th of May, '93? 7 Q: That's correct. 8 A: Seems to be information from Neil 9 Morse and Mike Keegan who are the JFO First Nations 10 dossier officers. 11 Q: And for some reason they're flagging 12 the school bus for you, as being present? 13 A: Excuse me, one second, I'm just going 14 to catch up on the reading here. 15 Q: Sure. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 A: This is -- I believe Inspector Carson 20 has spoken to Morse and Keegan at 9:30 in the morning. 21 And the information was relating to Camp 1: 22 "Appeared to be more vocal. There are 23 additional people. The school bus was 24 present." 25 Q: Right. In any event, the point being

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1 -- let me just put this as well, there was also 2 information, apparently, provided the -- during the 3 afternoon, early evening of September 6th, that the 4 yellow school bus had been filled with gas, in terms of 5 its tank, and was positioned down in the Park. 6 And you wouldn't have necessarily known 7 about that because that information didn't come to you, I 8 don't believe. It's not in your notes, in any event? 9 A: I believe that's correct. 10 Q: All right. But with all of those 11 examples, a trained analyst may have been able to flag 12 for Inspector Carson that night that the school bus had 13 been used in association, reportedly, with other 14 aggressive manoeuvres, and you could have flagged for 15 him the potential risk that it posed? 16 A: Yes, I could have. 17 Q: Now, I understand that Project Maple 18 ultimate -- sorry, was replaced by Project Bluewater? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And Project Bluewater had under its 21 consideration not only the Ipperwash Provincial Park but 22 also the Pinery Park? 23 A: I'd have to take a look at the 24 operational plan but -- 25 Q: I think that we've provided you with

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1 an excerpt, at least, of it. Do you have it there in 2 front of you? 3 A: Outside of the -- 4 Q: Yes, it was a separate -- 5 A: Oh yeah. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Commissioner, you 10 should also have it. It's Inquiry Document Number 11 2000903. And this is the 1997 edition and we've chosen 12 this edition because it has the intelligence operational 13 plan and your name attached to it. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: Fair? 16 A: Yes, that's fair. 17 Q: Yeah? Okay. 18 A: Sorry. 19 Q: Okay. I'd like to make this the next 20 exhibit, please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1667, Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1667: Document Number 2000903. 24 Project Bluewater, 2nd 25 Edition, 1997.

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1 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: And can you tell us what, if any, 3 differences in your role and -- and the function of 4 intelligence is reflected by this operational plan as 5 compared with the post September 6th Maple -- Project 6 Maple plan? 7 A: Yes. In Project Bluewater we were 8 now entering the collection phase, as I explained, that I 9 would have seen beneficial in '93 through '95 in that we 10 were using traditional intelligence collection gathering 11 means, such as various forms of covert activity and the 12 like, as well as utilizing our capacity was greater -- a 13 formalized structure was in place as far as reporting 14 relationships and the like, and then we were reporting it 15 up, excuse me, at the conclusion with a formalized report 16 upon the conclusion of the investigation. 17 Q: And if one looks at the personnel 18 component? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: It's Detective Inspector Jim 21 Hutchinson and -- and yourself as in charge of 22 intelligence. And then we have, in addition... 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 Q: ...nine (9) -- nine (9) personnel in 2 addition? So eleven (11) -- there's a complement of 3 eleven (11) intelligence personnel at this point? 4 A: Yes, although to be candid, there is 5 -- Staff Sergeant Armstrong's role was somewhat limited. 6 Q: All right. Fair enough. And in 7 terms of the electronic interception and surveillance 8 units you -- you now have the RCMP Westcam, which is 9 available on an as needed basis from the RCMP? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: There's a Detective Sergeant Barry 12 McKenzie involved, specifically to coordinate part 6 13 authorizations. And this is -- is this wiretapping? 14 A: Video. 15 Q: Video. Okay. Video surveillance. 16 All right. Any other -- any other enhancements with 17 respect to the technical support? 18 A: We had surveillance capabilities -- 19 Q: Yes? 20 A: -- should we require it. The other 21 officers there, with regards to personnel on page 4, are 22 various specialists that could assist in the obtaining of 23 video surveillance. 24 Q: All right. Thank you. Now, did you 25 give evidence at any of the criminal proceedings other --

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1 arising out of the events of September the 6th? 2 A: No, I didn't. 3 Q: If you go to Tab 35, please, of the 4 Commission Counsel brief? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: This is Inquiry Document Number 9 2004078 and it appears to be a will say. Did you provide 10 this statement? 11 A: Yes, I did. 12 Q: Do you recall the context of this 13 statement, what it was prepared for? 14 A: Yes, basically this is a 15 regurgitation of my notes. I went through my notes and 16 provided a point form document for the Inquiry. 17 Q: All right. And it -- it's a more or 18 less accurate transcription? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: I'd like to make that the next 21 exhibit, please? 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1668, Your Honour. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1668? 24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, sir. 25 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you.

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1 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1668: Document Number 2004078. 2 Will State of Det/Sgt. D.W. 3 Bell (undated). 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 6 Q: And if you would next go to Tab 36, 7 Inquiry Document 2003328, statement of D. W. Bell re. 8 Nicholas Cottrelle. 9 And did you provide this -- this 10 statement? 11 A: Yes, yes, I did. 12 Q: Do you know who you provided it to? 13 A: I would have expect that would have 14 gone up through Detective Inspector Goodall, but I can't 15 say for sure. 16 Q: Was it in relation to the criminal 17 investigation with respect to Nicholas Cottrelle? 18 A: Yes, related to the -- 19 Q: And was it -- were the answers given 20 true and accurate when you gave them? 21 A: The -- this, once again, just to -- 22 how I write my will says, I refer to my notes and put my 23 notes in bullet form into the will say document. 24 Q: All right. Do you adopt these as 25 accurate statement today?

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1 A: Yes, these are -- this is a 2 reflection of the questions regarding the incident at the 3 hospital. 4 Q: Yes, this is with respect to your 5 detainment of Jay George, correct? 6 A: Yes. 7 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'd like to make this 8 the next Exhibit, please? 9 THE REGISTRAR: That's document 2003328? 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Correct. 11 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, P-1669. 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 13 14 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1669: Document Number 2003328. 15 Statement of D.W. Bell 16 (undated). 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: Now, I'd like to ask you some 20 questions in a completely different area. We have heard 21 evidence at this Inquiry that some officers purchased 22 certain T-shirts and mugs which bore various symbols in 23 relation to, or at least made in the aftermath of the 24 events of September the 6th. 25 And first of all, I'd like to know whether

216

1 you saw or purchased any T-shirts or mugs or other items 2 which were procured or produced relating to your 3 involvement or the police involvement in the Ipperwash 4 matter? 5 A: I've seen the mugs, and I was given a 6 mug. I did not purchase a mug. 7 Q: All right. And can you tell us what 8 the mug -- first of all, do you still have it? 9 A: No, I don't. 10 Q: What -- when -- what happened to it? 11 A: I was given the mug during the -- 12 sometime after -- I believe it was after the Thanksgiving 13 weekend. And took the --to be quite candid, it was given 14 to me and for the life of me I can't remember who gave it 15 to me. I took the mug without really paying much 16 attention and put it in my desk drawer. 17 And then upon cleaning the -- my desk up 18 at Ipperwash I destroyed it. 19 Q: And why did you destroy it? 20 A: Having regard for the incident, I 21 thought it was inappropriate. I didn't think it was took 22 into account, let's say it lacked sensitivity. 23 Traditionally, these mugs, T-shirts, et cetera, are 24 created by investigative teams, project teams, to 25 celebrate a successful investigation, or just as -- to

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1 celebrate or a symbol of comradery in a team as for all 2 the team work, and a memento to remember such things. 3 Project Maple is certainly something that 4 can't be deemed a success, and is certainly something 5 that I really don't want to remember. 6 Q: Do you recall specifically what 7 images and words were on the mug? 8 A: What -- 9 Q: What was on the mug? 10 A: With my mug I can't -- actually as a 11 result of my preparation I'm aware there were two (2) 12 mugs. And to be quite candid, I can't remember what was 13 on my mug. 14 Q: All right. Did you ever see any -- 15 in the days and months following September the 6th, any 16 police cruiser with a bulls eye and arrow applique 17 attached to the side of it? 18 A: No. 19 Q: Or a photograph of it? 20 A: I don't believe so. 21 Q: Did you see any object that looked 22 like a beer can with a feather in it, police tape 23 surrounding it and a hole in it -- 24 A: No. 25 Q: -- something to that effect? Did you

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1 purchase or receive a pin that was created with respect 2 to Ken Deane? 3 A: No, but I've seen those pins. 4 Q: All right. Did you see or purchase a 5 T-shirt that indicated support for Ken Deane? 6 A: I was aware of a T-shirt but I've 7 never seen them. 8 Q: Were you ever interviewed by the 9 Professional Standards Board with respect to the mugs? 10 A: No. 11 Q: Were you aware that an investigation 12 was ongoing when -- into the mugs? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And can you advise as to why you -- 15 you didn't voluntarily provide a statement? 16 A: The mug was given to me. I would not 17 have purchased the mug. 18 Q: All right. 19 A: As such I didn't see the necessity. 20 Q: We've also heard evidence and 21 received evidence with respect to a matter that involved 22 Officers Whitehead and Dyke -- 23 A: I'm going to just ask you to step a 24 little closer to the mic, please? 25 Q: Sorry.

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1 A: Thank you. 2 Q: Sorry, about that. We also have 3 heard evidence in this Inquiry with respect to a 4 discipline matter involving Officers Whitehead and Dyke 5 and, in particular, with respect to videotaped comments 6 which -- which consisted of derogatory comments to First 7 Nations persons. 8 My first question is: Did you review the 9 videotaped evidence or the videotape that was taken by 10 Officers Whitehead and Dyke at any time between the 4th 11 and 6th of September, '95? 12 A: No. 13 Q: Or subsequently? 14 A: I've seen the Professional Standards 15 statements -- 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: -- which had -- indicated, I believe, 18 a portion of the audio. 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: And it indicates there were -- at 21 least a portion of the remarks that were made by 22 Detective Constables Dyke and Whitehead. 23 Q: All right. But were you privy to 24 those comments prior to seeing it in the discipline 25 material?

220
  1                 A:   The first time I was aware of it was
  2  when it became more or less public knowledge. 
  3                 Q:   And were you interviewed in relation
  4  to that investigation? 
  5                 A:   No, I wasn't. 
  6                 Q:   Now, I appreciate that it is now
  7  2006, but do you have any recommendations with respect to
  8  the intelligence function of this occupation which you
  9  would like the Commissioner to consider with respect to
 10  the part of his mandate directed at preventing similar
 11  incidents of violence in the future? 
 12                 A:   Yes.  And actually I jotted them down
 13  so if I can refer to this note? 
 14                 Q:   Certainly. 
 15                 A:   Certainly I think it -- or at least I
 16  hope I've articulated myself to express my concerns with
 17  regards to the intelligence process as it pertained to
 18  Ipperwash -- the occupation of CFB Ipperwash and
 19  Ipperwash Provincial Park.
 20                   Some of the recommendations that I'm
 21  about to suggest I realize are in place as a result of
 22  the time that's passed within our organization.
 23                 Perhaps the first recommendation I would
 24  like to make is to ensure that situations such as the
 25  occupation of CFB Ipperwash or Ipperwash Provincial Park

221

1 maintain the necessary prior -- priority in that 2 intelligence prioritizes their operations. 3 And I think that -- suffice it to say that 4 Ipperwash was a priority but I alluded to the spikes and 5 the valleys and I don't think you can have spikes and 6 valleys in a situation that you know is going to be 7 ongoing. 8 I think if you're going to ensure that the 9 intelligence process is complete and thorough and a lot - 10 - committed to providing incident command and senior 11 officers with the proper intelligence so that they can 12 make the proper tactical decisions or prepare them with 13 the proper strategic reports so they can make proper 14 decisions in their planning stages. 15 We have to maintain our priorities and we 16 have to ensure the intelligence process is satisfied and 17 ongoing. In that, I think you have to make sure or 18 ensure that you have the capacity as an organization to 19 fulfil all the processes. 20 And as I alluded to earlier, that I felt 21 the collection phase was one that was drastically -- we 22 were remiss in our responsibilities in collecting 23 information. 24 So as such my first recommendation would 25 be to prioritize and ensure the process is completed in a

222

1 thorough and professional manner. 2 The second recommendation is what I refer 3 to as res -- sorry, central repository of information. 4 And what I've often said in my current role is one-stop 5 shopping. Intelligence should be fed into one (1) 6 location. One (1) person should be assigned to deliver 7 the intelligence to the Incident Commander. 8 This person should be responsible to 9 ensure his intelligence is provided, that is proper 10 evaluation and analysis is done and that we're not 11 feeding raw data or information and in fact we're 12 providing a reliable -- a reliable product that the 13 Incident Commander can base tactical priorities on. 14 The third recommendation I would have 15 would be to have an increased capacity for analysis. 16 I think it would be important to increase 17 the number of anal -- analysts within our organization 18 and the police community as a whole. I think that we not 19 only have to look at tactical analysis but certainly 20 strategic analysis has to be a significant component for 21 police work because that's the management tool that we 22 should be relying to set our direction and establish our 23 priorities. 24 And the last recommendation I make has to 25 do with training. Intelligence officers should be

223

1 trained with more than a two (2) week course and simply 2 more than a tactical intelligence. 3 Intelligence isn't an exact science. 4 Intelligence requires a great deal of skill set. 5 Intelligence should take into account cultural awareness, 6 diversity, and certainly a thorough knowledge of the 7 intelligence process. 8 CI development is something that sometimes 9 lacks attention. And certainly I myself have to be 10 critical of my own abilities in assessing officers and 11 their ability to assess CI's. 12 Certainly there are indications during 13 this Inquiry where I've said -- stated situations where I 14 took it for granted that because of their expertise in 15 criminal activities they had the abilities to assess 16 CI's. I think in hindsight that was an error. 17 Q: CI's being...? 18 A: Confidential informants. 19 Q: Thank you. 20 A: "Senior -- senior officers and 21 Incident Commanders must have the ability to recognize 22 the intelligence process. They have to be available -- 23 they have to have the ability to question as to whether 24 or not they are receiving true intelligence, raw data, or 25 information. If they're not receiving intelligence they

224

1 shouldn't be basing their decisions on the product 2 they're receiving. 3 This would provide them with a better 4 position to assess their tactical priorities and a 5 strategic set to assist them in setting priorities to 6 direct intelligence officers or operational officers of 7 the proper course." 8 And those are the recommendations I'd 9 have. 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you very much. 11 That concludes the examination by Commission Counsel. 12 And at this time perhaps prior to the break we could 13 canvass the parties with respect to their estimates for 14 cross-examination. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And I'll just remind 17 the parties that I will be repeating your time into the 18 microphone so it can be recorded. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 20 we'll start with the OPPA. Ms. Jones...? 21 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Forty (40) minutes for 22 the OPPA. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The Province 24 any time? Oh, I'm sorry. Perhaps everybody stand up, 25 then I don't have to ask everybody. They usually do

225

1 that. Okay. 2 And next on my list is counsel on behalf 3 of Deb Hutton. 4 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Fifteen (15) minutes 5 for counsel for Deb Hutton. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Sulman, 7 for Mr. Beaubien? 8 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: I reserve ten (10) 9 minutes, sir. 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten (10) minutes for 11 Mr. Beaubien. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. 13 Esmonde...? 14 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Thirty (30) to 15 forty-five (45) minutes. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thirty (30) to forty- 17 five (45) minutes for Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 19 Scullion...? MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I think about forty- 20 five (45) minutes. 21 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Forty-five (45) minutes 22 for Residents of Aazhoodena. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 24 George...? 25 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Maybe ten (10)

226

1 minutes. 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten (10) minutes for 3 Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Roy...? 5 MR. JULIAN ROY: About thirty (30) to 6 forty-five (45) minutes. 7 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thirty (30) to forty- 8 five (45) minutes for ALST and a reserve for the OPP -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And then -- 10 MR. MARK SANDLER: Now I don't have a 11 single question. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 13 know until you see what happens. Could you give me some 14 rough idea what that...? 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I believe it's three 16 (3) to three and a half (3 1/2) hours. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a 18 break now and start right after lunch. 19 I understand, Mr. Scullion, you may have a 20 time problem. Can we try to accommodate it? 21 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I talked with 22 Counsel. I may jump the queue a little bit but -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 24 Thank you very much. 25 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you.

227
  1                 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN:   We'll take a
  2  break now.
  3                 THE REGISTRAR:   This Inquiry will recess
  4  for fifteen (15) minutes. 
  5  
  6  --- Upon recessing at 2:44 p.m.
  7  --- Upon resuming at 3:04 p.m.
  8  
  9                 THE REGISTRAR:   This Inquiry is now
 10  resumed. Please be seated. 
 11  
 12                       (BRIEF PAUSE)
 13  
 14                 MS. KAREN JONES:   Good afternoon,
 15  Commissioner.
 16                 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN:   Good
 17  afternoon.
 18                 MS. KAREN JONES:    Good afternoon,
 19  Inspector.
 20                 THE WITNESS:   Good afternoon.   
 21  
 22  CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. KAREN JONES:
 23                 Q:   I'll try and speak up for your ear
 24  but if for some reason you can't hear me, please let me
 25  know.

228
  1                 A:   Thank you.
  2                 Q:   My name is Karen Jones, I'm one of
  3  the lawyers acting for the Ontario Provincial Police
  4  Association.
  5                 I had a couple of questions to start off
  6  to ask you about in terms of the role of intelligence
  7  from September 1 to September 6 and the change that
  8  happened after that period of time.
  9                 And just to confirm my understanding from
 10  your evidence was that your assignments during September
 11  01 to 6 came from John Carson?
 12                 A:   My assignments were as outlined in
 13  Operational Plan, Project Maple --
 14                 Q:   Okay.
 15                 A:   -- which were, John to be specific,
 16  tasked each one of the team leaders to develop their
 17  function and then he incorporated in that plan.  So
 18  inadvertently they were from him but they were developed
 19  by the individual team leaders.
 20                 Q:   Okay.  You -- you've spoken though
 21  about your primary function during that period of time
 22  was to identify the occupiers, outsiders that were in the
 23  Park, and perhaps other people and to do biographies of
 24  them.
 25                 A:   Correct.

229

1 Q: And that direction came from John 2 Carson. 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: I'm just trying to distinguish 5 between John Carson's direction to you versus Trevor 6 Richardson's role. 7 A: Okay, thank you. 8 Q: Right. And my understanding 9 essentially with respect to Trevor Richardson's role, 10 vis-a-vis the intelligence function, was essentially you 11 would report up through him from time to time as opposed 12 to him giving you direct instructions about what to do 13 and how to do it. 14 A: Yes. He was a conduit to the 15 Incident Commander. 16 Q: Right. And is it also fair to say 17 from time to time during the period September 4th to 18 September the 6th, you would have been providing 19 information directly to John Carson? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And directly to Mark Wright? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: Yeah. And you were one of a number 24 of people doing that? 25 A: That's correct.

230

1 Q: Okay. And also fair to say that 2 during the period of time September the 4th to September 3 the 6th, you never had any concerns that information you 4 were passing to Trevor Richardson didn't get passed on -- 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: -- and get passed on accurately? You 7 had spoke a little bit, quite briefly, about an 8 expectation and I believe it was in relation to 9 intelligence officers to verify or to validate 10 information that they obtained personally. 11 Would you agree with me that that 12 expectation would not be the same for officers who were 13 not intelligence officers? 14 That is their role, more correctly, would 15 be to provide information with the expectation that if it 16 needed to be followed up on, someone else would do it? 17 A: I'd agree with that. 18 Q: Okay. And the responsibility, 19 potentially more accurately put, was depending on the 20 type of information that other officers received; their 21 obligation would be to pass that information along 22 promptly? 23 A: Sorry, you're saying that based on 24 the type of information that was to be received would 25 depend on --

231

1 Q: Right. 2 A: -- the urgency that it be passed on? 3 Q: That's right. 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Yeah. 6 A: I am having a little difficulty 7 hearing you. 8 Q: I'm sorry. Usually I have a booming 9 voice, so. You also spoke about maintaining information 10 and you talked about you keeping your own Project 11 Ipperwash notes in a separate binder because you didn't 12 want a situation where you would perhaps compromise 13 either information or an informant. 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And would you agree with me that that 16 is a common practice among police officers to keep 17 information such as confidential information received or 18 the source of it out of their regular police notes? 19 A: In fact that's part of our policy. 20 Q: Right. I wanted to then take you 21 back a little bit to the period before September 4 to 6 22 of 1995. 23 And you had spoke briefly about your 24 knowledge or understanding about plans or information 25 that the OPP had about plans the occupiers at the Base

232

1 had, between 1993 and 1995 to take over other land. 2 And I wasn't sure from the evidence you 3 gave what the scope of your knowledge was about that. So 4 I just wanted to spend a minute or so, seeing if we could 5 sort out that information. 6 I understood from your evidence that you 7 knew information about plans on the part of the occupiers 8 was coming in from a variety of sources? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And did you have information about 11 the scope or the particular areas of land that at least 12 the OPP had information about that could potentially be 13 taken over by the occupiers? 14 A: There was, and I believe -- it's in my 15 notes, I believe there was a plan that was in place or 16 being predicated by Maynard George, a three (3) phase 17 plan that was spoken about regarding CFB Ipperwash, 18 Ipperwash Provincial Park and Pinery Park -- 19 Q: Okay -- 20 A: -- is the one that comes to mind. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: And having regard for -- going from 23 memory I do know at the time -- I don't know if it was at 24 the timeframe you're referring to, I've heard of plans 25 that have talked about occupations extending from

233

1 Ipperwash, as far as Goderich. 2 Q: Okay. And were you one of the people 3 involved in collecting that information, was that 4 information that you got through others in the OPP? 5 A: And going back to my analogies of the 6 spikes -- 7 Q: Yes? 8 A: -- if it wasn't a spike there's a 9 good chance that the information was being provided to me 10 by one (1) of the dossier Officers being either Morris, 11 Whitehead or Keegan. But, there are occasions when I am 12 collecting, but there's -- many of the instances are 13 information being provided to me by those officers. 14 Q: Okay. You've spoke on a number of 15 occasions, and I see both in your binder notes and in 16 your police notes references to warriors and or Mohawk 17 warriors. And we've heard from a variety of people at 18 this Inquiry what they mean when they used that word. 19 And there seems to be some variation. And 20 I wondered if you could give us some assistance about 21 when you use words like, warrior or Mohawk warrior or 22 Mohawk warrior society, what do you mean by that? 23 A: When I use the term, 'warrior', 24 that's a situation where -- or 'Mohawk warrior' that's 25 how it's being conveyed to me by the sources. And that's

234

1 how I copied it in my book. 2 A warrior to me in my definition, is my 3 understanding, is an individual that is willing to put up 4 his life for the cause. 5 Q: You also spoke fairly early on in 6 your evidence in-chief with Ms. Vella about your dealings 7 with the Military and information sharing that went on 8 with the Military. And again, I wanted to ask you a few 9 questions about the scope of that. You talked about, for 10 example, meeting from time to time with Karl Heck and 11 Lloyd Stone. 12 Did have access to information that was 13 being gathered through the Military SIU? 14 A: My conversations with Major Heck and 15 I can't recall the rank of Lloyd Stone, were generally 16 information passing from myself to them regarding 17 information that we'd attained relate -- relating to the 18 Base because Insp -- or Major Heck was more or less the 19 Military Police. 20 Q: Yes? 21 A: So quite often I was providing them 22 with information for their reports. The more -- the 23 intelligence component from DND generally came through 24 Brian East. 25 Q: Okay. And from Brian East or others

235

1 would get information that, for example, had been 2 compiled by the Military from observation post logs or 3 information that had been gathered by the Military Police 4 while they were on patrols? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. And to follow up on that, as 7 well you had given some evidence to Ms. Vella that you 8 had information regarding firearms in the hands of the 9 occupiers in the Base and you had talked about a number 10 of sources of that. One (1) source I believe you said 11 was you had seen occupiers with guns yourself when you 12 were driving by. 13 Could you -- can you help us understand 14 what you mean by that? 15 A: Just a hunting rifle. 16 Q: Okay. and would that happened on one 17 (1) occasion -- 18 A: It -- 19 Q: -- on more than one (1) occasion? 20 A: Sorry to interrupt, it was one (1) 21 occasion. 22 Q: Okay. And can you give us some idea 23 about when that was? 24 A: No. 25 Q: Okay. You also spoke about receiving

236

1 or hearing about reports of gunfire on the Base. And you 2 gave an example of that, an incident you believed you 3 recalled where there had been I believe you'd said a 4 weapon or weapons pointed at cadets. 5 A: Yes, that was relayed through the 6 Military. 7 Q: Okay. Could you tell us whether or 8 not you heard from the Military that Military Police or 9 others on the Base were hearing automatic weapons fire 10 during the period 1993 to 1995? 11 A: Yes, I believe there was information 12 to that effect. 13 Q: Can you tell us whether from the 14 information you got you understood hearing weapons fire 15 from the occupiers on the Base was a frequent or usual 16 occurrence between 1993 and 1995? 17 A: From the information we were 18 receiving it would have -- it -- it's difficult to -- to 19 -- but it was regular, it wasn't an isolated incident. 20 It seemed to be coming across fairly routinely. 21 Q: And that was true for 1993, 1994, and 22 1995? 23 A: I can speak mostly for '93 and '95 24 because as you recall '94 was a real lull as far as the 25 JFO was concerned --

237

1 Q: Yes. 2 A: -- so it was -- I can't really 3 comment as to '94. 4 Q: Did you hear any reports from the 5 Military about the barracks or buildings in the Base 6 being shot at by the occupiers? 7 A: I'd have to go back into documents. 8 I's possible, but I don't have an independent 9 recollection right now. 10 Q: Okay. Did you obtain information 11 from the Military about Military Police or others in the 12 observation post having guns pointed at them? 13 A: I believe I heard information to that 14 effect. 15 Q: Okay. Did you receive information 16 from the Military about Military Police or others on the 17 Base seeing tracer fire or other visual confirmation of 18 automatic weapons? 19 A: I can't recall that. 20 Q: Okay. You also indicated in your 21 evidence in-chief that there were sources from outside 22 the Base or sources within the Base that were not 23 military personnel who also reported the occupiers on the 24 Base having guns. Can you give us any details of that? 25 A: We had information from civilian

238

1 sources that were attending the Base that they had seen - 2 - either seen weapons or that they had information that 3 people were taking weapons into the Base. 4 Q: Okay. And did those weapons include 5 assault-type weapons? 6 A: The information we received ranged 7 pretty much the full scope. 8 Q: Okay. 9 A: As I said earlier that's -- that was 10 the difficulty in that because of our limitations to the 11 collection phase -- 12 Q: Right. 13 A: -- it was very difficult for us to 14 determine the reliability of that information. 15 Q: And I wanted to ask you a couple of 16 questions about that because during the period 1993 to 17 the end of July of 1995 there would have been a number of 18 military personnel in the Base. Did you consider or was 19 it in, sort of, the mind of the OPP that you could check 20 with the people who were living and working there what 21 they were observing? 22 A: Again, during the timeframe that we 23 were most active being May '93, August '93 -- 24 Q: Hmm hmm. 25 A: -- and a good portion of the summer

239

1 of 1995 there was relatively regular contact with the 2 Military. 3 Q: Hmm hmm. 4 A: And our RCMP member, Mike Keegan, as 5 a Federal officer, tended to be the one that would do 6 that contact as he had the most comfort level in dealing 7 with that -- that particular source. 8 1994, again because of the priorities 9 established within the Joint Forces Operation in London, 10 we didn't have the capacity to continue that on such a 11 regular basis. So there was that intelligence gap, per 12 se, from our side in 1994. 13 However, as I said earlier, we were of the 14 understanding that the Base was going to be subject to 15 return upon the environmental assessment being complete. 16 Q: And so it wasn't a priority? 17 A: Exactly. 18 Q: Given the view that what would happen 19 on the Base would eventually end up in negotiation? 20 A: Exactly. 21 Q: Based on your -- the information that 22 you received and that the OPP received from a variety of 23 sources, I take it, between 1993 and 1995 about -- you 24 had said there was significant information about guns 25 consistent throughout the occupation.

240

1 I take it that the statement -- if I could 2 just ask you to turn to -- I have the wrong binder, I'm 3 sorry. If you look at Tab 24... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: ...which is the London JFO Project 8 Maple document, I believe, that you put together as 9 Inquiry Document 2004786. And it is -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1663. 11 MS. KAREN JONES: Thank you. I was just 12 going to say that, Mr. Commissioner. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. KAREN JONES: 15 Q: If you look at page 23 of that 16 document, you indicate there that: 17 "An alarming amount of information was 18 received regarding the flow of firearms 19 into the occupied area. 20 Unfortunately, investigators were not 21 able to refute or deny this 22 information. However, given the number 23 of sources, one would have to believe 24 the occupiers were in possession of a 25 number of illegal firearms."

241

1 And I take it you stand by that today? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: You talked a bit about the kind of 4 weight or the considerations that you would take into 5 account when looking at the reliability of information. 6 And do I take from what you said that, for example, 7 direct observations of Military Police or people who were 8 in occupation in the Army Base between 1993 and 1995, 9 those kinds of observations would be one that you would 10 likely be apt to give weight to and consider reliable? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And then I just had a few questions 13 to ask you about the outsiders, because I understood from 14 your evidence that as of, I believe it was August 12th of 15 1995, you had information that outsiders such as Isaac 16 Doxtator or Buck Doxtator, Les Jewel and Russell Jewel 17 were at the Base. 18 And I saw in your binder notes, which are 19 at Tab 6, and specifically at page 18, it's Exhibit 1641, 20 that on the to do list was to profile those three (3) 21 persons. 22 A: It's redacted in my copy but -- 23 Q: I'm sorry? 24 A: Sorry. It's redacted in my copy. 25 Q: Oh. Was -- as -- can I ask you this

242

1 then. As of around August the 12th, 1995, was that in 2 your mind as something that should be done? 3 A: As occupiers of the Base, that would 4 have been something that would be done. 5 Q: Pardon me? 6 A: If they were occupiers on the Base, 7 they would be profiled. 8 Q: Okay. And am I right in taking that 9 the gathering of information didn't really happen until 10 early September of 1995? 11 A: Gathering of -- 12 Q: On the outsiders who were staying at 13 the Army Base? 14 A: No, the information with regards to 15 the profiles was an ongoing mechanism. So as Officers 16 were attending the area they would recognize that. And I 17 believe the Jewels would have been on the radar before 18 that. 19 Q: Okay. And in terms of Buck Doxtator, 20 we heard evidence from George Speck on March 22 of this 21 year, and this was at page 120, that there was both 22 Military and OPP intelligence that he was a gun runner. 23 Is that information that you had access 24 to? 25 A: I was aware of Buck's criminal

243

1 activity. 2 Q: Okay. And we also have in the 3 Commission -- the Commission's document database, and 4 this is Inquiry Document 1010158. And I can pass you up 5 a copy of it. And I have one for the Commissioner. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: And this is a notice that, as I 10 understand, was circulated to north and south Lambton 11 Members, to keep an eye out for Buck Doxtator. Are you 12 familiar with the information that's contained on the 13 second page of that -- that is information, it says: 14 "CFB Ipperwash information"? 15 A: If I could just take a moment? 16 Q: Absolutely. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: Okay. I -- I don't -- my 21 recollection, having regard for the nature of this 22 information -- 23 Q: I'm sorry? 24 A: Having regard for the nature of this 25 information --

244

1 Q: Yes? 2 A: -- I would believe that we would be 3 in possession of it. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: But I don't believe I have a notation 6 relating to it. 7 Q: Specifically? 8 A: Specific. 9 Q: Okay. Can I ask you, based on the 10 information that you had as of the summer and early fall 11 of 1995, whether you similarly considered Buck Doxtator 12 to be extremely -- to be dangerous? 13 A: Based on my knowledge of Buck 14 Doxtator, I considered him to be a dangerous individual. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: Just with relation to this report, if 17 we had circulated this, we would have written it in a 18 fashion that we would have put some reliability factors 19 on it, just to be consistent with my previous evidence. 20 This isn't intelligence, this is 21 information that hasn't been analysed. 22 Q: I understand that and I realize the 23 reason I am showing this to you is I was asking you if it 24 was -- was it similar or the same information as you had? 25 A: It's consistent.

245

1 Q: Okay. And I note that on the front 2 page of the document, which has a picture of Mr. Doxtator 3 and a note saying, "Observation." It says on it: 4 "Information from Military and OPP 5 intelligence is Doxtator is heavily 6 into gun running. He was in 7 Montreal..." 8 And gives some more information. And the 9 question that I had for you about that is: In order for 10 information like that to go out and be disseminated 11 within the OPP, would that be information that in terms 12 of your scale or your rating of intelligence, that it 13 would be confirmed intelligence and reliable? 14 A: Based on the nature of the 15 information and I have -- I believe you asked me if this 16 information was consistent, or something to that effect, 17 with what I had? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: The specifics as to the date and 20 the -- 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: -- nature of the gun running -- 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: -- I don't have a specific notation. 25 Q: Okay.

246

1 A: The -- my comments are somewhat 2 generalized, that there was information indicating that 3 Buck Doxtator was a trafficker of illegal firearms. And 4 certainly his criminal record indicates his, you know, 5 his criminal past, et cetera. 6 With regards to this document and how we 7 would disseminate it in the intelligence world, if -- 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: -- that's your next question? 10 Traditionally -- and I'm more familiar with 2 District 11 than 1 District, and I assume this is 1 District as it's 12 out of Lambton County -- 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: -- this would come out in the form of 15 what we would refer to as a crime alert and would quite 16 often come out in the -- as a result of -- be passed on 17 through the District Intelligence Coordinator. 18 If it came out through Intelligence or the 19 DIC in the area that I'm most familiar with, it would 20 have the reliability factors on it, it would have 21 somewhat of a restriction level. 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: A restriction level would have been 24 unrestricted because we want it to go out to our -- our 25 officers on the road.

247

1 Q: Yes. 2 A: Certainly this type of information is 3 important to be distributed to front line officers for 4 officer safety reasons. So yes, we would have put it 5 out. Yes, we would have had reliability factors on it 6 and it -- 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: -- would have had a restriction 9 level. 10 Q: Okay. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: You had also given some evidence that 15 you had received from Peter Lollar in August of 1995. He 16 had gotten some information from a confidential informant 17 who had attended the Base, I believe on August the 30th, 18 and you had indicated in your evidence that the 19 information was somewhat startling, I believed was your 20 language, because it was inconsistent with all of the 21 other information and your personal experience of seeing 22 a gun in the hands of the occupiers. 23 And you gave a couple of possibilities 24 about why the confidential informant may have indicated 25 that he didn't see guns on that occasion when he was in

248

1 the Base. 2 And I just put to you that, in addition to 3 the possibilities that you outlined in your evidence in 4 chief, that you didn't know or had no information about 5 how long he was at the Base, for over what period of 6 time. 7 A: Excuse me. I believe he was there 8 for the day. 9 Q: For the day. Okay. And did you have 10 any information about which people or how many people he 11 was interacting with? 12 A: From my notes, there's indication of 13 probably a handful of individuals that he spoke of. 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: But I believe he would have had 16 interaction with other people that perhaps he didn't know 17 the identities of. 18 Q: Hmm hmm. And did you have any 19 information about where he went on the Base during that 20 period? 21 A: Yes. And I'll refer to Tab 6 page 21 22 of my notes. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: In that -- my conversations with 25 Detective Sergeant Lollar, he indicated that the Source

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1 had attended at the barracks. As to what barracks, I 2 can't say, but it was -- 3 Q: Right. 4 A: -- one (1) of the -- the structures 5 on the Base. 6 Q: Right. And I would just suggest to 7 you another possibility about why that confidential 8 informant didn't see guns, was he may have been in the 9 wrong place at the wrong time, speaking to the wrong 10 people on the Base to get that information? 11 A: No, certainly, you know, he wasn't in 12 every location of the Base; that's a possibility. 13 Q: Okay. And those are my questions. 14 Thank you very much. 15 A: Thank you. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 17 Ms. Jones. 18 I think Mr. Sulman is next. I think 19 you're before Ms. Panjer. 20 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Good afternoon, Mr. 21 Commissioner. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 23 afternoon. 24 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN:

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1 Q: And good afternoon, Inspector Bell. 2 My name is Doug Sulman and I represent Marcel Beaubien 3 who was the MPP of the area in 1995. 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: And Officer, I really -- I just have 6 a few questions in a very discreet area and I'm hoping 7 you could help me understand that. 8 And it is the document which is entitled, 9 "Chronology of Kettle Point, Stoney Point Reserve 10 Occupation of Camp Ipperwash," and it's Exhibit P-1643. 11 And I don't know how to -- oh, you've got it right in 12 your hand. 13 I was just going to ask you to turn that 14 up. I just -- just want your assistance in 15 understanding. 16 A: Okay. 17 Q: Okay? And you have that? And I -- 18 and I understand that you didn't prepare this document, 19 sir? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: But you've reviewed the document in 22 preparation for your evidence today? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Now, if you could -- if you look at 25 the document, there's an entry on May 21st, and it's May

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1 21st I think, /93 and it's a ten o'clock. 2 Do you have that in front of you, sir? 3 A: Detective Superintendent Wall? 4 Q: That's -- well it says D/ short form 5 for Superintendent Wall, is that the one you have in 6 front of you? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay, and it reads: 9 "Detective Superintendent Wall has 10 meeting with Inspector Carson, 11 Intelligence Section Number 1 District. 12 TSB regarding incident." 13 And that's the end of the quote there. Do 14 you see that? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And just so I understand some of 17 this, what is TSB? 18 A: Technical Support Branch. 19 Q: Right. And the incident that's being 20 referred to, sir, is? 21 A: The occupation of CFB Ipperwash. 22 Q: By certain Native persons? 23 A: By the Stoney Point Group. 24 Q: Thank you, sir. The next reads at 25 that -- at that point reads:

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1 "Information flow established." 2 Do you see that? 3 A: "Intelligence flow." 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Sorry, "Intelligence flow 7 established." Do you know what the intelligence flow was 8 to be? What's meant by that? 9 A: That's for -- that intelligence flow 10 is referring specifically to detachment level 11 intelligence. So I believe that's the intelligence or 12 the information, as we're now referring it to, that's 13 gathered by front line, et cetera. 14 And that's to go through -- and that 15 actually should say, I believe, Detective Staff Sergeant 16 Matthews. So the route is 'A' Division which is 17 equivalent to, I believe at the time, 1 and 2 Districts. 18 Q: Thank you. Now if you go further 19 down at 12:05. 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You've got that in front of you? It 22 reads, I believe it's Chief Superintendent Coles: 23 "Contacted MP Ralph Ferguson regarding 24 incident." 25 Do you see that?

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1 A: Correct. Yes. 2 Q: Okay. And that is again regarding 3 moving onto CFB Ipperwash by Stoney Pointers? 4 A: I'd have to draw that inference based 5 on the title of the document. 6 Q: Okay. But I -- I take it you've 7 reviewed the document and you -- you've taken the 8 opportunity to inform yourself to try to understand the 9 contents. 10 A: I believe everything is associated in 11 this document is relating to this. However, I don't have 12 first hand knowledge of this conversation, so there has 13 to be some level of inference on my part. 14 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Let me suggest 15 to you the purpose of the contact is to inform the Member 16 of Parliament of the Federal Parliament for the area in 17 1993, Ralph Ferguson, of the incident and the OPP's 18 response, correct? 19 A: Again, I can say that it's -- he's 20 referring to the incident. I don't know if he's talking 21 to him about the OPP response or not. 22 Q: Oh. But you're certainly talking to 23 him informing him about the incident? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay, fair enough. And in receiving

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1 such information, I take it's understood by -- by you 2 that the MP would be -- there would be some 3 communications back and forth, or there would be the 4 opportunity for communications? 5 A: I'd agree with that. 6 Q: Okay. And that any information given 7 by Chief Superintendent Coles to the MP, Mr. Ferguson, 8 that that information would then be -- Mr. Ferguson would 9 be in a position to disseminate that information, 10 correct? 11 A: I believe so, although -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't see 13 how he could know that. I'm not sure how this witness 14 could know that. 15 Mr. Sandler, is that what you were going 16 to say? 17 MR. MARK SANDLER: Well this Witness 18 doesn't know anything about this -- this dialogue between 19 the people named. So I don't know how he can assist My 20 Friend, with great respect. 21 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Well, he started to, 22 but I see My Friend's objecting. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't see 24 how he could know that. 25 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Okay.

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1 THE WITNESS: I was going to say, I don't 2 know what protocol is for a Minister. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: 5 Q: Protocol is -- I'm sorry I didn't 6 hear the last word. Protocol is for -- 7 A: Sorry, with a Member of Parliament. 8 Q: Okay. Fair enough. The next entry 9 at 21 May, 1993 at 12:30, which seems to fall in line 10 with what just has gone on. 11 And it says: 12 "Chief Superintendent Coles contacts 13 MPP Ellen McKinnon's office concerning 14 incident." 15 And it appears that just as in the case of 16 the call to Mr. Ferguson, the Federal member, Chief 17 Superintendent Coles has called the local Provincial 18 Member of Parliament, Ms. McKinnon, who is Mr. Beaubien's 19 predecessor, to inform her of the incident, correct? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And while you can't tell me what the 22 position the MPP may be in to disseminate information, 23 from an intelligence perspective, if information is 24 received from the MP or the MPP in this type of 25 situation, I take it you'd agree that any information

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1 received from the MPP or the MP in this situation, is 2 information that can be analysed and evaluated by the 3 intelligence branch? 4 A: Could it be? 5 Q: Could be, and that's all I'm asking. 6 A: If it was provided to us, yes, it 7 could have been. 8 Q: Okay. Good. Those are all my 9 questions on that issue. Thank you sir. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 11 Mr. Sulman. 12 Ms. Panjer...? 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 MS. MELISSA PANJER: Good afternoon. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 18 afternoon. 19 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MELISSA PANJER: 21 Q: Good afternoon. My name is Melissa 22 Panjer and I'm going to be asking you some questions on 23 behalf of Deb Hutton who was the Executive Assistant to 24 the former Premier. 25 The Commission has heard evidence that

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1 other Members of the OPP were aware of research into the 2 question of the title to the Park, and understood that 3 the Province had clear title to the Park. 4 I take it that you also had that 5 understanding? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And Deputy Commissioner John Carson 8 has testified that early in the morning on September 5th 9 he spoke to Chief Tom Bressette and he advised Deputy 10 Commissioner Carson that there was no claim to the Park 11 by the Band or by anyone else. 12 And other Members of the OPP have 13 testified that they were aware of this information by the 14 morning of September 5th. I take it you also would have 15 been aware of that information? 16 A: I wasn't aware of that conversation. 17 But I still was under the opinion that the Province -- 18 the Park was the Provinces'. 19 Q: And were you also aware that the Band 20 did not have a claim to the -- had not initiated a claim 21 to the Park, or anyone else had not initiated a claim to 22 the Park? 23 A: I'm not aware if I knew that 24 information or not. I just knew that the Park was not an 25 issue.

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1 Q: Okay. And I'd like to ask you a few 2 questions about the planning meeting on September 1st, 3 which is Tab 4 in the book of documents and it's P-421. 4 Actually, before you turn to that, I'd 5 like you to turn to your notes of the meeting, which is 6 P-1641, Tab 6, page 24. 7 And I just wanted to draw your attention 8 to your notes: 9 "Occupation, MNR asked to leave, obtain 10 Court injunction. OPP contain while 11 obtaining injunction. Keep people in 12 and out. Perimeter contain." 13 And I just wanted to confirm that by the 14 conclusion of the meeting, you understood that the OPP 15 plan was to contain and try to negotiate, and then in the 16 interim the OPP wanted MNR to seek and obtain and 17 injunction? 18 A: From my understanding, the MNR was 19 going to obtain an injunction, and that the rest of your 20 statement is correct. 21 Q: And if you turn to the minutes, P- 22 421, on the fourth page there's a reference in -- about 23 two-thirds (2/3's) down the page in the middle of the 24 paragraph: 25 "The reason for containing is we are

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1 trying to stop any additional people 2 coming into the Park." 3 And also on the second page from the back 4 again near the bottom, about (2/3's) two-thirds down: 5 "The Natives will be using women and 6 children. Sees threat from outsiders 7 trying to get into the Park. 8 JOHN: This is the main concern for our 9 perimeter. The whole reason for the 10 cordon is to maintain the amount of 11 people in the Park." 12 And I wanted to -- to ask you if you 13 understood that the reason for this perimeter was to 14 maintain the amount of people in the Park and to prevent 15 the occup -- outsiders from joining the occupation? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And you've already testified that 18 your primary function was to seek intelligence 19 information about the presence of outsiders at the Park 20 or at the Camp and also at the Park. And because the 21 effect -- there was a concern about the effect that they 22 might have on the occupation? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And the minutes of the planning 25 meeting on page 4 also refer to obtaining an injunction

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1 within twenty-four (24) hours. And the Commission has 2 heard evidence from a number of police officers who've 3 testified that the plan was to obtain an injunction; that 4 was going to happen quickly and that they wouldn't be 5 there for too long. 6 I take it that you also understood that 7 the injunction would happen quickly? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: And Detective Sergeant Mark Wright 10 has testified that he understood and expected that when 11 the OPP received the injunction order the OPP would 12 enforce the injunction and take back the Park. 13 id you also have that understanding? 14 A: Actually I felt that should there be 15 resistance to the injunction that we would continue to 16 negotiate. 17 Q: Okay. And the Commission has heard 18 evidence that in 1994 the OPP prepared a training package 19 for the OPP officers who were policing the area of West 20 Ipperwash Beach. And the package referred to the concept 21 that the OPP was a neutral entity and would take 22 enforcement action against anyone who breaks the law 23 regardless of race. 24 And a number of officers have also said 25 that they were aware of the concept that in enforcing the

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1 law the OPP doesn't treat anyone different -- differently 2 on the basis of race. 3 And you may not have seen the 1994 package 4 but I take it that in 1995 you were aware of that 5 concept? 6 A: That we don't -- 7 Q: Treat -- 8 A: -- like do -- 9 Q: -- treat anyone differently on the 10 basis of race? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And I'd like to take you to Tab 24 of 13 the documents, P-1663. One (1) moment, please? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And on page 18 of that document. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: Yes? 22 Q: There's a reference: 23 "The Premier left -- consequently the 24 Premier left the negotiation in the 25 hands of the OPP."

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1 The entire sentence is: 2 "Premier Harris recognized the 3 occupation of the Park as an illegal 4 act and would not negotiate with the 5 [First Nations people]" 6 I take it that's what "FNP" stands for? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: "Until they return the Park. 9 Consequently the Premier left the 10 negotiations in the hands of the OPP." 11 And the Commission has heard evidence from 12 Deputy Commissioner Carson that the OPP was trying to 13 open discussions with the occupiers, to try to work 14 through the issue -- issue peacefully so that everyone 15 knew what the other side was doing. 16 And -- but he also said it was not the 17 role of the OPP to enter into discussions to negotiate a 18 potential land claim. 19 I take it that you would agree with that? 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Excuse me. My concern 21 is with the form of the question. There were a lot of 22 assumptions built into the preamble of the question and 23 I'm not sure then asking a question at the end of it is - 24 - is very clear, what is the Witness actually being asked 25 to address.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MS. MELISSA PANJER: 3 Q: Well, I'll break it down. Deputy 4 Commissioner Carson said that the OPP was trying to open 5 discussions with the occupiers so that they could work 6 through the issue peacefully. 7 Do you agree with that? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And he also wanted to -- he said that 10 the OPP was trying to open discussions with the occupiers 11 so that everyone would know what the other side was 12 doing. 13 Do you agree with that? 14 A: That's difficult for me to say 15 because I wasn't privy to the negotiations. 16 Q: Okay. Regardless of whether you 17 agree with that, do you agree that it's not the role of 18 the OPP to enter into discussions to negotiate a 19 potential land claim? 20 A: I don't know if I'm in a position to 21 answer that question. 22 Q: Okay. Do you -- do you see a 23 difference between the OPP entering into discussions to - 24 - to maintain the peace as opposed to entering into 25 substantive negotiations with respect to the land?

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 2 Sandler? 3 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm not sure why these 4 questions are directed to this particular witness. I'm 5 not sure that it's that helpful given what his role was 6 at -- at the time and given the complete non-involvement 7 in these issues, with great respect. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We've heard 9 evidence of that but I'm not sure why you're directing 10 the questions to this Witness. 11 MS. MELISSA PANJER: Because in his -- in 12 his final report, he's written a comment with respect to 13 the Premier leaving negotiations within -- to the hands 14 of the occupiers -- or to the OPP and I'm trying to -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Make a 16 distinction. 17 MS. MELISSA PANJER: -- determine -- yes, 18 to distinct -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What type of 20 negotiations. 21 THE WITNESS: Perhaps, I could comment on 22 the nature of my comments. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think you 24 can comment on it. 25 THE WITNESS: As you can appreciate, or

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1 maybe I didn't explain this properly, in compiling this 2 report you use various sources of information. The 3 information I'm relating with regards to the comments 4 attributed to Premier Harris, are what we would refer to 5 as open source and quite likely come as a result of 6 reading items such as the newspaper. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MS. MELISSA PANJER: 9 Q: Okay, thank you very much. And I 10 have just one (1) more area. On the evening of the 6th, 11 I believe you arrived back at the Detachment at about 12 18:00 hours after you went to look for the OPP Who car 13 with Trevor Richardson. 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And Inspector Carson testified before 16 this Inquiry that when he went off-duty on the evening of 17 September the 6th at approximately 7:20 p.m., he expected 18 that things would be similar to the previous evening and 19 that it was his intention that the OPP maintain the 20 checkpoints, monitor with night vision, and wait for the 21 injunction the next day. 22 And around the time that you arrived back 23 at the Detachment at 18:00 hours and before you would 24 have received any reports from the scene or heard them 25 over the radio, I take it that that was your

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1 understanding of the plan for the evening that the OPP 2 would simply proceed as it had and -- 3 A: Status quo. 4 Q: -- and wait for the injunction? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: Thank you. Those are my questions. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 8 very much, Ms. Panjer. That was a long question, but the 9 witness was able to answer it. Thank you. 10 I think we're up to Ms. -- oh, you're 11 going to jump the que, Mr. Scullion? 12 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I think I am. I'm 13 not sure that we're staying until 7:00 or 8:00 tonight so 14 I thought I would just jump ahead. And it's not a 15 criticism. I'm referring back to Mr. Millar's advice to 16 me earlier this week. 17 18 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 19 Q: Good afternoon, Sergeant. My name's 20 Kevin Scullion. I'm one of the counsel for the Residents 21 of Aazhoodena, you may know better as the Stoney Point 22 Group. 23 You have trouble with your allergies, I 24 have trouble with the microphone. 25 Just following up on the questions asked

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1 of you a couple of minutes ago, regarding this injunction 2 and the enforcement of the injunction. 3 I take it, it was your view in the 4 intelligence branch that this occupation was going to be 5 peaceful in nature? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: Okay. And if an injunction was 8 obtained the enforcement of that injunction would also be 9 peaceful in nature and perhaps subject to further 10 negotiations? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: All right. Of course, I heard this 13 morning your reference to many of my clients as loose 14 cannons and there was some back-pedalling to an extent of 15 what loose cannons actually meant. 16 You -- if I understand your evidence 17 correctly, you were involved in this situation up to 18 about 1998, when you were transferred to another 19 assignment? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: All right. And you were involved 22 from about 1993 to 1998? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: All right. And other than this 25 particular moment in time, September 4th through the 6th,

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1 when the occupation began and a couple of months 2 following when there was some chaotic follow up or 3 aftermath, other than that, it's -- in your view and you 4 hopefully agree with me, that it's been a fairly peaceful 5 occupation of this land? 6 A: I would agree with you. 7 Q: All right. And you'd agree that it 8 is a land claim in nature? 9 A: I would agree with you. 10 Q: All right. And you were aware that 11 it was a land claim in nature from your work in the 12 intelligence branch up to September the 4th and 13 following? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: All right. And I'll just zero in on 16 my questions. They obviously relate to the information 17 that was obtained from a counsellor at Kettle Point the 18 early evening of September the 6th and actions that 19 followed the receipt of that information. 20 You've testified earlier that the first 21 you heard of that information was in a phone call from 22 Constable Dew about 9:15 that evening? 23 A: I believe it was personal contact. 24 Q: Personal contact -- 25 A: I believe so.

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1 Q: It was a discussion with Constable 2 Dew? 3 A: Again and I think I stated that I'm 4 not sure of the nature of the contact. I don't think it 5 was a discussion I think it was sort of a passing -- we 6 were -- I was in the Detachment so it had to take place 7 in the Detachment and I believe Mark was there and it was 8 a quick conversation. 9 Q: Okay. But that's the first you heard 10 of that particular information going through him to the 11 Incident Commander? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: All right. And did I hear you 14 correctly this morning when you indicated that it was 15 only about a week ago that you first learned that the 16 incident was not actually First Nations members or 17 protesters hitting a car with baseball bats but, rather a 18 person throwing a rock at a car? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: All right. And I trust that a week 21 ago you also learned that the person throwing the rock 22 was Stuart George? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Who you knew at the time, from your 25 intelligence work by the nickname of Worm?

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: And you learned about a week ago that 3 the person in the car was Gerald George? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And you were aware at the time, and 6 I'm taking about 1995, that he had a nickname of Booper? 7 A: Booper? 8 Q: Yes? 9 A: I probably did. I knew a lot of the 10 occupiers by nicknames. 11 Q: Right. And he was a counsellor at 12 the Kettle Point and Stoney Point Nation? 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: He's not an occupier. 14 MR. MARK SANDLER: I just want to make it 15 clear to him he's not an occupier. He was a -- 16 THE WITNESS: Sorry, a lot of the people 17 in the area -- I stand corrected. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 20 Q: All right. I didn't get -- I didn't 21 hear your answer and obviously it's a -- 22 A: I said I knew a lot of nicknames of 23 the occupiers and he wasn't an occupier. 24 Q: Right. I was just about to get into 25 that. He was a counsellor with the Kettle Point and

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1 Stoney Point First Nation? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: I've also -- I've gone through your 4 notes and I take it these notes are an accurate 5 reflection of the information you received along the way 6 in '93, '94, '95 relating to the occupation of the Base 7 and then subsequently the occupation of the Park land? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: All right. In here's there's 10 reference, in about August 29, and I can refer to it if 11 that helps, to you being advised of an article written 12 that was critical of the occupation of the Base. 13 Do you recall that being brought to your 14 attention? 15 A: Yes I believe it refers to the 16 article. I don't know if it says it's critical of the 17 Base. I think it draws attention to a newspaper article. 18 Q: Right, it's -- for your assistance 19 it's Tab 5 and your page is -- at the bottom of the page 20 is -- 21 A: This is my notebook? 22 Q: -- 22 of your notebook. Yeah, we're 23 working off a number of books here. 24 A: Tab five twenty-two (522)? 25 Q: It's Exhibit 1641?

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1 A: Yes, at eight o'clock in the morning 2 on the -- the morning of the 28th of August. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: Follow-up reference Ipperwash 5 newspaper article. 6 Q: Right. And you were aware at the 7 time of the rift as I've described it throughout the 8 Inquiry, the rift between views of the Kettle Point and 9 Stony Point First Nation regarding these lands and views 10 that were held by various other people that were 11 occupying the lands, right? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: You were aware that there was a 14 difference of opinion and some were saying do something, 15 others were saying do something else? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Right. And the First Nation itself 18 was saying, Don't occupy the lands, we'll go about it a 19 different way. And the people who were occupying the 20 lands were saying occupation is nine-tenths of the law, 21 right? 22 A: Well, not -- the terminology, I'm not 23 sure of the nine-tenths but I was aware that the Stoney 24 Point occupiers felt they had a lawful right to that 25 land.

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1 Q: Right, that was the approach? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. So you're aware of that 4 rift in the groups and you're also aware that at times 5 there's comments being made back and forth, and I -- 6 again I could take you to examples in your -- your book, 7 but there's examples of comments being made back and 8 forth of one (1) side telling the other side what to do? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. You also have a number of 11 references throughout your notes to comments made by 12 people referring to guns being available and other 13 comments from other people saying there are no guns, 14 correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And your job in the investigative -- 17 in the Intelligence Branch is to not only take that 18 information in but to assess it, authenticate it, 19 corroborate it if possible, and then refer it on if you 20 believe that it is believable; is that fair? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And that's a job you took seriously 23 along the way? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And that's a job that when you

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1 received information like that you set about trying to 2 authenticate that kind of information being received? 3 A: Where possible. 4 Q: Where possible, right. And the way 5 to do that is to seek it from other sources or to bounce 6 it off other sources to see if there's any truth to it? 7 A: There's various mechanisms to 8 corroborate the information. As I said before, with 9 regards to source information take a look at the person's 10 ability to obtain the information that's being provided; 11 to take a look at the person's record in the past; 12 providing information; checking various databases to see 13 if there's any evidence of deceit, any incidents of 14 obstruction of police or law enforcement or justice; take 15 a look at their involvement in the community to see if 16 there's anything that would provide them an opportunity 17 or -- or make them want to take the opportunity to 18 mislead, and things of that nature. 19 Q: Right. Motivations of the people 20 that are providing you with that information? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Right. And the issues of guns or the 23 availability of guns is something that wasn't unique to 24 the September 4th to 6th time period, it was in fact 25 frequently referred to in '93, '94, and '95?

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: Right. We've heard, you probably 3 won't be too surprised, but we've heard from James Irvine 4 who's a member of TRU that they were advised on at least 5 two (2) separate occasions of the availability of 6 weaponry such as a grenade launcher, 30 millimetre, 37 7 millimetre, 40 millimetre, AK-47's, other weapons being 8 smuggled; that wouldn't be surprising to you that that 9 kind of information was out there? 10 A: The level of sophistication of 11 weapons range all over the map so that does not surprise 12 me. 13 Q: Right. And it's not all that 14 surprising with respect to a protest that talk about 15 availability of weapons comes to play; is that fair? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: All right. And the concept of 18 warriors is also something that is in your notes and 19 reflected as issues that arise throughout '93, '94, and 20 '95? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And the concept of warriors in and of 23 itself, I take it for you is not all that concerning, at 24 least not until you do some backup checking; is that 25 fair?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: And you were asked some questions by 3 Ms. Jones on behalf of the OPPA regarding your 4 understanding of what a warrior means? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And I heard -- your explanation was 7 that it was somebody that was willing to give their life 8 for the cause. Do you remember giving that answer? 9 A: Yes, I do. 10 Q: That doesn't -- at least to me, and 11 maybe you can correct me, it doesn't indicate a level of 12 aggression to that person; is that fair? 13 A: That explanation may not. 14 Q: What's your explanation? 15 A: In fact in order to give their life 16 for the cause, that would indicate in -- in my version, 17 that means that they're willing to put their life down 18 and fight to the end. 19 Q: In -- either in an offensive or a 20 defensive situation, correct? 21 A: Exactly. 22 Q: Right. We've heard evidence from a 23 number of witnesses, First Nation and otherwise, in this 24 Inquiry, that the concept of Warrior also includes simply 25 helping Elders, helping families, assisting people and

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1 taking on that kind of a role around First Nations 2 Reserves. 3 Is that something that you are familiar 4 with with respect to the term Warrior? 5 A: No. 6 Q: No. And again, the words "Warrior" 7 when I seen them in your notes are words that you've 8 written as a result of somebody telling you that that's 9 perhaps an issue of concern? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: All right. In your notes you have a 12 couple of references to Warriors before the July 29th 13 takeover of the Barracks. 14 If I could just take you to those 15 references. 16 A: Tab 6? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Just one (1) moment, Mr. 21 Commissioner. I'm just working through the paperwork. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 2 Q: You may be quicker than me with these 3 notes. Page 11 of your Tab 6. 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: There's a reference at 17th of July 6 '95, parts of which are redacted, but left in are the 7 terms "Oneida Warriors" and a notation from you saying 8 "Offering services to Ipperwash". 9 Do you remember receiving a tip like that 10 from some source prior to the 29th of July? 11 A: Yes, on the 17th of July, as 12 indicated, I was paged from a confidential informant who 13 provided that information. 14 Q: All right. And you'd agree with me 15 that there was no presence of Warriors to your knowledge 16 in regards to this takeover of the barracks on July 9 -- 17 29th, 1995? 18 A: I'd have to take -- not -- there's no 19 immediate recollection that there were Warr -- people 20 that were identified as Warriors but I don't have the 21 list with me as to the exact numbers. But I don't have a 22 recollection that there was. 23 Q: All right. I suggest to you that the 24 people involved in that and the names involved that have 25 been bandied about along the way in the Inquiry, are all

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1 people that were occupying the land at that time. 2 Would that be a surprise -- 3 A: That would assist me. Then there 4 weren't any Warriors. 5 Q: All right. I just take that as an 6 example to show that some intelligence is more reliable 7 than others and you have to assess all of the 8 intelligence for -- whether or not it's true or not, 9 right? 10 A: I -- I agree with you. 11 Q: All right. Now you'd indicated to 12 Ms. Jones this afternoon as well that -- and confirmed I 13 guess your evidence from this morning, that you were 14 quite surprised to hear from somebody who said that they 15 did not see any guns at the Camp. 16 Do you remember giving that evidence? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: All right. You'd agree with me that 19 that kind of evidence has been given to you or relayed 20 onto you from other sources a number of times that there 21 were no guns at the Camp. 22 A: It's the same source. 23 Q: It's the same source. Well, I 24 suggest to you that that information came to you from 25 your discussion with J. T. Cousins who you knew as J.

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1 George, at the hospital, the Strathroy Hospital, the 2 night of -- the morning of September the 7th, correct? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: All right. We also have that kind of 5 information from a -- well, referred to in a newspaper 6 article from a person by the name of Jim Moses. 7 Have you heard that name before? 8 A: Yes, I have. 9 Q: And an article was written back in 10 1999, it was quoting Jim Moses as being a confidential 11 informer of the OPP that was inside the Base at about the 12 time of the protest in the Provincial Park and that he 13 never saw a gun in the hands of the protesters. 14 Are you aware of that information from Mr. 15 Moses? 16 A: I can't confirm nor deny that Jim 17 Moses was an informant for the OPP. 18 Q: You'd agree with me that his 19 information, as related in this article, is consistent 20 with the information that came from Officer Lollar to you 21 in that discussion that you had in the summer of 1995? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: Now, would you agree with me that 24 given what you knew going into September the 6th and 25 given what I've told you or that you read a week ago

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1 about a rock being thrown at a cat by Worm against 2 Booper, who had previously written an article criticizing 3 them, that would fall into your category of somebody 4 expressing frustration towards another individual; is 5 that correct? 6 A: I would have issues with information 7 provided by that source. 8 Q: You'd have issues and you'd follow it 9 up to see -- I think your evidence was to see how 10 reliable it was, correct? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: I'd suggest there would be another 13 reason that you'd be doing it, which is to put it into 14 context? 15 A: Perhaps I could review what I would 16 do in this instance. Having regard for the situation of 17 the information provided by Gerald George if I had 18 received that information, having regard for the 19 newspaper article and some of the other information I had 20 regarding his relationship with the Stoney Point 21 occupiers, one would have to think that there could be 22 ulterior motives that he had in providing the 23 information. 24 As such, I would put limited reliability 25 on the information that he was providing. However,

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1 having regard for the amount of other information that 2 was received, I would still pass it on. 3 But I would qualify it with -- I would 4 actually tell the Incident Commander, We're receiving 5 this information from Gerald George, you're aware of his 6 issues, per se, with the Stoney Point occupiers. However 7 I am making you aware of this information because there 8 is a possibility, based on all the other information that 9 we've received, that it could be true. 10 Because it could affect the safety of the 11 Officers and the safety of the community, we have to be 12 aware of it. However, it's extremely difficult to put 13 any strict reliability factors on it, based on his 14 relationship with the occupiers. 15 Q: All right. You'd put certain 16 qualifiers on the information although you'd still pass 17 it along? 18 A: I'd pass it on. 19 Q: All right. Now, you were referred 20 earlier by Ms. Vella to the Connolley report? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Do you remember hearing about that, 23 reading through that. It was at Tab 32 of your booklet. 24 And I'm referring to -- it's page 11 at the bottom of P- 25 483.

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Do you remember being referred to 4 paragraph six? 5 A: Yes, I do. 6 Q: Right. And what appears to be a 7 criticism of the role of intelligence in terms of 8 authenticating the information coming in, you'd agree 9 that this is a criticism from Inspector Connolley of 10 certain information getting its -- making its way along. 11 A: I agree. 12 Q: All right. And you'd agree that one 13 (1) of the primary issues in this case, when you've got 14 two (2) sections, two (2) groups that are arguing not 15 only about the land but how to deal with the land, that 16 this particular issue, where you have one (1) group that 17 may want to discredit the other side, that's something 18 you always need to keep in mind. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Okay. It's almost along the lines of 21 what you referred to earlier with the people recognizing 22 a mole or smelling a rat, and passing along information 23 that's not true but very helpful to their cause? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Right. It's analogous to that kind

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1 of question regarding information? 2 A: Yes. I would like to clarify, 3 however, that I don't believe the criticism, as outlined 4 in point 6, is towards the information that's being 5 received. 6 I believe it's the manner in which the 7 information was being gathered, in that the intelligence 8 process was flawed in that we had too many tentacles 9 passing information on to Inspector Carson, referring to 10 the product as intelligence where, in fact, it was either 11 information or raw data and hadn't been put through the 12 proper intelligence cycle. 13 And I think that's where the criticism 14 lays and that's where the point of authentication comes 15 because it hasn't been evaluated properly. I think that 16 was more of an in-house criticism as the way we were 17 doing business, not as to the way that the information 18 was being received. 19 Q: Right. Well, there's two (2) parts 20 to that criticism, both of which I think come under the 21 term 'loose'. 22 The system was pretty loose up until you 23 tightened it up following the event that occurred 24 September the 6th, correct? 25 A: It had its deficiencies.

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1 Q: It wasn't a traditional method of 2 intelligence gathering, prior to you tightening it up 3 following the incident of September the 6th, correct? 4 A: It wasn't the traditional mode of 5 collecting intelligence, that's correct. 6 Q: Right. There weren't written 7 reports, it was verbal, and I suggest to you it was 8 fairly loose in nature from that perspective; is that 9 fair? 10 A: Yeah, I'll say that's fair. 11 Q: All right. There were also, as a 12 second point, a number of tentacles, as you say, of 13 information coming directly to the Incident Commander 14 that wasn't subject to that screening that would 15 otherwise be available with one (1) collection site? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: All right. That all changed 18 following September the 6th into a much tighter 19 intelligence mode and a way of verifying what turns out 20 to be a lot of information coming in; is that fair? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: All right. You were referred, in 23 your cross-examination again by Ms. Jones, to your report 24 which was at Tab 24. Do you have that before you? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: Page 23. She referred you to the 2 second paragraph of that page about the alarming amount 3 of information that was coming in? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: When I read through your report, if I 6 turn you to the page before, page 22, the bottom 7 paragraph refers to the volatility of the situation 8 created by the shooting of Dudley George. Do you see 9 that reference? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: I trust that your report is in 12 chronological order. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: Without reading the whole report -- 17 Q: Let's stick with those two (2) 18 paragraphs. It's in chronological order. I suggest to 19 you that the alarming amount of information being 20 received is subsequent to the shooting of Dudley George 21 that evening? 22 A: The alarming amount of information we 23 received was from 1993 on through the shooting, and post. 24 Q: Right. You'd agree with me that it 25 wasn't alarming up until the shooting of Dudley George

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1 September the 6th? 2 A: No, I wouldn't agree with you. 3 Q: It wasn't something that you acted 4 upon up until the evening of September the 6th or 5 following the evening of September the 6th? 6 A: You have to realize I'm an 7 intelligence officer. The information was alarming 8 because the amount -- the information was alarming in the 9 fact of the number of people that were telling us that 10 there were weapons there. 11 What was also a problem for us is our lack 12 of ability to substantiate the amount of weapons that 13 were going in, but I did feel it was alarming. 14 Q: No, I appreciate that, but we've gone 15 through other sources that were saying there were no guns 16 at all, and that you had a job of balancing and weighing 17 the information that was coming in. Do you remember 18 discussing that with me? 19 A: In making an analysis, the number of 20 sources that were providing the information regarding 21 weaponry, far outweighed the number of sources that were 22 denying it. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 Q: One (1) moment, Mr. Commissioner. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: It is always preferable to put your 6 finger on the piece of paper I'm looking for. 7 I'm going to suggest to you that it became 8 alarming when you received information from whatever 9 source, that there were a hundred (100) Warriors coming 10 from Oneida and that they were -- they had access to 11 seven (7) to eight hundred (800) AK-47's. 12 And for that reference it's Tab 13 of your 13 materials, which are your intelligence reports. For the 14 Commissioner's reference, at the top corner, the top left 15 corner it's 2200836, small letters, which is referred to 16 as an intelligence report prepared by you on the 7th of 17 September '95. 18 A: Okay, 19 Q: It's about page 8 of that tab. 20 A: Can you just give me the time, 21 please. It's easier. 22 Q: Tab 13. 23 A: Yeah. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 Q: Yeah. It's confirmed it's eight (8) 2 pages in. I have an extra copy -- 3 A: I've got it. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: I was just asking the time there that 6 was on the document, 16:00 hours. 7 Q: Oh, with respect to the report. 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: All right. But you have it in front 10 of you? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And that's a report that you filled 13 out, that you're receiving information that a hundred 14 (100) Warriors, fifty (50) additional Natives will be 15 travelling to Ipperwash tonight from Six Nations, 16 Walpole, Oneida and Muncey. 17 Most will be carrying AK-47s and 18 information there's five hundred (500) to eight hundred 19 (800) AK-47's available on Oneida. 20 I suggest to you at this point in time, 21 when you received information of this nature, from 22 whatever direction, that's when it becomes alarming and 23 something to make a note of. 24 A: Again, I don't want to disagree with 25 you, but I have to. The problem is, you're looking at

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1 this one specific incident. The amount of firearms were 2 alarming to me prior to September 6th. The amount of 3 information we were receiving with regards to weapons, 4 was consistent. 5 The level of sophistication, we were going 6 from hunting rifles to AK-47's. Certainly the 7 information you're referring to on the 7th of September 8 is alarming. 9 But I can't trivialize the information we 10 were receiving prior to that. That, in fact, was 11 alarming as well. And what was further alarming, if we 12 want to continue if that word, is our inability to put a 13 firm reliability factor on that. 14 And I've addressed that in previous 15 comments, is that it would have been very beneficial if 16 we'd had the proper prioritization. The proper -- proper 17 collection phase, that we were in a position to properly 18 put up a confirmation factor on that. 19 That's the difficulty. That information 20 you're referring to is different -- definitely alarming. 21 But my level of angst was far before the 7th. It was up 22 into and including the 4th, 5th and 6th, because there 23 was far too much information coming in on firearms. 24 Q: Okay. I'm trying to get a handle on 25 what's alarming to you in the intelligence end of things.

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1 If we're looking at the afternoon and early evening of 2 September the 6th as business as usual, what, in your 3 mind, is alarming? 4 What is on the Base or reports of what's 5 on the Base and in the Park, or what's available by way 6 of access to weapons? 7 A: It's alarming to the -- as I've 8 stated earlier, we had to be cognisant of it. And my 9 reports to Incident Commander Carson were that we can't 10 get caught up on the level of sophistication of the guns 11 that are being reported in the Base/Park. 12 What we have to be alive to is the fact 13 that there is the possibility for lethal weapons in the 14 Park. And up to and including, I believe the 5th or 6th, 15 we had the report of automatic gunfire being heard in the 16 Park. 17 We had the report of the butt of the gun 18 being seen by the Officers. So again, they're incidents 19 that are putting guns, weaponry in the Base/Park. We had 20 to be aware of that. Incident Commander Carson was aware 21 of that. 22 So the availability factor is alarming. 23 The fact that the potential for sophisticated weaponry is 24 alarming. The point that you're making on September the 25 7th at 16:00 is alarming.

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1 I think any time that you have people that 2 have the access or availability to weaponry, regardless 3 of the weaponry, having regard for the emotionally 4 charged issues that we were facing at that time, should 5 be alarming to everybody. 6 Q: Okay. And that's information that 7 you're passing along to Inspector Carson as the Incident 8 Commander, correct? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: That given the high level of emotion 11 involved with people who believe firmly in what they're 12 doing, and the potential access to weapons, that that's 13 alarming to you as an intelligence officer in this 14 situation? 15 A: I didn't have to articulate that to 16 Inspector Carson. I put forward to him the information 17 or the intelligence that we had. He knew what the 18 situation was with regards to the devotion and dedication 19 of the occupiers. 20 He can make his own assessment as to 21 what's alarming. 22 Q: I appreciate that, but from the 23 intelligence end of things, you didn't negate that 24 concept of alarming that you had? You didn't disregard 25 that information?

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1 A: No, information regarding weaponry 2 was always passed onto Inspector Carson. 3 Q: All right. You were asked a number 4 of questions by Ms. Jones about Buck Doxtator. You were 5 shown pictures of Buck Doxtator and it was pretty clear 6 from your answers that Buck Doxtator was -- you were not 7 unfamiliar with him; is that fair? 8 A: That's fair. 9 Q: All right. I trust that you weren't 10 in a position and the OPP wasn't in a position, but they 11 were tracking the movement of Buck Doxtator? 12 A: You're correct. 13 Q: Right. Simply his physical presence 14 in any one (1) area wasn't enough to cause concern, it 15 was simply that you were making a note of it; is that 16 fair? 17 A: No. And his physical presence was a 18 flag to us, that is a concern. 19 Q: Anywhere in the Park, in the Base or 20 anywhere else in Ontario? 21 A: Buck Doxtator is a known -- as I 22 said, is a known criminal. He's known to be involved in 23 the illicit movement of firearms and, as such, his 24 presence is of interest to any Intelligence Officer. 25 Q: Okay. Would the same be true of Les

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1 and Russ Jewel? 2 A: Les and Russ Jewel were -- I was not 3 as familiar with them. However, I'll remind you of my 4 position at London JFO, and Mr. Buck Doxtator residing in 5 and around the London area. Certainly I was more 6 familiar with him. 7 Les and Russ Jewel are American citizens. 8 I didn't have the same level of information or 9 intelligence on their activities. 10 Q: Right. I trust that as part of the 11 intelligence branch, it wasn't an assignment for you to 12 research any linkage that either Buck Doxtator or Les and 13 Russ Jewel might have had to any of the people that were 14 occupying the Base? 15 A: Certainly, we were trying to obtain 16 or ascertain linkages with anybody. I don't know if we 17 were able to obtain or to determine if there was a 18 linkage between Les and Russ and Buck Doxtator, or not. 19 But again, that's part of, you know, our role as 20 Intelligence Officers to determine why people are in a 21 certain area, particularly outsiders, why would they be 22 there for a land claim that really isn't -- has no 23 bearing on them. 24 Q: I take it from your answer then that 25 you weren't able to find any linkage of any kind between

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1 Buck Doxtator and anybody on the Base that was occupying 2 the Base, or Russ and Les Jewel with anybody who was 3 occupying the Base? 4 A: We had linkages through our 5 informants that had Buck at meetings with individuals on 6 the occupiers on CFB Ipperwash. 7 Q: Okay. But it didn't go so far as to 8 say he was friends with anybody in particular? 9 A: I don't know if the person was in a 10 position to distinguish friendship or not, but it 11 certainly seemed that they were comfortable in talking to 12 each other. 13 Q: All right. And nobody indicated, at 14 any point in time, to the Intelligence Branch that Buck 15 Doxtator's father had fought oversees with Members of the 16 Stoney Point First Nation? 17 A: No. 18 Q: All right. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: And along the same vein, I trust 23 nobody, at any point in time, indicated to the 24 Intelligence Branch that Russ and Les Jewel were part of 25 the Odawa Grand Council?

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1 A: No. 2 Q: Okay. Or that Wayne Pine came from 3 Cross Village in Michigan which held particular 4 significance for those in the Stoney Point community? 5 A: No. 6 Q: I take it that all comes as a 7 surprise to you, if true? 8 A: If it's true. 9 Q: Okay. One (1) last area. I listened 10 to your evidence, with interest, regarding all of your 11 activity in the Intelligence Branch. And then we got to 12 the evening of September the 6th, and you got in a car 13 and seemed to chase a white car down the road. 14 Can you help me as to why, at that point 15 in time, you become an officer on the ground involved in 16 arresting individuals at the Strathroy Hospital? 17 A: The reason I became involved is I was 18 at the detachment when Trevor was about to leave. As 19 such, there was information that there was a car that had 20 more than one (1) occupant. From an officer safety 21 perspective I attended with Trevor. 22 Q: So you were simply a person that was 23 available to go with Trevor and you hopped in the car? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: All right. You arrive at the

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1 hospital in or about the same time as this white car 2 carrying four (4) individuals, correct? 3 A: Well, in fact, we observed the car 4 travelling into the hospital. We were northbound, they 5 were southbound and we turned and followed them into the 6 hospital. 7 Q: But you got there about the same 8 time, right? 9 A: Basically, yeah. 10 Q: All right. The previous three (3) 11 days, September 4, 5, and 6, you've been analysing your 12 black binder and your book of photographs of those people 13 who are occupying the Base, right? 14 A: I'd been compiling the black binder, 15 yes. 16 Q: Right. You've been looking at these 17 photographs, and I find three (3) -- at least three (3) 18 references to you looking at these photographs with 19 Constable Vince George to identify those people that were 20 occupying the Park, correct? 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 Q: And it wasn't -- it wouldn't be a big 23 surprise to you to see that most of the people occupying 24 the Park were the same that were occupying the Base? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: Right. And those photos you'd 2 compiled over the previous two (2) years, correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: You're familiar with the faces in the 5 photos of those that are occupying the Park and the Base? 6 A: Relatively. 7 Q: Fair so far? 8 A: Relatively familiar. 9 Q: Right. You get out of your car, you 10 walk over to the white car, you see four (4) individuals, 11 all of whom have been occupying the Park or the Base. 12 Did you recognize any of them when you 13 walked up to that car? 14 A: I have to clarify for you, you have 15 to take into regard the circumstances surrounding us 16 attending at the Strathroy Hospital. You have to take 17 into circumstances the adrenalin levels and somewhat a 18 degree of angst having regard for the situation that had 19 just taken place. 20 I did not attend to any part of that 21 vehicle, or pay any specific attention to any part of 22 that vehicle, other than going to the back door and 23 talking to J. George. 24 Q: The -- 25 A: So I was not -- I did not make a

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1 visual, other than the fact that I knew there was a woman 2 leaving the passenger side, I could recognize that. But 3 as to the driver, the other passenger, or to recognize 4 the person in the back of the vehicle, I didn't have 5 enough time to make that observation. 6 I didn't know these individuals on a 7 first-hand basis. For me to make an observation from the 8 pictures at that moment would have been virtually 9 impossible because we're talking fleeting moments. I go 10 to the back, I ask J. to get out the car with me, J. 11 exits the vehicle, we go to the front. 12 I can't even tell you for sure, as I said 13 before, who exactly Trevor went to. I know that 14 everybody was taken care of with regards to driver and 15 the passenger of the vehicle, and I believe that the 16 medical staff tended to the injured party in the back, 17 but other than that, I can't tell you who they were on 18 that night. 19 Q: All right. But you'd agree with me 20 that the concept of fleeting moments is by design, 21 because you were arresting the people as and when they 22 get out of that car? 23 A: Again, I'm going to take you -- 24 clarify a matter. 25 I have my intelligence cap on at this

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1 time. My concern isn't the arrest of these individuals. 2 My concern, and as you can see through my conversations 3 with J., was to develop somewhat of a quick threat 4 assessment as to what was going on at the Park/Base. 5 I wanted to attempt to determine if there 6 was any further threat, if there was anything that we 7 could get from the information provided from J., if there 8 was something else we had to be aware of. 9 Was there a further threat to the 10 citizens? Was there a further threat to the officers, 11 the First Nations et cetera? That's what I was hoping to 12 ascertain. 13 As such, I turned over the arrest. I 14 didn't even have the grounds myself to arrest, they 15 weren't articulated to me, that's why I turned him over 16 to Constable Vanessen to ex -- to carry on with the 17 arrest. 18 Q: Right. You had no idea what they 19 were being arrested for, or at least why they were being 20 arrested. 21 A: No. I did -- I was aware that there 22 was the grounds for -- grounds for the arrest and that 23 those grounds had been articulated to Trevor. 24 And I believe the ground -- their offence 25 was conspiracy -- related to the conspiracy to commit

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1 attempt murder. 2 Q: That's the charge, correct? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Are you saying that you're aware of 5 the grounds that were given to Sergeant Richardson or 6 that you were aware that -- 7 A: What I'm saying -- 8 Q: -- there should have been grounds of 9 some kind given to him to justify the arrest -- 10 A: No, I'm aware -- I'm aware that 11 Trevor was given the grounds to articulate so the 12 individuals could be arrested. I wasn't given those 13 grounds. 14 Q: Did Trevor Richardson give any of 15 those grounds to you? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. So you're not aware of 18 what the grounds were, if any, for the charges that were 19 going to be laid against these four (4) individuals? 20 A: No, that's why I didn't arrest them. 21 Q: Okay. But you have this J.T. 22 Cousins, also known as J. George, you're speaking to him 23 and you realize that the fellow in the back, who's 24 unconscious, is his uncle, correct? 25 A: Hmm hmm.

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1 Q: Did he ever tell you that the two (2) 2 in the front were brother and sister of the one in the 3 back? 4 A: I think he referred to him as his 5 uncle. And I don't think he referred to the lady as his 6 aunt though. I think he referred to her as -- by her 7 first name. 8 Q: Okay. Was it your impression that 9 they were all related, or could be related, in that car, 10 to the person who's injured in the back seat? 11 A: Well he said that the person in the 12 back was his uncle. 13 Q: Right. And he's related at least to 14 one of the two (2) in the front, correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Looking back on it, do you think it 17 was a little bit harsh to arrest them as they arrive at 18 the hospital, as opposed to allowing them to get them 19 individually in the back seat? 20 A: Oh. I -- I believe I articulated 21 that in my -- Ms. Vella's examination-in-chief, that in 22 retrospect I do believe that appropriate opportunity 23 should have been given for some sort of counselling at 24 the hospital. 25 And as I said at that time, maybe it was a

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1 harsher world, but police have become a lot more 2 sensitive to victims and to people involved in incidents 3 such as this. 4 And I do agree that, having regard for the 5 circumstances, that he should have had an opportunity to 6 talk to somebody. 7 Q: Okay. The adrenalin that you 8 referred to that had built up for you and perhaps 9 effected somewhat your actions at this point in time, is 10 that adrenalin that builds on the car ride over, or is it 11 the result of the night in general. 12 A: It's over the course of the whole 13 evening. 14 Q: And when did it begin to start to 15 increase, this adrenalin, this sense of something 16 occurring? 17 A: Well I -- I think perhaps it peaked 18 when you saw the car coming down the road with the sparks 19 flying. 20 Q: No, I appreciate that. But was there 21 any sense, prior to receiving the tap on the shoulder 22 from Sergeant Richardson that you're going with him, that 23 something had occurred and that you had to do something 24 about it? 25 Was there any sense before that, for you?

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1 A: Well my position there, or reason, as 2 I think I eluded to earlier, the reason I was still at 3 the Detachment was in the event that intelligence 4 function was required. 5 Q: Okay. Those are all my questions, 6 thank you. 7 A: Thank you. 8 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Thank you, Mr. 9 Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 11 Mr. Scullion. 12 Ms. Esmonde...? 13 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Good afternoon. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 15 afternoon. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 18 Q: Good afternoon. My name is Jackie 19 Esmonde. I'm going to be asking you some questions on 20 behalf of the Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 21 Now, I was interested to begin with your 22 testimony yesterday about the different dossiers within 23 the JFO in London. And you had listed several different 24 categories, including motorcycle gangs, traditional 25 organized crime and -- and there is, in fact, a dossier

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1 for First Nations organized crime. 2 A: Organized crime with the First 3 Nations -- excuse me, organized crime within the First 4 Nation community. 5 Q: Right. And you also told us that a 6 file was opened with respect to CFB Ipperwash at the time 7 that the Stoney Pointers first moved onto the Base on May 8 6th of 1993. 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: So do I understand you correctly then 11 that the precipitating factor to opening a file within 12 the First Nations -- organized crime within First Nation 13 dossier was the reclamation of the CFB Ipperwash land? 14 A: Yeah and I think I -- we didn't see 15 the occupation of CFB Ipperwash as an organized crime 16 activity. However, within the First Nations dossier 17 that's more or less the title associated to it. 18 So there is no linkage between organized 19 crime and the occupation of CFB Ipperwash. 20 Q: Of course, because the reclamation of 21 traditional lands is not organized crime within the sense 22 that you understand it, right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: But, that was primarily the function 25 of the JFO in London was the gathering of intelligence

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1 with respect to organized crime groups? 2 A: Traditionally, yes. 3 Q: And I did want to clarify one (1) 4 other point with respect to information that you had 5 available to you before Stoney Pointers moved into the 6 Park on September 4th, 1995. 7 Now, you had some indication that that may 8 happen after Labour Day, right? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: But, did I understand you correctly 11 that you had no information about why -- what reasons may 12 be motivating the Stoney Pointers to move into the Park, 13 apart from your assumption that they saw it as a 14 continuation of the CFB Ipperwash land? 15 A: I believe -- sorry I believe in the 16 meeting of on or about August the 10th and to be sure I 17 should probably check my notes -- I'm looking in Tab 6. 18 Q: At page 14? 19 A: Yes and I'm looking at page 14, 20 reference the meeting at the RCMP 'O' Division. At the 21 bottom of the page: 22 "Provincial Park - Stoneys may take the 23 Park after Labour Day weekend." 24 So that's not providing the information I 25 was thinking. For some reason I was thinking of

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1 information that was provided indicating that that was 2 scared land. And I'm not -- I can't recall where that is 3 in my notes, if that's pre or post. 4 Q: Okay. For the record you're 5 referring to P-1641. So there may have been some 6 indication that it was considered sacred land but, you 7 didn't have any information I take it that it was 8 believed that there was a burial ground within the Park? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: Now, you've told us a little bit 11 about how you assess the reliability of information. 12 And in general, things that are observed 13 by police officers are considered reliable? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And you've also said that when you're 16 receiving information from a police source you count on 17 them to assess the validity of the information before 18 it's provided to you? 19 A: In most cases. 20 Q: In most cases? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Okay. And when would you not? 23 A: Well, I think I alluded to earlier in 24 circumstances surrounding some Members that were 25 associated to Crime Units, when interpreting information

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1 from confidential informants, I assumed that they had 2 that ability. 3 So I didn't take the steps to confirm it 4 myself. 5 Q: You were asked some questions earlier 6 by Ms. Vella about how you would have responded if you 7 had been advised of two (2) different versions of events, 8 with respect to the damage to the car on the evening of 9 September 6. 10 And I wanted to go to a little bit more of 11 the specifics about what actually occurred that evening. 12 I have here Exhibit P-1115. I have a copy for you and 13 for the Commissioner. 14 And this is a transcript of a -- I believe 15 it's a radio communication from Mark Wright to the 16 Command Post on the evening of September 6, 1995 at 17 approximately 19:54 hours. 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: And I understand you've had a chance 20 to review this transcript, perhaps overnight? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Is that correct? So I'd like to go 23 to what specifically was reported by Acting Detective 24 Sergeant Mark Wright on that evening. 25 According to P-1115 he radioed in:

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1 "We got up to eight (8) individuals at 2 the picnic table area. I assume you 3 know what that is and they're just 4 about on the edge of the road. They've 5 got some bats and stuff in their hand 6 and apparently they damaged some -- an 7 individual's vehicle. So we got some 8 mischief right now. And willful 9 damage. And I talked to them for a 10 while. They weren't sure who I was and 11 it appears to me -- it appears to me 12 they're up to something." 13 And then it goes on. 14 Now, that -- that's not information that 15 was provided to you that evening; is that right? You 16 learned that later, yes? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: And Mark Wright was somebody that 19 you've identified as someone who is second perhaps only 20 to Inspector Carson in terms of his ability to analyse or 21 assess information -- 22 A: Relate -- 23 Q: -- regarding the occupation? 24 A: Relating to this incident, yes. 25 Q: Yes. Now, if -- if this information

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1 -- if this had occurred let's say post September 6th when 2 the new intelligence regimen had been set up where 3 information was to go through -- I can't remember the 4 rank now -- 5 A: Grand Bend. 6 Q: -- Superintendent Hutchinson? 7 A: Filtered up. It would come -- 8 Q: Filtered up through -- 9 A: -- to Grand Bend through the -- the 10 Intelligence Branch members and into Hutchinson. 11 Q: So am I right then that the proper 12 reporting for this information from Acting Detective 13 Sergeant Mark Wright would have been through you or 14 someone in your role and then up through Superintendent 15 Hutchinson? 16 A: How it would have worked is in this 17 event if this had been post September 6th if this was 18 intelligence, Mark would have completed a sheet and put 19 it in the tray, it would have come up through us and then 20 up through to Hutch and then into the Chief. 21 Q: Okay. And assuming that the 22 information provided on the sheet was precisely what I've 23 read to you here -- 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: -- now you would have characterized

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1 that as reliable information? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Because it was coming from Acting 4 Detective Sergeant Mark Wright? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And that you -- you would not have 7 done anything further to follow it up? 8 A: Well, unless I'm missing something 9 here this account appears as though this is what Mark's - 10 - it says it appears to be his observation from this 11 report, so up to eight (8) individuals picnic area -- 12 table. It was -- it's quite possible that it would have 13 gone through without follow-up. Depending on the 14 circumstances there could have been follow-up questions. 15 There could be questions relating to bats 16 and stuff. What do you mean by "stuff"? 17 "They damaged individual's vehicle," there 18 probably -- there would have been questions as to whose 19 vehicle? 20 "I talked to them for a while," there 21 would have been questions as to who they talked to. 22 "It appears -- they're not sure who I 23 was. It appears to me -- it appears to 24 me they're up to something." 25 I'd ask for clarification on that as well

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1 so there's quite a few questions here so having regard 2 for this particular piece of information there would have 3 been a follow-up required. 4 Q: Okay. But there's nothing in the 5 report here, these words that are used to indicate to you 6 that you may need to follow up on whether in fact it was 7 bats that were used to damage the vehicle? 8 A: No, I'd definitely assume that bats 9 had been used. 10 Q: So -- and -- and we have subsequently 11 learned that this information is not entirely accurate 12 and you know that now, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And can I take it you can't be 15 certain that even in the intelligence regimen that was 16 set up post September 6th that that error would have been 17 caught? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And I -- I assume based on -- Ms. 20 Vella showed you earlier today that in fact this -- this 21 erroneous report showed up in your final report -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- your final Ipperwash report. So 24 can we take it from that that in fact you did not follow 25 up on that information that you received about a

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1 civilian's vehicle being damaged by bats? 2 Q: No, in fact it was on that report I 3 relied on a media report -- media release to create that 4 document. 5 Q: That's right. The -- the OPP media 6 release? 7 A: Yes. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Now, in terms of the information you 12 received from I believe it was Detective Constable at the 13 time, Detective Constable Dew? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Now, you told us that you didn't ask 16 him about the source of the information because of 17 concerns about confidentiality of informants; that's 18 right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: But surely, you could have asked him 21 some questions that could have guided you in terms of 22 assessing the reliability of the information, for example 23 you could have asked Detective Constable Dew if he had 24 ever used this individual as a CI before? 25 A: Again, you have to take yourself back

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1 to the reporting relationships at that time. Sorry. You 2 have to take yourself back to the reporting relationships 3 at that time. 4 Mark was an information gatherer or a 5 crime unit person answering to Trevor Richardson. He 6 wasn't reporting to me. He wasn't in my intelligence 7 silo per se. Certainly again and I think I've recognized 8 this as a fault, that I had regard for Mark as a criminal 9 investigator. 10 I knew him to be involved in criminal 11 investigations where search warrant preparation would 12 have been used in the past. And in search warrant 13 preparation generally you're using CI's and assessing 14 CI's. 15 As such, I -- I perhaps falsely believed 16 that Mark would have the necessary skills and abilities 17 to assess the CI information that he had obtained. 18 Q: So I take it from that, you assumed 19 then that the CI was considered reliable by Detective 20 Constable Dew? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And that is why you didn't ask him 23 any questions about the reliability of the source? 24 A: And again, I've having trouble taking 25 myself back to that exact conversation or exchange of

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1 information. But I don't believe this was a conversation 2 where we were sitting down having a coffee. 3 I believe this was a passing -- passing 4 conversation. 5 Q: Do you believe -- look -- turning 6 your mind back to the conversation, was he -- I'm trying 7 to understand your -- what you've just said then. 8 So he -- you don't believe that he was 9 giving you that information because you were there and 10 your role as intelligence? 11 It was just information he was passing 12 along out of interest? 13 A: Correct. And to be quite -- I -- I'm 14 having a real difficult time placing this conversation. 15 And in fact if I didn't have a note, I wouldn't be 16 recalling this conversation. 17 Q: You made a note of it though because 18 it referred to firearms within the Park or the Army Base? 19 A: Exactly. 20 Q: Now a number of factors have been put 21 to you regarding the reliability of Gerald George as an 22 informant in the circumstance. And I'd like to put a few 23 others to you. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: If Gerald George was someone who had

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1 not been used previously as a confidential informant then 2 that would be a factor you'd want to consider in terms of 3 assessing the reliability of the information? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And if you were aware that in fact 6 Gerald George had not been in either the Park or the Army 7 Camp since the occupation began on September 4th, that 8 would be further information with respect to the 9 reliability of his information? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And further that he had in fact had 12 not been in the Park or the -- the Base for some 13 significant period of time prior even to September 4th 14 that would be relevant information as well. 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Now the fact that you were not even 17 aware of Gerald George's name until the last few days, 18 can I take it that you in fact never followed up, never 19 put this information from Detective Constable Dew into 20 the intelligence cycle, it was never subject to that? 21 A: No. 22 Q: And can you tell me why -- why that 23 is? 24 A: Why wasn't it processed? 25 Q: Yes.

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1 A: The -- the information after that 2 night, never went into the reporting system. I don't 3 believe there was an intelligence report generated by 4 anyone. And again, that could be a -- a fault of the 5 process. 6 However I think it's significant to note 7 that my assessment of that information having known all 8 of the negatives, that that information still would have 9 been passed on. 10 I think it's also extremely important to 11 note the role of intelligence in the decision making 12 process for tactical priorities and that it was clear 13 that the Incident Commander Inspector Carson when he was 14 involved, was not going to utilize intelligence for 15 setting his tactical priorities. 16 He was basing his informa -- his -- his 17 tactical priorities based on his knowledge and the 18 relationship he had with local officers, the community 19 and the like. 20 So as to the impact of this information on 21 the incident of September the 6th, I would have the 22 difficulty in placing the amount of information that -- 23 or the amount of weight that appears to have been put on 24 it today. 25 Q: And -- and that's because you don't

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1 believe that Incident Commander Carson would have relied 2 on that information in making tactical decisions? 3 A: Minimally. 4 Q: And if you had information otherwise 5 that in fact that was relied upon, that would cause you 6 concern I assume. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Now is it not the case that in fact, 9 in terms of categorizing this information from Detective 10 Constable Dew that you assigned it to the category of 11 unknown reliability? 12 A: No. What I believe I stated that 13 information -- if you took a look at the circumstances 14 surrounding an informant such as Gerald George you would 15 put it as unknown reliability traditionally. 16 However, given the circumstances and the 17 amount of information that had been provided previously 18 between 1993 and 1995 you would raise that to believed 19 reliability. 20 Because in looking at the evaluation cycle 21 although you certainly can't put much weight on the 22 informant there could be some validity based on the 23 information that's been coming in on weapons previously 24 to this date. 25 Q: But the information that you have

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1 from Detective Constable Dew was that his source told him 2 that he had actually seen these weapons, is that not so? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 A: My notes indicate that the weapons at 7 CFB Ipperwash doesn't say in fact if it was seen or if 8 this is sort of a third party. 9 Q: We have a transcript of a radio 10 transmission at 20 -- or I believe it may be a telephone 11 call actually at 20:34 hours, Inquiry document 1000013, 12 which is a telephone call from Detective Constable Dew to 13 Sergeant Graham? 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: And I'll show you the document so you 16 can verify what I'm saying but, it does -- the transcript 17 does have Detective Constable Dew saying: 18 "I just talked to a fellow down here 19 who's been in and eyeballed some of the 20 weaponry that they have." 21 If you wish to see it, I have a copy I can 22 show you. 23 A: Actually I read it last night. 24 Q: You read that last night, okay. 25 A: And again, that was news to me last

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1 night. That wasn't the way the information was portrayed 2 to me. 3 Q: Now in terms of assessing again the 4 reliability of that information, let's take this piece. 5 I understand your testimony that you don't recall him 6 actually communicating that to you, that Gerald George 7 had told him that he had eyeballed this weaponry? 8 A: What I was -- what I was given was 9 the weapons that were there. 10 Q: Right. But, in terms of -- taking 11 that piece now and including that in your analysis and 12 including the information that in fact Gerald George had 13 not been in the Park or in the Camp for some significant 14 period, would that not again undermine even attaching...? 15 A: I think I've been quite clear that 16 the information provided by Gerald George, if I would 17 have been the receiver of such information I would have 18 put limited weight on it. 19 The only credibility I'm giving it is the 20 fact that it is another piece of the information that has 21 to be analysed regarding the amount of weapons at CFB 22 Ipperwash/Provincial Park. 23 Q: Now, moving ahead to when you left 24 the Forest Detachment with Detective Sergeant Richardson 25 to --

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1 A: Yes -- 2 Q: -- follow the -- to look for the 3 white car. Now you were in plainclothes? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: You were not wearing any tactical 6 gear? 7 A: No. 8 Q: For example, you didn't have a bullet 9 proof vest or a bullet resistant vest on? 10 A: To be quite candid, I'd be surprised 11 if I did. 12 Q: And nor did Detective Sergeant 13 Richardson? 14 A: I'd be surprised if he did. 15 Q: And you weren't accompanied by any 16 other cruisers? 17 A: We were followed in at the hospital 18 by Strathroy Police Service. But, had we not been at 19 that particular location, we would have been by 20 ourselves. 21 Q: Did you have a sidearm? 22 A: I believe so. 23 Q: And your intent was to find the car 24 and try to pull it over to help to provide first aid, is 25 that correct?

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1 A: That would be the first level of 2 response. 3 Q: So I take it then it wasn't a major 4 concern for you at that time that the occupants of the 5 vehicle might try to do harm to you or the Detective 6 Sergeant Richardson? 7 A: No. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Now, you testified that you believed 12 the charge for the arrest -- sorry -- that the charge 13 that would be laid against the occupants of the vehicle 14 was conspiracy to attempt murder? 15 A: Or attempt to commit murder, one (1) 16 or the other. 17 Q: Okay. So you're not certain. And we 18 have heard evidence that the planned charge was attempted 19 murder and I take it you don't disagree with that 20 evidence? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Now when you pulled up in front of 23 the white car at the hospital now, the priority for you 24 when you got of the vehicle was to take charge of the 25 occupants?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And that's the term that you used 3 earlier today was take charge. And by that you mean take 4 physical control of the occupants of the vehicle? 5 A: To remove the --sorry, to remove the 6 occupants from the vehicle in order that the medical 7 personnel could attend to the person in the back of the 8 car. 9 Q: But you also wanted to ensure they 10 didn't flee? 11 A: Certainly. 12 Q: And that was in your mind when you 13 approached the individual you knew as -- you learnt to be 14 J. George? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And the notes of your conversation 17 with him, you made those very shortly after the 18 conversation? 19 A: Yes. Some time between I believe 20 12:15 and 1:25. 21 Q: And though you didn't place him under 22 arrest when you were having your conversation with him, 23 he certainly was detained by you -- 24 A: Yes, he was. 25 Q: -- agree with that, right?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And the other occupants of the 3 vehicle who you now know to be Pierre George and Carolyn 4 George? They -- they were in the process of being 5 arrested while you had this conversation with J. George? 6 A: I believe so. 7 Q: I know you don't remember saying that 8 but that's your understanding, right? 9 A: Well certainly at this time I know 10 they were -- through my preparation and I knew that the 11 occupants, -- the grounds were there for arrest. I just 12 didn't see the arrest being executed. 13 Q: And before you began speaking with J. 14 George or asking him questions, you certainly didn't 15 advise him of his right to speak to counsel before 16 speaking to you? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Or tell him that he had no obligation 19 to make any statement to you? 20 A: No. And I'll go on record now as 21 saying that in hindsight he should have been cautioned. 22 However, again, having regard for the circumstances and 23 at times as you can appreciate I think -- at least I hope 24 you can appreciate after a day and a half, that the 25 collection phase was somewhat difficult.

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1 And this opportunity presented ourselves 2 to conduct what I would assume is a rather quick threat 3 assessment as to the potential for further incidents at 4 the Base/Park. 5 I had my intelligence hat on, I should 6 have had both hats on, the intelligence and police 7 officer in cautioning him appropriately. 8 However, I do not feel that there was any 9 malice on my part. I do not feel that J. felt 10 uncomfortable at the time we were speaking and at any 11 time did he ever indicate that he didn't want to speak. 12 And if he had, we would have ended the conversation. 13 Q: He was fourteen (14) at the time, 14 right? 15 A: I'd have to do the math. 16 Q: Well I believe you have recorded in 17 your -- in your notes, 1980 was the date of birth. 18 A: It's redacted. 19 Q: Oh, I see, okay. And we've heard 20 from -- from him that he was fourteen (14)at the time. 21 So he would have had the right also to have a parent or 22 guardian present while you were questioning him? 23 A: I'm not -- I'm not taking at issue at 24 all the fact that he didn't have his parent or guardian 25 or his caution or anything read to him.

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1 However, as I stated, I was taking a look 2 at the overall assessment, the possibility to obtain 3 information that could lead to preventing further 4 activities at the Base/Park that could effect not only 5 the First Nations community, the local community but 6 officers' safety. 7 Q: And then you told us you handed him 8 over to Constable Vanessen? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And what did you do? Did you ask 11 Constable Vanessen to execute the arrest? How did that 12 happen? 13 A: I turned him over and then after that 14 I believe he would have spoken to Trevor for the grounds. 15 Q: Sorry. Could I -- I didn't 16 understand. 17 A: I turned J. George to Constable 18 Vanessen for the purpose of arrest. And he would have 19 had to have received his grounds from Trevor Richardson. 20 Q: But when you -- when you turned him 21 over to Constable Vanessen, did you say please place him 22 under arrest now? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And you -- you didn't know the 25 grounds for the arrest so you couldn't provide those to

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1 Constable Vanessen? 2 A: That's right. 3 Q: And you're not aware of whether 4 Constable Vanessen had a discussion with Detective 5 Sergeant Richardson prior to that and which he received 6 the grounds for arrest? 7 A: No. He was still detaining J. until 8 they received the grounds. 9 Q: So is it your understanding that 10 Constable Vanessen learned of the grounds from Detective 11 Sergeant Richardson after the arrest was executed? 12 A: No. Prior he would have received the 13 grounds. I assume prior to the arrest. 14 Q: You -- when? 15 A: Between the time -- when I turned him 16 over, I would assume and again I'm assuming, I didn't 17 arrest J. George. I turned him over to Constable 18 Vanessen to execute the arrest. 19 I would assume that he continued the 20 detention until he spoke to Detective Sergeant Richardson 21 and obtained the grounds for arrest at which time he 22 would have formally arrested and -- and done the various 23 cautions. 24 Q: Okay. So you're assuming the best 25 case scenario?

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1 A: Yes. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Now, you -- you aware I take it from 6 the Ipperwash review that there was in fact some question 7 about the legality of the arrests at the Strathroy 8 Hospital? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And have any of your superiors at the 11 OPP ever talked to you about the propriety of those 12 arrests? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And you've never been disciplined for 15 any role you may have played? 16 A: No. 17 Q: I have one (1) final area I'd like to 18 ask you some questions about and that's with respect to 19 Officers Dyke and Whitehead? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Now, Jim Dyke, you've told us he was 22 working in the Intelligence segment of Project Maple over 23 the course of September 4th through 6th? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Though his background was as a

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1 criminal investigator? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And Darryl Whitehead, he was actually 4 from your unit in London, right? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And he was an Intelligence officer? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Now, you've had an opportunity to 9 read the -- the transcript or portions of the transcript 10 of the audio and the comments that they made? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: Were you surprised to see that they 13 had made comments of that nature? 14 A: Extremely. 15 Q: You had never heard them make such 16 comments to you? 17 A: My relationship with Darryl was 18 certainly, you know, I spent a lot more time with Darryl 19 than Jim. Jim, my relationship with Jim was strictly 20 professional and actually I wouldn't -- I've had very 21 little contact with him other than at Crime Unit 22 meetings, et cetera. 23 Whereas Darryl I would consider a -- a 24 personal friend as well as a professional colleague. 25 Certainly I can speak better to Darryl's position than I

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1 can Jim. 2 Having said that I'll flip back to Jim and 3 no -- never in the time that I spent with Jim did I ever 4 see him exhibit behaviour or make comments as though -- 5 as he did on that date. 6 With regards to Darryl again in both a 7 social and a professional setting I never saw him make 8 comments of that nature either. 9 Q: And I'm sure you don't carry yourself 10 as a person who would welcome hearing comments of a 11 racist nature? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: You'd agree with me of course that 14 it's important for those involved in intelligence to 15 approach their job without any bias? 16 A: It's imperative when doing proper 17 analysis. 18 Q: And one (1) of the most serious forms 19 of bias is racism? 20 A: I'd agree. 21 Q: And in the same way you wouldn't want 22 to rely on a confidential informant that had a 23 significant bias about the people they were reporting on. 24 You would have the same concerns about an intelligence 25 officer who was biassed in that way?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: It undermines the credibility of 3 their intelligence functions? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And I take it you'd agree with me 6 that it's important as an intelligence officer who's 7 involved in investigating First Nations communities to be 8 aware of cultural practices and traditional knowledge in 9 those communities? 10 A: Yes, I do agree but as you can -- if 11 you refresh your memory I did identify that as an area 12 that I thought needed improvement. 13 Q: Yes, and I wanted to explore that a 14 little bit further in the -- the last few questions that 15 I have. 16 For example, if it was a customary 17 practice for people from different First Nations or 18 different territories to visit one another that's 19 something that you'd want to consider when you were 20 assessing the information about outsiders at Stoney 21 Point? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And similarly the term or concept of 24 warrior can have a different meaning in different First 25 Nations communities?

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1 A: Possibly. 2 Q: And we've learned in fact that police 3 officers sometimes refer to uniformed personnel as "road 4 warriors," were you aware of that? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And it's important for non police 7 officers to understand how the OPP use that term rather 8 than making assumptions, right? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So it would be similar in terms of 11 understanding how First Nations people use that term? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Now, in terms of training available 14 for intelligence officers like yourself, in 1995 -- I've 15 looked at your CV and I didn't see any reference to 16 training specific to First Nations communities? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Had you -- before September 4th, 19 1995, had you had any such training? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Have you since? 22 A: No. Well -- I'll correct that to a 23 degree. Not specific to First Nations territories. 24 However, I have attended seminars with regards to 25 diversity. One (1) in 2000 and -- within the last two

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1 (2) years I've been at two (2) seminars with regards to 2 diversity training which addressed cultural issues in 3 various communities. 4 Q: Moving to the specific, that being 5 you to the more general in terms of Intelligence 6 Officers, there's no training that you're aware of for 7 Intelligence Officers who are involved in investigating 8 First Nations communities that is -- 9 A: At present? 10 Q: At present? 11 A: I'm not at liberty to answer that 12 question. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: I shouldn't say I'm not at liberty, I 15 just don't know. 16 Q: Okay. What about -- you're not with 17 the London JFO any longer right, you're with the -- 18 A: Biker Force. 19 Q: -- a completely different Unit? 20 A: Yes. 21 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Thank you very much. 22 Those are my questions. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 24 Ms. Esmonde. 25 Now, it's ten after 5:00. I'd like if

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1 possible to finish today but, I'm not sure that we can. 2 Let's see where we are. 3 How long do you think you'll be Mr. 4 George, you estimated ten (10) minutes are you still on-- 5 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: I'll just be a few 6 minutes. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Pardon me? 8 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: I'll just be a few 9 minutes. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. Roy, 11 how long do you estimate? 12 MR. JULIAN ROY: My estimate has not 13 changed. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So your 15 estimate what -- 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: I suggested -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- was 18 thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes? 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yeah, I think I am. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Your 25 estimate was thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes?

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1 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yeah, I think it's still 2 thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes and perhaps forty- 3 five (45) might be -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. Are 5 you alright to continue for awhile? 6 Would you like to continue for awhile and 7 finish or would you like stop now and finish in the 8 morning, it's not much left? 9 THE WITNESS: Having regard for the way I 10 feel Commissioner, I'd prefer to do it in the morning. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You'd prefer 12 to stop now and continue in the morning? I feel the same 13 way so I'm not unhappy with that choice of yours. 14 So I think what we'll do now is adjourn 15 and start tomorrow morning at 9:00. Okay. Fine. Thank 16 you. 17 18 (WITNESS RETIRES) 19 20 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 21 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, June the 8th, at 9:00 22 a.m. 23 24 --- Upon adjourning at 5:11 p.m. 25

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1 2 3 4 Certified Correct 5 6 7 8 ___________________________ 9 Carol Geehan 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25